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PREFACE
At the annual meeting of the Louisiana Historical
Association on March 14, 1986 in Shreveport, Glenn Conrad
and Carl Ekberg presented papers which stirred my interest
in the commandants and captains who exercised authority over
local communities during the French and Spanish periods.
Ekberg's study of colonial Ste. Genevieve suggested that the
extraordinary power and influence of the Valle family might
somehow be connected to the militia captain's office.1
had

noticed

the

many

references

to

"captains"

I

in the

correspondence of French colonial administrators.

While

pursuing the idea that the title involved much more than a
simple, military rank, I discovered that W.J. Eccles had
suggested
captains.2

the

need

for

a

study

of

Canadian

militia

The references to Choctaw Indian captains in

1Carl J. Ekberg, Colonial Ste. Genevieve: An Adventure
on the Mississippi Frontier (Gerald, Missouri: The Patrice
Press, 1985), 340.
2W.J. Eccles, France In America (New York:
Row, 1972), 69, n. 1.
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Harper &

the two volumes of the

Mississippi Provincial Archives

edited by Patricia Galloway beckoned for an explanation.
My archival
Louisiana

Studies

investigation began at the Center
in

Lafayette.

While

reading

for
the

correspondence written in the days following the Natchez
Massacre,

I discovered that colonial officials were

so

overwhelmed by fear of the Indians that they hesitated to
venture out from the city of New Orleans.

Governor Etienne

de Perier insisted that the safety of the colony required
"putting sufficient troops in it to cope with the Indians."
His reference to "officers who state to the Court that they
will manage the Indians by the devotion and friendship" that
the Indians will have for them seemed to indicate that
officers with deeper roots in the colony had a technique for
dealing

with

Indians

that

did

not

rely

completely

on

military force.3
From Lafayette, I traveled to Natchitoches and Austin.
Impressed by the amazing career of Louis Juchereau de St.
Denis, I found evidence to support my contention that the
failure of the French crown to control colonial development

3Mississippj Provincial Archives: French Dominion. 3
vols., ed. Dunbar Rowland and Albert Godfrey Sanders
(Jackson, Miss., 1929-1932; 2 vols., ed. Rowland and
Sanders, rev. and ed. Patricia Kay Galloway (Baton Rouge,
La., 1984), 4:102.
ix

was

not

rooted

in

the

division

commissary and governor.
controls

was,

in

fact,

of

authority

between

The establishment of financial
the

means

used

by

the

royal

government in Versailles to control Canadian officers who
needed the sovereign power of the French king to promote
their

economic

enterprises.

The

career

of

St.

Denis

suggested the possibility that royal sovereignty and royal
control were

in some

sense dependent

on the voluntary

service of colonial officers.
The old Canadian captains emerged at a time when they
exercised a form of royal sovereignty that was undiluted by
the effort to introduce financial controls.

The efforts of

the crown and the Company of the West to control the old
captains failed,

but the work of men such as St. Denis

created a durable and effective organization of frontier
territory that survived during the transfer of sovereignty
from France to Spain and ultimately to the American Federal
Republic.
St.

Denis

intermediary

epitomized

between

the

Indians

ancien
and

capitaine

Europeans

and

as

an

as

an

independent entrepreneur who presented himself as a servant
of the crown.

At the Natchitoches court house and the

Eugene Watson Memorial Library, I learned that a militia
captain could hold many different titles, that the captain's

rank was almost always stated first and followed by the
titles added to it by official appointments.

My perusal of

the Natchez Trace Collection in the Barker Archives at the
University

of

Texas

clearly

revealed

that

the

militia

captain played an important role not only in Ste. Genevieve,
but in all of the frontier posts during the period of
Spanish Dominion.
I had been interested in maritime captains for a long
time.

Admiralty

cases

scattered

through

Council

records prompted me to consult Nicolas Valin's

commentary on the Ordonnance de la marine.

the

Superior

My search for

the roots of the European captain's office led me to Lyons,
Aix-en-Provence,

and

Venice,

but

the

relationship

established between Samuel de Champlain and the Montagnais
sagamores in Canada provided the key for understanding how
the anciens capitaines functioned as masters and mediators
who cleverly forged the links in the chain that connected
the French king to his people in the New World.
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ABSTRACT

The linkage between king and people in the discourse of
the ancien capitaine is based on the dual roles of the
captain as an intermediary representing the people to the
king and as a royal officer commissioned by the king to
exercise

royal

sovereignty.

Maritime

captains,

Indian

chiefs, and French missionaries participated in a discourse
that advanced and nurtured the village leader and post
captains as links between France and New France, between the
king in the old world and his people in the new.

Tracing

the development of the diplomatic language in New France and
observing the old Canadian captains as they extended French
dominion into the Mississippi Valley, shows that the chain
linking the king to his people was strained by the gap that
developed between the interests of the king's service and
the welfare of the colony itself.
The city of Natchitoches planted by Louis Juchereau de
Saint Denis on the border between two empires became the
nucleus of a viable frontier community. The economic failure
of the Company of the West created new opportunities for

xiv

those who were ready to learn and apply the techniques of
the ancien capitaine. and by demonstrating their ability to
control a vast territory with a handful of soldiers, the old
captains attempted to bridge the gap between the king's
interest and the survival of the colony.
The use of words and force by the ancien capitaine
forged the strong link of the chain that tied the people—
families, tribes, and traders— of the captain's post to the
kingdom, confederacy, or federal republic which was best
able to defend and protect his people and supply their
needs.
agent

The ancien capitaine presented himself as the royal
who

could

bring

the

benefits

of

protection

and

material prosperity to the people who accepted him as their
spokesman.
The effective frontier commandant was a royal officer
who commanded the loyalty of the fictive kinship groups
surrounding his post.

The key to Spanish control was the

enlistment of French captains in the service of the Spanish
king.

xv

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The discourse of the ancien capitaine. which was to
become central to the administration of colonial Louisiana
in the eighteenth century, had its roots in medieval Europe
and developed along the banks of American river valleys.

In

Europe and America, the ancien capitaine was the head of an
extended family and a fictive kinship group.
spokesman for his "people".

He served as

When he entered the royal

service he became the personal link in a hierarchy that
reached

from

the

king

of

considered his "children".

France

to

the

subjects

he

If royal service subordinated

the local leader to a higher level of authority, it also
elevated him in his own eyes and those of his people to a
higher level of public service which enhanced his local
prestige and power.

By smoking the calumet with a French

captain, the leader of a tribal band identified himself as
a Frenchman and committed his people to embrace a new French
identity which brought them into the French empire.

1

There

they became children of the French king, the pere de famille
of the French nation.
The language of the ancien capitaine permits us to see
Louisiana as a colony where real conflicting needs and
interests had to be negotiated.

Some historians, such as

Frangois-Xavier Martin and Alcee Fortier, have idealized
Louisiana and failed to place it in the context of global
imperialism.1 The

publication

of

Marcel

Giraud's

1950

article "France and Louisiana in the Eighteenth Century"
called attention to the minuscule importance of Louisiana on
the scale of imperial priorities.

The titles and chapter

titles of Joe Gray Taylor and Mathe Allain,

who

(quite

properly) treat the colony as a peripheral concern of the
French crown suggest that the pendulum has moved too far in
the opposite direction.

These scholars inspired by the

research of Marcel Giraud and Charles Edward O'Neill have
focused on the failure of the French crown to promote and
foster the economic development of Louisiana.

Joe Gray

Taylor subtitled chapter 1 of his bicentennial history of
Louisiana "A Study in Failure." "Not Worth a Straw," the
title of Mathe Allain's recent book on French colonial
policy, replays the same theme.

Donald J. Lemieux's 1978

1Frangois-Xavier Martin, The History of Louisiana from
the Earliest Period (New Orleans:
Gresham, 1882; repr.,
Gretna, La. : Pelican, 1963); Alcee Fortier, A History of
Louisiana. 4 vols. (New York: Goupil, 1904).

article

stressed the marginal position of Louisiana

colonial politics.2

in

My analysis of the discourse of the

ancien capitaine will not restore Louisiana to its position
in the center of Martin and Fortier's universe, but it has
led me to the conclusion that Louisiana was more than a
token in the struggle between European states.
world of

its own with a unique political

It was a

culture that

emerged from the creative interactions of Europeans, native
Americans, and their captains.

Central to this political

culture was the ancien capitaine.
By focusing on cultural development influenced by —
but not dependent upon —

national and imperial power,

Richard White and Daniel Usner have recently explored the
role played by native Americans and African slaves in the
Mississippi Valley.

White's Middle Ground is a village

world of "republicans" and "rebels" who were active players
and not mere "pawns" in the struggle between France and

2Marcel Giraud, "France and Louisiana in the early
Eighteenth Century," Mississippi Valiev Historical Review.
36 (1950): 657-674; Charles Edward O'Neill, Church and State
in French Colonial Louisiana: Policy and Politics to 1732
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Joe Gray Taylor,
Louisiana:
A Bicentennial History (New York:
Norton,
1976); Mathe Allain, "Not Worth a Straw": French Colonial
Policy and the Early Years of Louisiana (Lafayette, La.:
Center for Louisiana Studies, 1988); Donald J. Lemieux, "The
Mississippi Valley, New France, and French Colonial Policy,"
Southern Studies. 17 (1978): 39-57;

England.3

Indians

also played

an active

role

in the

culture characterized by Usner as the "frontier exchange
economy" of the Lower Mississippi Valley.4
In White's terminology,

the ancien capitaine was a

"cultural hybrid" who played an active role in the creative
process of institutional and social development that began
before the arrival of the French and extended far beyond the
waning

of the English,

French,

and Spanish empires

in

America.5 The present study begins by tracing the medieval
and early modern roots of the ancien capitaine.

It then

takes up the story of the ancien capitaine in the village
world of the pays d'en haut: the Great Lakes region where
the French made their portage from the St. Lawrence to the
Mississippi River.

The village world of the pays d'en haut

gave the French captain-traders and their missionary allies
the opportunity to establish their authority over Indian
refugees who needed a means to protect themselves
stronger, hostile tribes.

from

At the same time, Indian leaders

3Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians. Empires,
and Republics in the Great Lakes Region. 1650-1815 (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
4Daniel H. Usner, Jr., Indians. Settlers. & Slaves in
a Frontier Exchange Economy: The Lower Mississippi Valiev
Before 1783 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina
Press, 1992).
5White Middle Ground. 283-284.
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who accepted French sovereignty increased their power over
their followers.
Chapter

4

describes

how

Pierre

Lexnoyne,

Sieur

d'Iberville and his captains used the techniques of the
Indian and maritime captains to create the ancien capitaine
and

establish

French

Mississippi Valley.

territorial

control

in the

Lower

The establishment of the Natchitoches

Post on the border between two empires is the focal point of
the following chapter.

Louis Juchereau de St. Denis, who

managed to make Natchitoches a viable community,
model ancien capitaine.

is the

St. Denis was able to manage the

Indians by commanding their devotion and respect — ■ but only
by presenting himself as the local agent of the wealthy and
powerful French king.
The ultimate economic failure of the Louisiana colony
demonstrates

the

crucial

relationship

between

local

political authority and financial investment by the state in
colonial

administration.

The

ups

and

downs

of

this

relationship are explored further in chapters 6 through 8
which focus on the ongoing struggles between the sword and
the purse in colonial Louisiana between

1723 and 1763.

Whereas the recall of Commandant General Jean Baptiste
Lemoyne, Sieur de Bienville in 1724 after an audit of his
accounts was a victory of the purse over the sword, the
Natchez Massacre of 1729, the death of Commissary-General

Jacques de La Chaise, and the continuing need to control the
Indians, opened the way for Bienville's return only four
years later.

The Louisiana colony, however, only witnessed

further episodes in the conflict between commissaries who
were responsible for distributing supplies to meet the needs
of soldiers and colonists and trade goods for the Indians,
and

commandants

communities

who

tried

to

mediate

as ancien capitaine.

between

the

two

When Governor Pierre

Frangois de Rigaud, marquis de Vaudreuil,

protested the

directive of his superior, Minister of Marine Maurepas, to
restrict the trading activities of the commandants,

his

valiant effort to reconcile royal and colonial interests was
couched

in

the

language

of

the

ancien

capitaine.

Vaudreuil's correspondence reveals his self-image to be that
of an ancien capitaine: the crucial link between the king
and his people.
In the end, of course,

French colonialism failed in

North America, but to talk only about French failure and to
disparage the efforts of the crown to control the colony by
dividing administrative functions,

is to place too much

emphasis on the control exercised over Louisiana by royal
officials in Versailles.

The real defect was a lack of

economic and financial resources that produced a reliance on
the old captains to ensure the loyalty of the Indian tribes.

After the return of Bienville in 1733, the governor was
always in control if he had the loyalty of the old captains.
Vaudreuil was able to ignore the complaints of Michel
de la Rouvilliere and he continued to promote the trading
activities of the old captains.

Commissary General Vincent

de Rochemore gave Governor Louis Billouart,

Chevalier de

Kerlerec a difficult time because he had the support of old
officers such as Pierre Henri D'Erneville.

Kerlerec's

appeal to popular assemblies and militia captains that set
the stage for the leaders of colonial factions to organize
the rebellion of 1768 needs to be understood in terms of the
crucial

role

played

by

the

ancien

capitaine

in

the

administration of colonial Louisiana.
My story ends with the Rebellion of 1768, but in a
concluding chapter I analyze the persistence of the language
used of the ancien capitaine at all levels of colonial
administration to establish and maintain authority over
Indians

and

colonists

alike.

When

refugees

came

to

Louisiana from Acadia in French Canada in 1765, French and
Spanish officers charged with their relocation drew upon
this rich discourse to integrate the new arrivals into the
culture developed by generations of ancien capitaines. When
Alexander O'Reilly arrived to retrieve the Louisiana colony
for the Spanish in 1769, he looked to the Natchitoches Post
as the training ground for his post commanders, appointing

Frenchmen steeped in the tradition of the ancien caoitaine
to command frontier posts in the territory of what was to
become known as the Louisiana Purchase.
This study will reveal the crucial importance of the
captain's office as a link between the king and his people.
It seeks to explain the surprising power and influence of
militia captains in the Mississippi Valley during a period
when European sovereigns decided to forsake their "children"
in the New World.

CHAPTER 2

The European Origins of the Discourse of
the Anciens Capitaines

The term "ancien capitaine" was fashioned by French
colonial administrators and will be used in this study to
describe a leader who demonstrated the ability to use words
and force to mobilize colonial soldiers and Indian allies to
fight

for

the

crowned

European

protection and European goods.

ruler

in

return

for

The linkage between king and

people in the discourse of the ancien capitaine is based on
the

dual

roles

of

the

captain

as

an

intermediary

representing the people to the king and as a royal officer
commissioned by the king to exercise royal sovereignty.

The

cultural keys needed to unlock the written discourse are the
theological model

of the medieval French monarchy,

the

Italian tradition of the capitano del popolo. the historical
experience

of

captains

with

cities

in

Spain,

and

the

development of maritime ordinances in France.
Syndics
Toulouse

and

(or capitouls. as they were called in

several

other

cities)

normally

performed

military service, but the close connection between municipal

10

civic duty and military functions can most clearly be seen
in medieval

Italy.

It was the captain's office which

developed in the cities and along the coasts of Europe that
offered

the

best

possibility

of

integrating

the

many

villages, towns, or cities into the universal res publica.
The process of integration ultimately failed, but the bond
established between the captain and his people on the local
level helped to pave the way for the incorporation of local
areas into the national "cities" that were to become the
territorial states of modern Europe.

The captain as chief

syndic linked himself and his city with the king as head of
the corporate nation.
The relationship of a captain to a company as the head
is related to the body was a legacy of the Middle Ages that
had wide ramifications in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries.
functions

The quarrel over the appropriate distribution of
within

the

Christian

corpus

climaxed

on

the

battlefield between pope and emperor, while Roman law and
Christian theology produced an administrative theory based
on the analogy of the head controlling the members of a
physical body.1 Both Roman law and ecclesiastical doctrine
originally supported the claims of pope and emperor to

1Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The Kino's Two bodies: A Study
in Medieval Political Theology (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1957; Princeton Paperbacks, 1981), 3-6.
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exercise control over the persons of feudal lords and the
legal corporate entities of towns and municipalities.

The

ideal of unity persisted, but the breakdown of imperial and
papal authority in the later Middle Ages put a new emphasis
on local autonomy.

The transition from the medieval res

publica Christiana to a system of sovereign territorial
nation-states overshadowed the dramatic role of maritime
captains in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but
urban and maritime captains played an important role in both
the failure of pope and emperor and the success of the royal
kingdoms in the struggle for control of European territory.
The

high

Middle

Ages,

1000-1250,

unfolded

in

the

chaotic atmosphere of warfare between leagues of cities and
the German emperor.
imperial

and

themselves,

During the ensuing conflict between

anti-imperial

a variety

of

factions
offices

within

burgeoned

the

cities

within

the

diverse systems of municipal administration. The podestas
and captains of the medieval communes performed military and
judicial functions which brought them to the forefront of
municipal politics, and both performed executive functions
during

times

when

they

served

as

heads

of

the

local

community.2

20n the podesta see Lauro Martines, Power and
Imagination:
City-States in Renaissance Italy (New York:
Knopf, 1979; Johns Hopkins Paperback, 1988), 42.

An institutional structure was evolving which would
eventually produce the territorial nation-state as an inter
mediate form of political organization.
Benjamin

of

Tudela,

and

a

German

A Jewish traveler,

chronicler,

Otto

of

Freising, noted the autonomy of the Italian cities3, but
the reality of local government in the later Middle Ages
must be examined within the context of a mentalite that
cherished a hierarchical structure.

The captain's office

served as the linchpin that could either connect the local
community

with

the

medieval

hierarchy,

defend

the

independence of the local unit, or serve as the connecting
link between the local population and a larger political
entity.

An examination of the office and function of the

captain

in the Italian city-republics will

clarify the

connection between the later maritime captain's office and
the local community which are the subjects of this study.
The transformation of the urban captain from mediator
and agent of the people to master of the local community can
be seen in the evolution of Italian city-state government.
In theory, every group or organization occupied a place in
the corporate structure of the European civitas, but the

3Daniel Waley, The Italian Citv-Republics. 3d ed. ,
(London: Longman Group UK Ltd, 1988), 10.
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emperors

were

unable

to

establish

their

sovereign

authority.4 The process of integrating clergy, nobles, and
cities

into

the

larger

European

commonwealth

republicae christianae) ultimately faltered.

(

societas

But while the

attempt of popes and emperors to orchestrate the activities
of the European commonwealth languished, strong families,
guilds,

and

monasteries

actually

achieved

a degree

of

success in their efforts to arrive at a position of harmony
between head and members.

The agents of these medieval

corporate bodies exercised the authority of a pater familias
over their members.5 In essence they were the captains and
their "families” constituted their "companies."
The military captain was the leader of a company of
soldiers, and whenever a diverse group gathered together to
defend a local territory, the headman was often called a
captain.

Consequently, whenever a greater degree of unity

was achieved either in the city or in the countryside, it
was only natural for a larger, more heterogeneous group to
come under the authority of a captain.
the

breakdown

of

authority

was

In a culture where

endemic,

the

captain

maintained order by wielding his sword against external
4See James Bryce, The Holy Roman Empire (New York:
MacMillan, 1904; repr., Schocken Books, 1961), 94-95, 251.
5For example, the abbot of Cluny exercised paternal
authority over the family of the monastery. See Marcel
Pacaut, L'Ordre de Clunv (Paris: Fayard, 1986), 26.
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enemies and performing police functions within the territory
controlled by the corporation which commanded his loyalty
and service.

His "ministerium" on the local level had been

to protect the bishop and the church.6
defense

of

responsible

the

commune

in

succession

depended
to

the

on

In Italy,

the

militia

captains

Consulate,

podesta,

capitano del popolo. and finally to the signoria.

In

medieval Italy a confusing proliferation of titles often
obscures

the

fact

that

vavasors,

captains,

podestas,

constables, and signore often performed similar functions.
Historians of the Italian city-states have identified many
important functional and chronological differences indicated
by the variety of titles.7 Yet, in rural areas, and during
the urban crisis in Italy as the communal form of government
gave way to the siqnoria. the headman in the local community
was quite likely to be officially titled "the captain."
Realizing the importance of the office and function of
a captain during the later Middle Ages makes it easier to
appreciate the connection between the captain and the local
community.

Prior to the rise of the independent communes in

northern Italy, the captains served as great vassals of the
6Walter Ullmann, The Growth of Papal Government in the
Middle Ages:
A Study in the Ideological Relations of
Clerical to Lav Power (New York:
Barnes & Noble, 1962),
129-131.
7Martines, Power and Imagination. 34-110.
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bishop, count, or marquis.

As rural knights they held fiefs

in return for military service, fidelity, and counsel.

The

commune produced its captains, but the authority of the
communal captains was rooted in the urban community and its
body

of

citizens.

In

Italy,

a

city

asserted

its

independence when consuls selected as executives of the
people began to govern the commune as a collegiate body, the
consulate.

When the consulate of the nascent communes began

to displace the bishop as the supreme jurisdictional power
in the cities, new opportunities opened up for men with
military training to organize a defensive force for the
cities.

A man selected to represent a municipal corporation

in the consulate may have functioned as a captain in the
city's militia, or consuls without military experience may
have

brought

effective military

leaders

into

the

city

government.
The background of the consuls and urban captains is
difficult to determine.
city-government were

The men who rose to prominence in

literate laymen.

Some might have

emerged from the propertied, city-based cives described by
Lauro

Martines

element."8

as

the

"thriving

popular

or

plebeian

Daniel Waley indicates that the judges came

from the class of knightly maiores "who had received a

8Ibid., 14.
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training in secular book learning, as opposed to those whose
upbringing had been primarily military or ecclesiastical."9
Otto of Freisung writes that consuls were chosen from among
the captains, vavasors, and commoners.10
origin,

Whatever their

it was the military organization of the people

(popglo) and the need to train citizens for defense of the
city

that

gave

a special prominence to

the

office

of

captain.
If captains were important in rural areas as protectors
of

bishops

and counts,

they were

guardians of the popular commune.
only

one

corporation

among

egually

important

as

Initially, the popolo was

many

within

the

commune.

Eventually, in some cities, the guilds developed an identity
with the popolo.

In Florence a practical distinction was

made between the major guilds which represented the popolo
qrasso and the minor guilds symbolized as the popolo minuto.
Originally, however, the popolo was a "societas uniting the
bodies of regional infantry whose task was to check the
power of the magnates in time of crisis."11

The popolo

always had its captains, and when the capitano del popolo
became the governing authority of a city, his functions were

9Waley, Citv-Republics. 14.
10Ibid., 35.
11Ibid.,131, 134.
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similar to those of a podesta.

Indeed they often came from

the same class of judicially trained knights, and the same
individual who served as podesta in one city might later be
employed as capitano del popolo in another.12
The independent commune consisted of many corporations,
one of which came to be known as the popolani. Its interests
frequently clashed with those of the powerful magnates.

The

leaders of the popolani were usually men of noble birth and
only the wealthy members played an active role
corporation.

in the

The guild masters suspected the poor masses

(popolinq) of cooperating with the powerful magnates against
their corporate interests.13 Clashes between the communal
corporations created a need for effective military and
diplomatic leaders who achieved popularity by wielding words
and force to form alliances and restore stability in the
community.
In some cities formal alliances bound citizens together
with an oath of loyalty.

These mutual assistance pacts came

to be known as consorzeria (consortiums).

For example, in

Bologna an oath of 1196 designated nine captains from among
whom rectors were to be chosen.

These captains along with

other jurors undertook the construction of a tower to be

12Ibid., 135.
13Ibid., 131.

used for their mutual defense.
"swear

a

The sons of these men were

required

to

similar

fifteenth

birthday or at whatever

appropriate by the rectors.

oath"14

before

age might

be

their
deemed

A century and a half later the

statute of a Florentine consorzeria stipulated that, "if it
should so happen that one of us receives any outrage or
offence at the hands of anyone, then each of us is bound to
help defend and revenge him with his own property and
person,

treating

himself..."15

the

quarrel

as

though

it

involved

In 1211 Bologna made an attempt to outlaw

rival associations when it organized the compaanie delle
armi. These consorzeria and compaqnia usually included men
recruited from the quartieri (neighborhoods) of the city,
but occasionally references are made to Lombardi and Toschi
who were not natives.16
In Milan, military organization enabled the patarini to
force archbishop Guido and the nobles to withdraw from the
city in 1057.

The Milanese Pataria was a congregation of

laymen which was organized to reform the clergy.

Two

clerics,

and

Arialdo and Landolfo,

served as preachers

captains in the effort to wrest control of the city from the

14Ibid.. 122.
15Ibid., 123.
16Ibid.. 143-144.

19

archbishop.
temporary.

The

predominance

of

the

patarini

proved

Noble captains and vavasors used armed force to

restore episcopal authority, but the organization continued
to influence urban politics.

The struggle of the patarini

against the archbishop was an early attempt to establish a
commune which can be defined as "a sworn association of free
men collectively holding some public authority."17
Later other northern Italian cities asserted their
independence and established consulates.
of the consulate disintegrated,
families within the city.

When the authority

warfare broke out among

Neighborhoods were then organized

and towers for defense were constructed throughout the city.
At this stage, the consular nobility agreed to vest a chief
magistrate,

the

podesta,

executive

authority,

conflict

and

settle

with

powerful

expecting him
disputes

to

among

judicial

stand
rival

above

and
the

groups.

Eventually, the conflict of interests within the ranks of
the nobility as well as between the ruling factions and also
the community as a whole caused discontented leaders to help
organize the societas populi. At first the popolo developed
as one corporation within the commune.

Each city had

different experiences, but a Genoese chronicler indicates
that the authority of the podesta diminished with the rise

17Martines, Power and Imagination. 16-18.
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of the popolo.18

Perhaps it was dissatisfaction with the

judicial decisions of the podesta that opened the way for
the ascendancy of the capitano del popolo. More likely, it
was the leader who could achieve popularity and win the
respect and loyalty of the masses who became the primary
spokesman for the people.
Many of the smaller groups resembled the popolo, and
when a successful captain managed to gain the loyalty of the
people, he could establish himself as capitano del popolo.
podesta, or signore.

These diverse offices with different

names shared the common function of serving as head over the
members of a corporate society.
constables
included.

who

Another office held by the

commanded mercenary

troops

can

also

be

Occasionally, individuals such as the marquis de

Montferrat

served as

"captain and

'lord'"

of

one

city

(Alessandria in this case) before he captured several other
cities.

Each city agreed to give him the title of captain

or podesta for varied periods of time.19
To some Italians, such as Machiavelli, the triumph of
the signori symbolized, a disaster and the loss of liberty.
The lack of popular virtue brought corruption and tyranny.
Florence and the other communes had freed themselves from

18Waley, Citv-Republics. 43.
19Ibid., 161-162.
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the stranger appointed by the prince to rule, only to choose
another foreigner to rule over them.
they

called

citizens.

him,

could

be

This "captain," as

corrupted

by

the

powerful

"And in the course of the mutations of their

government that system was changed, and a council of eight
citizens was appointed to perform the functions of the
Captain; which only made matters worse."20

An ambitious

citizen such as Cosimo de' Medici could be prevented from
usurpingpower

by a

government which would

"occupy

in

advance of him those ways by which he expects to attain the
rank

he

aims

at." This

could

be

done

by

"adopting

[Cosimo's] plan of favoring the people."21
Machiavelli was beginning to focus on the natural
development of the state as a political community,
Aristotle

had

taught him that liberty and

but

tranquillity

depended on adopting a policy grounded in virtue.

Marsilius

of Padua had defined tranquillity as "the good disposition
of the state for the functioning of its parts."

In his

effort to determine "what the state is in itself, and why;
what

and

howmany are

its primary parts;

what

is the

function appropriate to each part, their causes, and their

20Niccolo Machiavelli, The Discourses on the First Ten
Books of Titus Livius in The Prince and The Discourses (New
York: Modern Library, 1950), 240.
21Ibid., 244.

order

in relation to

crucial

distinction

one another,"22 Marsilius
between

voluntary

and

made

a

involuntary

subjects, which led to the question of whether government
rests on the consent of the governed.23

Machiavelli as a

political theorist and the later kings of France and Spain
influenced by Italian legal and political doctrine were
determined to establish tranquillity with the consent of the
people if possible, or without it if necessary.

Indeed, it

was during the period of dynastic rivalry and civil strife
that the office of captain became the linchpin connecting
kings and provinces.

Aristotle had enumerated five methods

of establishing kingly monarchies. One was to appoint the
ruler "for one determinate function ... such as the leader
ship

of

the

army."

Referring

to

the

appointment

of

Agamemnon as leader of the Greek army, Marsilius recognized
that

in

"modern communities this

office

is called

the

captaincy or constabulary."24
Castile:

Kings and Cities

Outside of Italy, the "captain" was just as deeply
embedded

in

the

local

administrative

structures.

The

22Marsilius of Padua, The Defender of Peace: The
Defensor Pacis. trans. Alan Gewirth (New York: Harper & Row,
1967), 9.
23Ibid., 31.
24Ibid.. 30.

barbarians had their chiefs who established control over
various

parts

of

Europe.

Some

established

sedentary

dynasties which transformed their tribal organization of
clans and families into feudal kingdoms.
became

the

Carolingian

counts

The "knights" who

and grands

seigneurs

of

medieval civilization were originally heads of families
functioning as military leaders.25 The revival of commerce
and

the

advent

of

the

medieval

commune

produced

new,

heterogeneous bodies of citizens who proceeded to elect
their

civic

and

military

leaders.

Meetings

held

in

traditional places within the town produced a local "body
politic", sometimes designated as "la Republica", or "la
Comunidad." This corporate body of citizens represented the
"community

of town and land"26 that transcended

social

origin, political affiliation, and economic status.
Spanish historian Helen Nader

refers

to

Castilian

leaders of municipal corporations as "judge," "sheriff," and
"councilmen.1,27

A town meeting could elect one man or a

team to function as their agent in negotiations with the
25J.F. Verbruggen, The Art of Warfare in Western Europe
During the Middle Ages: From the Eighth Century to 1340.
trans. Sumner Willard and S.C.M. Southern (Amsterdam:
North-Holland, 1977), 65.
26Helen Nader, Liberty in Absolutist Spain:
The
Habsburg Sale of Towns. 1516-1700 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1990), 32-33.
27Ibid.. 35-36.
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king. In peninsular Spain this spokesman could potentially
become a royal captain of the coast, as indicated in the
maritime

ordinances

which

reflect

maritime

practices

developed along the Mediterranean coasts.
The important relationship between kings and medieval
communal captains,
perspective,

so difficult to see from our modern

becomes visible in the context of European

territorial expansion and colonization.

In the medieval

corporate hierarchy the king and captain had protected the
priest by exercising disciplinary terror.

The "ministerium"

of the king to rule the "populus Dei" extended to the local
captain and his "people" as part of corporate "Europa."28
The elusive terminology, the problem of translation,
and the fragmentary character of documentary evidence make
it difficult to see how the theory and practical application
of medieval corporatism fashioned the captain's office as
the key for unlocking the door of territorial expansion and
control.

John Beeler makes virtually no mention of the

captain's office in his Warfare in Feudal Europe. 730-1200.
He refers to kings and counts, and he lists the levels of
nobility

as

ricos

hombres. hidalgos,

and

caballeros.

Mounted commoners increased in number and importance with
the establishment of new towns in conquered territories.

28Ullmann, Papal Government. 106-114, 129-131.
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These non-noble knights who received land grants and "lived
as

nobles"

were

called

caballeros

villanos.29

Beeler

notes that there is a serious lack of information about
medieval military organization,30 but the noble commanders
performed the functions of captains as did the men who
commanded smaller contingents.
In the Middle Ages, the source of authority and control
lay in the body, not the head.
real entity.
structure.

The local corporation was a

It had to assemble and develop an executive
Beeler suggests as much when he concludes that

in Leon and Castile, "the nobles and the free men of the
towns exercised an influence that often overshadowed that of
the monarchy."31

When the executive structure came under

the control of the municipal corporation's agent, —

name,

number,

could

and

title

notwithstanding

—

the

king

negotiate an agreement with that agency which would then
perform the function of a royal captain.

Kings could, of

course, use military force to subjugate the town and country
and

install their own captains,

but the

lack of royal

military and financial resources usually produced alliances
which were mutually advantageous to crown and town.
29John Beeler, Warfare in Feudal Europe. 730-1200
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971), 166-169.
30Ibid., 165.
31Ibid.. 166.
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Helen Nader's analysis of the municipal organization of
Castile and its implantation in the Americas focuses on the
importance of town meetings and municipal councils.

Her

study provides a clear indication of how the captain's
office operated as a bridge between Castilian kings and
their cities.
A popular leader might refuse to obey the governor of a
province, have himself elected as "captain" by the people,
and present himself to the king as the man who could govern
the territory in the name of the king.

This was possible in

Spain

exercised

because

authority

the

"through

Castilian
town

kings

and

city

councils

political
in

an

administrative structure that linked towns directly to the
monarchy but not with each other."32
While describing the Castilian municipality "as the
basic territorial unit of the monarchy", in which "crown and
town formed a single body that flourished or withered as
one,"33 Nader

suggests

that

the

territory

acquired

by

Spain in the New World should be viewed administratively as
a "patchwork quilt of municipalities."34

In Castile the

bond established between a Trastamara king and a village

32Nader, Liberty in Absolutist Spain. 4.
33Ibid., 6, 9.
34Ibid., 41.

often opened the door for the village to liberate itself
from

a

city

upon

which

it

depended.35

In

America,

Hernando Cortes defied the royal governor's instructions by
establishing the new city of Veracruz and extending his
authority over the Indian villages around the new town.

He

bypassed the authority of the governor by having himself
elected as captain.
Cortes

then

recognition.36

With the support of the town council,

petitioned

the

king

directly

for

The authority of a popular assembly,

a

town meeting, thus became the means, first, of defying the
royal governor and then of establishing a bond between the
new city, its dependencies, and the king.
France:

Captains and Crown

In France the relationship between noble lords and
local assemblies developed in a different manner.

The

French kings did not have to undertake a reconquista to
reclaim territory taken by Moslems, but they did have to
subdue powerful vassals to convince them to accept royal
authority and justice.
urban

development

Ecclesiastical organization and

played

an

important

role

establishment of French monarchical sovereignty,

in

the

and in

France, as in Italy and Spain, the captain's office bridged

35Ibid., 71.
36Ibid., 95-97.
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the gap between noble and non-noble, rich and poor, country
and town.

The royal captain offered protection to the local

church and linked the leaders of the local community to the
state.
Medieval historian Joseph R. Strayer defined a kingdom
as "people who recognized a certain royal family as their
royal family, just as a kin-group was composed of people who
recognized the founders of a certain family as their common
ancestors." The kings of France transformed the local urban
and ecclesiastical officials into servants of the crown by
converting captains into provincial governors and then using
intendants

to

impose

royal

financial

controls.

The

historical development of the royal military office which
produced the modern rank of captain was part of a broader
institutional

evolution.

The

conceptual

framework

associated with the "Christian assembly", enhanced by the
categories of Roman Law, grew
passage of time.

more sophisticated with the

Theologians and legal scholars, however,

did not envision the development of the modern state as a
means "of incorporating new territories and new populations"
into

an existing

structure.37

They did,

nevertheless,

37Joseph R. Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the
Modern State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970),
11, 25; See also his "France:
The Holy Land, The Chosen
People, and The Most Christian King," Theordore K. Rabb and
Jerrold E. Siegel, eds., Action and Conviction in Early
Modern Europe:____Essays in Memory of E. H. Harbison
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construct a theological model of the earthly and heavenly
cities which spawned and defined the orders and offices
associated with the genesis of the territorial state.
The
classes.

captain's

office

mediated

between

orders

and

Long before the captains (military leaders) became

royal officers, they performed administrative functions as
clan leaders.

Just as clan and household headship served to

organize and mobilize the people on a tribal level, so, too,
did the captain as the head of his company or corps operate
as an effective means of administrative and social control
in developing the dynastic state of the Medieval period.
In the theological model, the family not only extended
beyond the kinship group of husband, wife, and children, but
the Greek and Roman principle of household administration in
which a master-servant relationship existed between husband
and wife was applied to all

social

and administrative

relationships.

Augustine's principle that the soul should

rule

body was drawn

over

translation

the
of

Aristotle's

century reinforced it.38
(Princeton:

from

Politics

scripture,
in

the

but

the

thirteenth

The intellectually and morally

Princeton University Press, 1969), 3.

38The impact of Aristotle's social theory on European
political discourse has been examined by Otto Brunner, "Das
'Ganze Haus' und die alteuropaische 'Okonomik'", in Neue
Wecre der Verfassunqs- und Sozialqeschichte. 2d ed.
(Gottingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1968), 103-27; In a
recent article David Herlihy explains that authority, not
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superior master had a natural duty to protect and rule over
the servant who performed his or her duties of office as a
member of a lower order of the same body.

Both order and

office must be interpreted as branches of a hierocratic
system fashioned with bonds of personal fidelity.
order

comprised

a

segment

of

the

universal

assembly, and each order had its "captain".

Each

Christian

To assemble and

motivate the "captains" and give them their proper rank
within the "republic" or "monarchy" was a task ultimately
undertaken by the king of France.
The conceptual framework of French political discourse
was based on the ideal of gathering one people under one
ruler, but the concept of sovereignty had to be developed
and redefined before effective, centralized, bureaucratic
control

could

be

exercised.39

The king

performed

the

duties of his office on behalf of the people of France.
Strayer

concludes

that Philip the

Fair

relied more

on

persuasion and propaganda than the use of force in his
exercise of sovereign power.40 J. Russell Major maintains
that Renaissance monarchs "were obeyed when they could get
consanguinity, "was at the core of the ancient concept of
family." "Family," American Historical Review 96 (February,
1991): 2.
39J. Russell Major, Representative Government in Early
Modern France (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 3.
40Strayer, "France," 8.
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the bulk of the population to support their cause."

His

careful examination of the procedures followed in selecting
deputies to attend provincial and general assemblies was
undertaken to support his contention" that there was an
increase in popular participation in government" between
1484 and 1560.41

Yet the monarch did not receive his

authority from the people, and his right to rule depended
more on his claim to superior wisdom due to its divine
origin.
A thread of continuity can be traced in the theological
model of the monarchy.

Starting with Augustine's concept of

the res publica Christiana. the principle that "God shall
rule the man,

and the soul shall rule the body"42 was

extended to any master-servant relationship.
first,

second,

principle.

and

third

estates

was

The ranking of
based

on

this

During the seventeenth century, venal officials

rationalized their resistance to the king's new agents and
claimed that they were safeguarding royal authority at a
time when the "true situation in a disordered state"43 had
41J. Russell Major, Representative Institutions in
Renaissance France. 1421-1559 (Madison:
University of
Wisconsin Press, 1960), 14. Representative Government. 1.
42Augustine, The
Library, 1950), 708.

City

of

God

(New

York:

Modern

43Roland Mousnier, "The Financial Officiers During the
Fronde," in P.J. Coveney, trans. and ed., France in Crisis:
1620-1675 (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1977), 219.
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been masked.

In this

instance,

to defend

the

king's

subjects from unjust exploitation was tantamount to serving
the king.

Yet these same venal officials recognized the

need for governors and intendants who would exercise royal
authority to protect and provide justice for the king's
provincial subjects.

One report noted that the "disorders"

created a situation in which the "people begin to taste the
need for intendants in the provinces, and that by comparing
past times with the present, the wisest of them consider
that a province is without a soul if it is deprived of a
qouverneur or an intendant■"44

At issue between the old

and new agents of the king was not the acceptance or
rejection of royal authority, but rather the protection of
the king's people.
Different assemblies had different officers, but the
king exercised his office by performing his functions on
behalf of the various assemblies that together represented
the French people.
the

people

of

His duty was to serve God by protecting

France.45

In

that

capacity

the

king

functioned both as captain-general and as pere de famille of
the French people.

44Quoted by Mousnier, Ibid.. 220.
45Strayer, Medieval Origins. 56.
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The

assertion

implementation
entailed

the

functions.
organism
between
material

of

of

royal

royal

separation

sovereignty

edicts

in

an

of military

and

effective

expanding

and

realm

administrative

The enlargment of the polis into the corporate
of

the

civil

French kingdom produced

"household"

level

intellectual

and

the

plane.

administration
sovereign

crown

a distinction
on the
on

What Otto Brunner has

a

lower,
higher

called

the

"herrschaftliche Prinzip" provided for the "domination of
the ruler ... in the polis" and the domination of the master
in the household.
the estates.46

The crown was the "organizing soul" of

The function of the king was to provide

justice and protection for the people gathered into his
great household.
Originally

vassals

performed

royal

service

and

established their position in the social and political
hierarchy by "fighting for the king", but the development of
a money economy permitted magistrates and financiers to
acquire

honor

in

the

king's

service.

The

increasing

importance of judicial and financial officers provided an
alternative pathway to honor and glory, but the medieval

46Brunner, "Das 'Ganze Haus'," 112-114. See also Claude
de Seyssel, The Monarchy of France, trans. J.H. Hexter (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1981).
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pattern of local independence was difficult to break.47
Captains and provincial governors resisted the efforts of
intendants to dilute their power by taking

over

their

functions.
Regional
importance

commercial development and the

of

money

revenue

gave

royal

increasing

judicial

and

financial officials the opportunity to use their offices to
build

official

absolutism

fiefdoms.

The

triumph

of

monarchical

in the seventeenth century has obscured the

popular buttresses of the French monarchy that Strayer and
Russell Major have labored to expose.

These historians have

focused on the transformation of a royal dynasty into a
modern state, but the proliferation of venal offices in the
sixteenth century converted public offices
property.

into private

Under Louis XIII and Richelieu,

the king's

council continued its centralizing activities but moved away
from

the

doctrine

of

contractual

government

which

was

ultimately embraced by venal officials.48
47See Roland Mousnier, The Institutions of France Under
the Absolute Monarchy. 1598-1789:
Society and the State,
trans. Brian Pearce (Chicago: University of Chicago Press),
216-221.
48Russell Major maintains that "the emergence of the
bureaucracy did not take place until the late sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries when it proved to be as much a
hindrance as a help in creating a more absolute monarchy."
Representative Government in Early Modern France (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1980), 5. For the role of the king's
council in the process of centralization see James D. Hardy,
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Royal, provincial, and municipal officials were the
agents of their respective corporate bodies.

The process of

subjecting local pens, robes, and swords to the authority of
the king is the story of political centralization.

In a

dynastic state the bonds of kinship, loyalty, and mutual
interest supported the king's authority and enabled the
crown to exercise a degree of control over the various
corporate bodies which constituted the monarchy.

A vassal's

compensation for performing the duties of his office was his
land or fief which produced revenues which would be shared
with the crown only on a contractual basis.

When the pen

and the robe began to produce revenues, it was only natural
that the holders of judicial and financial offices would
begin to create bureaucratic fiefdoms.
duke

or

count

to

captain-general

or

As one moves from
governor

in

the

historical development of the French royal bureaucracy, the
basic function of the captain's office as the significant
link between the king and his people, between the crown and
local corporations, becomes visible.

From this perspective

it can be seen that the commissioners,

later intendants,

were

king's

royal

agents

who

exercised

the

sovereign

Jr., Judicial Politics in the Old Regime; The Parlement of
Paris During the Regency (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State
University Press, 1967), v-vi and Jerry A. Micelle, "The
King's Council in the Old Regime:
An Edict Concerning
Procedure," M.A. Thesis, Louisiana State University, 1967.
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authority by taking over judicial, financial, and police
functions of recalcitrant officeholders without completely
relieving

them

of

their

rights

of

office.49

The

collection of money taxes and establishment of financial
controls

dramatically

transformed the methods

of

royal

service and the exercise of sovereignty, but the incentive
of service as the pathway to honor and higher degrees of
nobility continued to attract both nobles and commoners to
offices.
The

first

important

steps

in

this

process were taken by Philip Augustus.

centuries-long
In 1204,

when

William du Hommet transferred his loyalty from the king-duke
of

Normandy

to the king

of France,

the

separation

of

financial and judicial functions had not yet begun to take
49The hostility of the "traditional" royal fiscal
agents, the tresoriers de France. toward the intendants they
accused of being instruments of the traitants (tax farmers)
during the years before the outbreak of the Fronde was
symptomatic of the rivalry between royal agents who
justified their actions in the provinces by reference to the
interests of the crown and concern for the people they
claimed to represent. See Roland Mousnier, "The Financial
Officiers During the Fronde," 209. By the eighteenth
century, the royal commissioners who had been accused of
destroying the people by exercising extraordinary judicial
authority had become, "within each generality ... the
personal embodiment of the monarch's sovereignty and the
supreme executor of the Crown's will." (Ibid., 204)
By
then, according to Vivian Gruder, they fulfilled their
responsibility for "governing the provinces in the interests
of the Crown and with concern for the people who lived
there." The Roval Provincial Intendants: A Governing Elite
in Eighteenth-Centurv France (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1968), 209.

place within either household.
reign

of Philip Augustus

commander

of

the

centuries of state-

king's

Only gradually after the

did the constable
feudal

army.50

formation in France,

become

the

During

the

the captains-

general, who became provincial governors, used their swords
to protect

the

interest of

local corporations.

Royal

judicial and financial officers administered justice and
collected fees from those local bodies who agreed to accept
royal

justice and contribute monetary resources to the

crown, initially on a contractual basis.

Theoretically, the

head of each corporate assembly was subject first to the
"lord" of the local territory, and through the local lord to
the king.

The duties performed by royal officials within

the local territory represented a division of functions
which derived from the one monarchical office of the king at
the head of la chose publique.

The medieval society of

orders consisted of many different "bodies" —

monasteries,

towns, guilds, universities, confraternities, etc. —
of which was led by a potential "captain."

each

When any local

company was recruited for military service, the company and
its captain could be placed under the command of a captaingeneral or governor by means of royal letters of provision.
50Charles Petit-Dutaillis, The Feudal Monarchy in
France and England;
From the Tenth to the Thirteenth
Century (London: Kegan, Paul: 1936; repr. New York: Harper
Torchbooks, 1964), 161, 164, 235.
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According to letters of provision issued by a municipal
maritime administration in 1318, a council of barons and
prelates exercised control over captains and fleets.60

In

Aristotelian and Augustinian terminology, royal authority
emanated

from

the

soul

in

the

person

of

the

king.61

Consequently, maritime captains submitted to the authority
of the provincial governor as captain-general carried out
the duties of their office.

Whether it was logical or not,

the king's right to rule his kingdom was theoretically
rooted in his ministerium to rule the "populus Dei" as head
of the royal household administration. The cooperation of
popular

municipal

bodies

was

secured

for

the

king

by

captains who were able to lead their companies and guide
their members in the performance of royal service.

The

leadership of the army belonged to men who could effectively
wield a sword in the service of the king, but those who wore
judicial robes, carried the purse, and wielded the pen in
the service of the king were also royal agents who expected
to acquire nobility and bask in the light of royal majesty
as rewards for their work.

60Charles de La Ronciere, Histoire de la Marine
Francaise. 6 vols. (Paris: Plon, 1898-1932), 1:220.
61Aristotle, Politics 1.5.1254; Augustine, City of God.
705-708.
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The captain's office became the primary link between
the French king and his people during the late medieval and
early

modern

produced

the

centuries
liaisons

when
and

cooperation
alliances

that

and

conflict

shaped

and

established the relations between the king and his estates.
The relationship between the king and his counts and dukes
was based on the theological model which recognized the
ultimate authority of the king while actually depending on
the bond of fidelity.

Official rank in the society of

orders depended on the connection established with the
king's council as well as meritorious service.

As soul and

head of la chose publique. the crown directed the lower
members in the provinces.

The office of captain-general or

governor provided a greater degree of centralized control by
giving

royal

authority to

one man who would

rule

the

province according to principles spelled out in his letters
of provision.
official

who

The captain-general was essentially the royal
commanded

all

the

particular

captains

exercising authority over all corporate bodies carrying on
activities in his province.

In effect, the letters gave the

captain-general the duty of bringing all the provincial
corporations under control of the king.
The theological model of the French monarchy acknowl
edged the right of the king to make final judgments, but
provincial military commanders continued to assert their
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prerogatives over administrative officials exercising civil
jurisdiction.

Commissaires directly responsible to the

king's council could be used to report on the activities of
the captain-generals just as the missi dominici had been
dispatched by Charlemagne to superintend the affairs of his
counts.

Nevertheless, the captains-general belonged to a

higher order than the civilian officers because military
service

was

service.
different

traditionally

more

meritorious

than

civil

The governors and intendants did not represent two
social

classes,62 but they did perform

their

functions as members of two different orders during the time
when the medieval society of orders was being transformed by
long-term economic development, and the absolute monarchy
was

attempting

centralized
overlapping

to

bring

control.

the

The

jurisdictions

French

provinces

institutional

and the

under

reality

inclination

of

of

royal

officials toward the creation of bureaucratic fiefdoms meant
that the establishment of effective centralized control
based on payment of salaries through a bureaucratic system
depended on the social, economic, and political changes that
took place in the wakes of the Hundred Year's War, the Wars
of Religion, and the Fronde.

62Gruder, Provincial Intendants. 208.

Richelieu's intendants served as agents of the crown,
but royal sovereignty required a division of administrative
functions.

No matter how the division of authority was

made, no matter whether the royal agency operating in a city
or province was a single individual,
assembly

of

notables,

the

basic

a council,

relationship

or an
between

magistrate and people was the relationship between officer
and corps. The officer performed his duties and received his
benefit from the corps of which he was the executive agency.
Each

executive

agency,

single

or

collective

—

duke,

captain-general, or municipal or provincial council —

was

a little king presiding over its people and exercising royal
jurisdiction over its part of la chose publique.
The city of Toulouse provides an excellent example of
the evolution of local institutions and the acceptance of
royal

authority.

medieval

commune

corporate

The

magistrates

represented

bodies,

forming

a

(

capitouls)

the various
consulate

of

the

districts

and

which

sovereign judicial and legislative authority.
there were

exercised
Originally

twenty-four capitouls who functioned as the

captains or syndics of administrative districts.
number

was

reduced

fifteenth century.

to

eight

at

the

beginning

Their
of

the

During this crucial period of state-

formation in France, the capitouls became the link between
the populace of the city and the French monarchy.

Service
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to the king of France during the Hundred Years War opened
the way for the city to be incorporated into the French
state.

Royal service by officials acting as agents for the

municipality created a bond of loyalty between the king and
the people and their captains.

The process reached a climax

in 1459 when the crown conferred nobility on the consulate
of Toulouse.63
The king acknowledged the noble status of the capitouls
of Toulouse because of their service just as earlier kings
had recognized the nobility of counts and dukes and later
kings

would

intendants.

confer

nobility

on

councillors

serving

as

Length of service and noble birth determined an

individual's status in the social hierarchy, but military
service as a captain of a company opened the door to the
higher orders.64

An appointment as captain-general could

be given to any male regardless of his birth or status, but
when that individual or his descendants became the governor
of a province, the noble status of his family was assured.
As corporate bodies families, companies,

and cities

were linked to the crown when their agents recognized the
authority of the king's agent.

Each region of France had a

63Robert A. Schneider, Public Life in Toulouse. 14631789: From Municipal Republic to Cosmopolitan City (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1989), 14-15.
64La Ronciere, Marine Francaise. 1:513-514.

different history, but according to Robert Harding, the men
first

recognized

as

governors

of

Languedoc,

Dauphine,

Guyenne, Champagne, Lyonnais, Ile-de-France, Normandy, and
Picardy between 1337 and 1504 were "successors to a long
line of captains-general and lieutenants-general who had
[previously] commanded the military forces and maintained
the defenses in the province without the title of governor."
The connection between the captains-general and the people
of a province represented an extension of the officers'
leadership role as captains of the gendarmerie.

As Harding

writes the "men in the companies were . . . personally tied
to their captain, who controlled recruitment and promotion."
The captains of various provincial towns received their
commissions directly from the provincial governor.65
By the sixteenth century, the medieval captains-general
had been given the new title of governor, and between 1515
and

1560,

fifty-one out of fifty-two French provincial

governors were former captains.66

Robert Harding argues

that the provincial governors were intentionally chosen from
the most prestigious provincial

families

"to coopt the

65Robert R. Harding, Anatomy of a Power Elite:
The
Provincial Governors of Early Modern France (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1978), 9, 22, 97.
66I b i d .. 9, 21.
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traditional

local power of the Aristocracy."67

Viewed

from the other direction, however, powerful leaders of local
communities

agreed

to become creatures of

enhance their status in their provinces.

the king to
The governors

appropriated the royal mystique to project what a contem
porary author described as the "image of God and one of his
ministers on earth."

The greater the distance of his post

from Paris, the rarer the visits of the king, the easier it
was for a captain-governor to play the role of a surrogate
king.68
In the early modern period the crown extended royal
sovereignty

by

placing

the

captain-general

within

a

hierarchy in which the governor represented the person of
the king as commandant-general.

The letters of provision

for new governors stipulated that the governor was the
king's personal representative "in all the affairs of the
province."

In that capacity the governor was responsible

for the security, peace, and tranquillity of the subjects
residing in the province.

Each governor was surrounded by

an entourage of fiddles, satellites, and compagnons. These
members of his community were the chiefs of their respective
companies or corporate bodies.

67Ibid., 15.
68I b i d . . 11-13.

Just as the captain's name,
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reputation, and colors had been the "focus of company pride
and morale" in the Middle Ages, the governors served to
mobilize and motivate the local community.

Indeed they

functioned as mediators between the local community and the
royal court.69
It was the captain-general and then the governor of the
province who was ultimately responsible for the order and
tranquillity of his province.

In addition to power, the

office provided opportunities to gain wealth by means of
brokerage

and

the

distribution

of

offices,

but

many

governors borrowed money and incurred tremendous debts in
the

royal

service.

powerful motives.

Honor,

prestige,

and

wealth

were

There were, of course, different concep

tions of honor, but the monarchy used the distribution of
offices to identify honor with royal service.
Honor required the governor above all to maintain his
place, which meant the territory he held for the king.

The

worst thing that could happen to a governor was to lose his
place.70

A governor

could be rewarded for gaining or

holding a place by being installed in a knightly order.
example,

For

in 1469 the order of St. Michel was created to

reward valor and promote loyalty to the king.

69Ibid.. 14-15, 21-22.
70Harding, Provincial Governors. 69-70.

In 1693, the
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order of St. Louis became part of what Harding has termed
the inflation of honors.71
The identification with the royal person and the need
to maintain one's place provide the key for understanding
the survival of local autonomy in an age of absolutism.

On

the one hand, nothing mattered except honor and service to
the king. On the other hand, the interest of the king was
not as important as holding one's place in the service of
the king.

In

1591,

Hurault took note of the extreme

localization of the governors' concerns when he wrote that
once a governor was installed in his office, the place no
longer belonged to the king.72
France:

The Crown and the Sea

Maritime organization was the key to French expansion
overseas.

Coastal cities and fleets had to be brought under

royal control.

During the period of state formation, local

captains and constables came under the authority of the king
and his constable, but coastal cities had their captains who
often either controlled or were responsible to municipal
councils.73

Royal service performed by port cities and

their captains spanned the long period when royal justice
71Ibid. , 81. See also Mousnier, Institutions of France.
232.

72Harding, Provincial Governors. 70-71.
73La Ronciere, Marine Francaise. 2:160.
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and

the

royal

instruments

of

financial
political

administration

developed

centralization.

The

as

coastal

captains were brought together under non-royal captainsgeneral who ultimately bound themselves to the king of
France by an oath of loyalty to the admiral of the fleet who
himself

was

ultimately

linked to the king

by

an

oath

administered by the parlement of Paris.74
Port cities produced substantial revenues during the
Crusades and later during the Hundred Years War.

During

these conflicts the Norman navy came under the control of
the Admiral of France who functioned as a powerful vassal of
the king.

Yet the historical tradition of "Viking equality"

was difficult to overcome.

For a time Norman princes

coveted the title of due des pirates.75

The Norman kings

and dukes had adopted the methods used by the Arabs to bring
the

fleet

under one

chief,

but

after

the

conquest

of

Normandy by Philip Augustus, the medieval French kings had
difficulty establishing harmony between the constable and
the admiral.

Under Louis XI and Charles VIII, unity of

command over the fleets broke down completely.

Command and

control continued to depend primarily on the bond of loyalty
between the king and the admiralty.

74I b i d .. 2:48.
75I b i d .. 1:95,124.

Yet at the dawn of the
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sixteenth century, the French king had to reckon not with
one but with four different admiralties.76
Armed merchant fleets faced the perpetual threat of
Mediterranean pirates.

Royal funds were used to build

fleets and ports during wartime.

For example,

Louis IX

promoted the development of Aigues-Mortes in preparation for
his famous crusades.

The keenest example of the linkage

between king and captain in France occurred when the "ancien
capitaine du peuple de Genes" agreed to enter French royal
service to develop and govern the new port in return for
half the revenue.77

The Levant continued to have its own

admiral until Provence and Languedoc were joined to the
French crown.

The letters of provision issued to Rene of

Savoie in February, 1515, specified that, as "governor and
lieutenant general over land and sea in the county of
Provence", he would exercise sovereign jurisdiction over the
admiralty.
rights

in

Provence

Frangois I suppressed the governor's sovereign
judicial
the

right

matters
to

and

exercise

gave

the

judgment

Parlement
in

the

of

last

resort.78

76Ibid., 1:134-137; 2:439-40. Petit-Dutaillis, Feudal
Monarchy. 214-26.
77Ibid.. 1:191.
78I b i d . . 2:448-449.

The admiral of France was a commander in chief of the
French navy in only the broadest sense of the term.
he

commanded

a

coalition

of

forces

periodically even during wartime.

He

that

At best

broke

up

functioned as

a

powerful officer who exercised, in his jurisdiction, as much
control over the administration of justice, the collection
and disbursement of revenue as the king himself.79

All

maritime officials appointed by the king were given the
title of lieutenant to affirm their subordination to the
admiral's authority.80

The powerful garde du clos des

galees du rov. functioning as commissary-general of the
marine, performed many of the same duties that would be
assigned by Colbert to royal naval intendants.81
France:

Louis XIII/ Richelieu, and the Admiralties

By the edict of October 162 6, Richelieu combined in his
person the office of admiral of France and Brittany held by
Charles de Montmorency-Dampville,
Guyenne,

with the admiralty of

and the vice-royalty of New France.

He also

proclaimed his authority over the fleets of Languedoc and
Provence.82

In doing so, Richelieu attempted to establish

79Ibid., 1:400-401; 2:46.
80Ibid.. 1:401.
8•‘•Ibid.. 1:401-02.
82Ibid.. 4:559-61.
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royal control by means of a system in which the admirals'
agents expected to extract value from the sea and share the
proceeds with their commanders just as tax-farmers collected
revenue in the name of the king.83
Even so Richelieu continued to rely on traditional
methods of command and control and on procedures established
in the ordinances and edicts of 1373, 1517, 1544, and 1584
to exercise control over French naval resources.

Local

customs had to be respected to insure the cooperation of
captains

and

municipalities

who

participated

in

royal

activity more as a coalition of forces than as part of a
national

navy.

Even

Richelieu's

intendants was not completely new.
companies whose members
ports,

employment

included captains of ships and

secretaries of the king,

entrepreneurs

to

naval

He formed commercial

treasurers,

echevins and syndics of port cities.
these

of

subordinate

as well as

Richelieu invited
their

"individual

interests to the general interests of the state",84 but
the development of a naval bureaucracy with strict financial
controls did not begin until the reign of Louis XIV.
Richelieu's naval policy actually produced a new form
of feudal structure for France's army and navy, a personal

83Ibid.. 4:558.
84Ibid.. 4:583-85, 503-04.
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hierarchy of civil and military captains serving the king.
As

the

self-proclaimed

grand maitre

de

la

Richelieu continued to depend on personal

navigation.
liaisons

and

alliances to marshal the naval resources of France against
the

enemies

of

the

French

state.

In

his

Testament

Politigue. Richelieu employs an extended metaphor of head
and body to articulate the relationship between the king and
his people that reinforced the traditional role of the
captain in European society.
For Richelieu command and control emanated from the
head of the state whose will was translated into action via
a complex nerve system.

Maritime administration provided

the king with a powerful arm, controlled by the nerves,
which linked the maritime provinces to the head.
when

the

structure

of the human

body was

In an age

becoming

an

important object of scientific interest and when knowledge
of the human nervous system was practically non-existent,
Richelieu

developed

a

crude

analogy

to

explain

the

relationship between the king and his people and the need to
use land and sea power for the tranquillity and welfare of
the state.
In chapter 7 of the Political Testament. Richelieu
articulated the relationship between the state and the royal
household by using the analogy of the human body.

For

Richelieu as for Aristotle, Isidore of Seville, and Claude
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de Seyssel, the state was an enlarged household.
provinces

could not

experience

tranquillity

Cities and
until

they

submitted to royal captains obedient to the king as head.
Each family or city was a microcosm of the universal res
publica ruled by the king as pere de famille.85
As

pere

revitalizing
society.

de

famille the

and reforming

king was

a corrupt

responsible

for

and disintegrated

The reform of the state had to begin with the

reformation of the royal household.

Reason dictated that

the king receive service from and give sustenance to the
estates

whichconsisted of Church,

who marched at the head of the

Nobility, and officers
people.

In order

to

accomplish his task, an effective king needed three things:
good counsel, the authority of Rome, and sea power.86

The

king had to command the faithful service of his officers
who,

in turn,

functioned as the

nerves controlling the

various families or companies which made up the body of the
state.87

85Armand-Jean du Plessis, cardinal de Richelieu,
Testament Politique, ed. Louis Andre, 7th ed. (Paris, 1947),
256-279.
86Ibid.. 401.
87In his memoirs, Richelieu used the word "company" to
refer to the estates of Languedoc. Major, Representative
Government. 555.

A robust body

would respond to the

control of the head.88

initiative

and

In a parallel fashion, the power

of the local prince was necessary for the greatness of kings
and the welfare of their government.89
that

the

ultimate

point of

Richelieu insisted

a prince's

possession of the heart of his subjects.90
runs parallel to the modern

power

was

the

This assertion

theory that the authority ofthe

prince was derived from the community and that the people
were

subjects

deputies.91

of

the

crown

represented

by

their

The difference lies in the intermediary role

of the officier who had to respond to the rational authority
of the head as opposed to the emotional impulses of the
people.

In the provinces and on the sea, the primary link

between the king and his corps was the royal captain-general
or governor.
Richelieu

engaged

in

the

process

of

bringing

recalcitrant provincial officials to the point of responsive
obedience

to

the

king

with

the

ultimate

objective

of

transforming a disordered corps into a tranguil state under

88Richelieu, Testament. 396.
89Ibid., 372.
90Ibid.. 430.
91Major, Representative Government. 183-184.
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the authority and control of the rational king imbued with
divine wisdom.
Loyalty, fidelity, and the determination to place the
interest of the state above private interests were required
of all the king's servants, but those officers motivated by
reason

served

distinction

on

a

higher

level.

between nobles who

battlefield

and

administrative

the

gens

affairs.

made

a

served the king on the

de

The

Richelieu

guerre

king,

destined

who was

for

ultimately

accountable to God, had to seek the counsel and service of
officers who performed their duties with reason, steadiness,
and zeal.

Passion and impatience may have been desirable in

ordinary sailors and soldiers, but administrative officials
had to guard against fickleness and channel the energy of
lower members of the corps for the benefit of the king and
his people.92
Richelieu

endeavored

to

transform

the

material

interests of companies and cities into the land and sea
power of the kingdom of France.

Administrative gens de

guerre functioned as rational links of a hierocratic system
fashioned

with

bonds

of

personal

fidelity.93

As

the

92Richelieu, Testament. 301, 374, 380-382, 396.
93J. Russell Major makes the same point in "The Crown
and the Aristocracy in Renaissance France," American
Historical Review 69 (April 1964): 637-639.

"head” of the state, the king governed and guided the wellordered state.94

As his "arms" royal captains linked the

orders to each other and to the head.
of

captains

to

the

king

Loyalty and obedience

promoted

and

produced

the

rationality and nobility which were the gauge of a tranquil
and healthy body politic.

In his analysis of the power

of the French king on land, Richelieu stressed the need for
"chiefs

worthy

to command."95

The

elimination

of

the

intermediaries between the king and his people was not as
important as rendering them and their companies responsive
to the head of the body.

The same reasoning informed

Richelieu's maritime policy.

Sea captains, their crews, and

ultimately the colonial companies that emerged from the
maritime expansion of the French state extended the power of
the French king into overseas provinces as "arms" of the
state.

Richelieu's plan for challenging Dutch and English

naval superiority was not to finance and build a national
navy from scratch, but rather to bring the merchant fleets
under royal authority and insure that maritime revenues and
expenditures

be

channeled

in

the

national

interest.96

Maritime provinces and port cities made up the lower organs

94Richelieu, Testament. 395.
95Ibid.. 379-388; quotation, 388.
96Richelieu, Testament. 127, 247.
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of the body politic. Concern with private interest on that
level spawned corruption.
would

promote

health.

Obedience and reasonable service
Yet

bringing

urban

maritime

enterprises under royal command and control was no easy
task.
Richelieu's navy disintegrated during the Fronde.

In

1669 Jean Baptiste Colbert, then Louis XIV's controllergeneral, created a new Ministry of Marine and established
financial controls by submitting it to his own ministry.

In

so doing Colbert established a modern naval bureaucracy.
Maintaining control of sea captains was no easy task,
however, as Kenneth Andrews has shown for England, where the
navy developed in similar fashion.97
perennial problem,

and there was a narrow line between

privateering and piracy.
abounded.

Dissension was a

Acts of insolence and factions

Some captains saw their companies split in two,

and it was not uncommon for seamen to set up another master
or elect a new captain.98

While parliamentary sovereignty

blossomed in London and bureaucratic absolutism

bloomed in

Paris, a new form of feudalism persisted at sea.

97Kenneth
Andrews,
Ships.
Money
and
Politics;
Seafaring and Naval Enterprise in the Reign of Charles I
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 3, 13, 75.
98Ibid.. 63-64.
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Maritime Administration

In an important book on the survival of feudalism in
the age of Louis XIV, Eugene Asher has observed that the
concept of duty and obedience to the state . . .
was present in the minds of naval captains and
admiralty lieutenants only insofar as it suited
their personal interests, and then only in direct
proportion to the ability of the central power
and its agents to control their actions."
The naval captains and admiralty lieutenants continued to
resist the efforts of Colbert and his successors in the
Marine Ministry to establish centralized control.
When

Colbert

appointed

the

two-year

old

Count

de

Vermandois as Admiral of France in 1669, he assumed the
functions previously performed by an old-style noble officer
of the crown, presiding over the navy as an independent
corps rooted, grounded, and funded by coastal cities and
provinces.100

The predecessor of the young count was the

Duke of Beaufort who had held Richelieu's title of Grand
Maitre. Louis XIV had reprimanded Beaufort for his failure
to

cooperate

with

the

administrators", but

intendants

Beaufort

and

continued

other
to

"civilian
resist

the

crown's agents. In June, 1669, the duke expelled a royal
commissioner sent to inspect his ships and replaced him with
"Eugene L. Asher, The Resistance to the Maritime
Classes: The Survival of Feudalism in the France of Colbert
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960), 31.
100Ibid., 39.
5:359-360.

See also La Ronciere, Marine Francaise.
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his own appointee.

Less than a month later, Colbert took

advantage of Beaufort's death in battle to suppress the
position

of

Admiral.101

Grand

Master

and

recreate

the

office

of

The appointment of a child as admiral was

actually a subtle means of securing the control of the crown
over the admiralty.

Still, the problem of bringing the

naval captains and admiralty lieutenants under state control
remained to be solved.
The naval captains continued to resist the efforts of
the marine minister to regulate the recruitment and payment
of sailors as well as the provisioning of ships.

When naval

intendants attempted to prevent the profiteering practices
of the commanders, the captains "contended that they were
entitled to a share of the seamen's pay as 'compensation'
for their efforts in the levy."102

In March 1670, Colbert

convinced the king to transfer the provisioning duties of
the captains to Sieur Jacquier as munitioner-general of the
fleet, but captains continued to profit from the sale of
provisions even if they had to intimidate and starve their
crews to do so.103

101Asher, Maritime Classes. 39-41.
102Ibid., 33.
103Ibid., 34.
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Colbert made important changes in maritime administra
tion, but his famous Ordonnance de la Marine of 1681 was
essentially a codification of time-tested principles that
had been used along the coasts of Europe since ancient
times.

The really significant change entailed transferring

control of the French navy from the admiral, who was a
powerful "vassal" commissioned as a royal officer by letters
of provision, to the Ministry of the Marine controlled by
the crown.
The

Ordonnance

de

la

Marine was

based

on

the

development of the legal theory and practical experience of
Europe.

It

represented

a

codification

established in every port of the continent.

of

principles

Source material

for drafting the Ordonnance included the Laws of Rhodes and
Rome,

the

ordinances

of

Charles V and

Philip II, the

judgments of Oleron, the Venetian Consulate, ordinances of
Wisby,

and

regulations

the

Teutonic

drafted

by

Hanse

Cardinal

as

wellas

edicts

Richelieu.104

and

Because

France was now a colonial power, this European tradition was
being applied to French America.

The significance of the

term ancien capitaine and the connection between the French
provincial governors, the old medieval office of captain-

104Rene
Josue
Valin,
Nouveau
Commentaire
sur
1 ' Ordonnance de la Marine, du mo is d'Aout 1681 ... (La
Rochelle, 1766), l:iv-v.
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general, and the capitaines de la c6te of Canada emerges in
the provisions of the maritime ordinances regulating the
appointment and service of coast-guard officers.

Coast

guard captains and other officers referred to in the Marine
Ordinance were called captains-general, majors and aidesmajor, or coast guard lieutenants.

These officers formed

the general staff of each capitainerie.
The Ordinance of 1584 confirmed the admiral's customary
prerogative

of

nominating

and

installing

coast-guard

officers, but in 1669 the king reserved the right to fill
these offices by royal commission.105

The Ordonnance de

la Marine made it possible for a militia captain to be
commissioned as a capitaine aarde-cote. or capitaine de la
cote, as he would be called in Canada.106
enter

the

royal

compensation.

service

and

Thus he would

receive

standardized

The right to appoint all marine officers was

exercised by the Minister of the Marine.107

According to

title V, article 1 of the Ordinance of 1681 the capitaines
garde-cotes. their lieutenants, and ensigns were obliged to
take

an

oath

in

the

presence

of

the

admiral

or

his

105Ibid.. 2:481.
106Benjamin Suite, "The Captains of Militia," Canadian
Historical Review. 1 (1920): 241.
107Valin, Nouveau Commentaire. 2:496.
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lieutenant at the headquarters where the captain would
serve.108
These capitaines qarde-cotes came under more specific
rules in 1716.
article

1)

By the regulation of 28 January (title I,

they

d'infanterie. In
capacity,

were
case

given
they

the

were

rank

of

serving

in

capitaine
a

higher

their commissions might give them the rank of

major, but along with the higher grade, they would "have
also

the

rank

of

capitaine

d'infanterie."109

Service

under this rank might open the way into the Order of Saint
Louis.

By title II, article 1, Capitaines gardes-cotes were

required to accumulate pertinent data relating to their
captaincies.

This would include information about terrain,

roads, and other information that would be essential in time
of war.

They also maintained a roll of all inhabitants aged

eighteen to sixty.

Article VII provided that the senior

captain of the highest rank would take command when forces
were combined.110
Colbert's Ordonnance and subsequent amendments fostered
royal control of French maritime captains, but traditional
practices

persisted.

108Ibid.. 2:481.
109Ibid.. 2:509.
110Ibid.. 2:510.

The

ordinances

of

1734

and

17 35

62

established

rules

for determining

preference to noble officers.

seniority

and giving

Rene Valin stated

in his

commentary on the Ordinance of 1681 that it was understood
that the captain-general would function under the authority
and with the approval of the commandant-general of the
province and the general and particular officers that he
commanded.111

Colbert's

financial

for

lever

the

naval
French

reforms
crown,

provided

but

a

centralized

control in France's territorial and commercial empire still
required the loyalty and obedience of maritime captains
serving as intermediaries between the king and his subjects
in the provinces and overseas.
French Sovereignty in New France

The men who developed the diplomatic

language and

established the tradition of the ancien capitaine in Canada
were

experienced

frontiersmen

who

exercised

control over villages in New France.

effective

Colbert's maritime

ordinance of 1681 placed them under the authority of the
commandant-general of the province.

The novelty of the new

ordinance, however, rested not in the subordination of the
captains

to

the

commandant-general

but

rather

in

the

financial controls of the new civilian administrators.
These

new

administrators

111I bid. . 2:491.

were

royal

commissioners

who
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replaced the municipal officials of the port cities which,
during

the

period

of

state

formation,

made

financial

contributions to the admiral and to the crown.
The captain's office provided the original link between
the crown and the provinces.

Under Colbert's Ordonnance.

the

bound

maritime

controls

captains

implemented

were
by

naval

to

resist

intendants

financial

because

the

division of administrative functions diluted the traditional
authority of ship captains.

The old captains exercised the

authority of peres de famille. but the new rules required
them to conform to a higher, rational level of authority.
In theory the naval intendants would protect the king's
subjects from those who would take advantage of them, even
when it was royal officials who abused their authority.112
In

practice

the

captain

exercised

his

traditional

prerogative of reconciling loyalty and service to the king
with the mutual obligation of protecting and providing for
the king's people. As the primary link between the king and
his people, the effective officer was the one who balanced
the interest of his people with the interest of the king.113
112According to Russell Major, Henry IV "restrained his
own demands and protected his earliest subjects from his own
officials." Representative Government. 375.
113In 1622, the duke of Ventadour called upon his
people to eradicate every "passion and individual interest"
and place foremost the public good. Then he called upon the
king to extirpate "abuses if you wish to lighten the burden

Richelieu's description of the corporate structure of
France

represented

the king as the head,

the maritime

administration as the powerful arm, and the officers as the
nerves

controlling

the

muscles

of

the

body

politic.

Obedient and loyal officers were the key to a healthy body,
but the crude analogy of extended families as miniature
"republics" was not compatible with absolutist political
ideology.

In

the

New

World,

the

maritime

captains

established themselves as peres de famille. symbolically
adopted the Indians as members of their families, and became
the

primary

link

between

the

king

and

his

colonies.

Obedience to the king and responsibility to his people
depended
people.

on

an

identity of

interests

between king

and

In the end, the old captain would be forced to lie

to his people, deceive the king, or find another sovereign
willing

to

accept

a more

substantial

degree

of

local

autonomy.
The discourse of the old Canadian captains reveals the
stratifications
institutional

of

urban,

structures.

national,
Motivated by

and
the

imperial
domination

principle French captains used words and force to forge a
relationship between the king and his "children." Tracing
the development of the diplomatic language in New France and
on the people and establish the public good." Quoted by
Major, Representative Government. 473.

observing the old Canadian captains as they extended French
dominion into the Mississippi Valley, will show that the
chain linking the king to his people was strained by the gap
that developed between the interests of the king's service
and the welfare of the colony itself.

CHAPTER 3

Mediation and Mastery in the Language of
the Ancien Capitaine

French traders and missionaries used and developed a
language in Canada that must be interpreted by reference to
European

social,

religious,

political,

culture.

Functioning

within

respective

village

urban

French captains,

and

Indian chiefs,

the

and

intellectual

framework

institutional

of

their

structures,

and French missionaries

participated in a discourse that advanced and nurtured the
village leader and post captains as links between France and
New France. In the middle ground of the pays d'en haut where
Frenchmen made contact with native Americans, village elders
and European officers contributed to a written record that
reveals the historical significance of the "captain" in the
pyramid of power improvised in seventeenth-century Canada.
The fragmented threads of the discourse have to be pieced
together

from

missionaries

the

who

narratives

took

of

forgranted

captain-traders
the

existence

and
of

a

corporate state composed of families linked to the royal
head by commercial, military, and ecclesiastical officers.
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Between

the

fragmented

opposite
thread

poles

included

(captains and chiefs)

of

king

and

references

to

people,
the

the

masters

who struggled to bridge the gap

between the head and members of a disordered commonwealth.
The

diplomatic

language

amalgamated

disparate

elements

including the customs and tradition of native American
tribal organizations, the procedures and protocol of village
assemblies and regional councils,
French sovereignty.

and the principles of

Village leaders and Great Captains came

under the umbrella of the French crown by using the language
to bridge the gap between popular leader and royal agent.
The strong desire of the Canadian Indians for stability
during a period when villages were being uprooted by hostile
invaders

provided

an

opportunity

for

French

maritime

captains to establish imperial control while presenting
themselves as mediators between the French king and those
native American refugees or village leaders who were willing
to be "adopted" into the royal household.

The intermediary

relationship between "rational" Frenchmen and "barbarian"
refugees requiring sustenance and protection from their
enemies was expressed in terms of a relationship between
fathers and children, masters and servants, rational men and
brute beasts.
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French

missionaries

gradually

became

conscious

of

important differences between French officers and Indian
tribal leaders, but maritime captains and Indian chiefs had
one common characteristic from the moment of contact:

the

need to establish a personal relationship with someone who
could supply equipment and provisions for the protection and
sustenance of their followers.

This need facilitated the

French alliance with the Algonquian Indians and secured the
primary personal
Canadian colony.

bond between the

French king and the

The royal captain represented the state on

the local level prior to the development of bureaucratic
institutions.

In the pays

d'en haut. the

attempt

to

transform Indian chiefs into French officers produced a
hybrid offspring in the person of the ancien capitaine.
Maritime Captains,

As

a

Indian Chiefs, and French Missionaries

maritime

captain,

Samuel

De

Champlain

was

affiliated with many different companies as a trader and
explorer before he established the city of Quebec in 1608
and developed a reputation as "Father of Canada" and the
first "governor" of New France.1

Champlain began his

1Samuel Eliot Morison notes that no one in authority
referred to Champlain as "Father of New France" before the
nineteenth century. Samuel de Champlain:
Father of New
France (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972), 225-226. Moreover,
the founder of Quebec, was never officially appointed
governor of the new colony, though many authors, including
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exploration of the St. Lawrence Valley as a partner of a
commercial enterprise,

but he exercised royal authority

because his partner, Pierre de Gua, sieur de Monts, held
successive titles of vice-admiral and lieutenant-general of
Acadia.

De Monts was also given a 10-year monopoly over the

fur trade, and Champlain became a partner in the company he
formed to exploit this privilege.

The company dissolved

after Champlain negotiated alliances with the Indians and
founded the city of Quebec.
established,

After the new colony had been

Champlain was designated commandant of New

France.2
In the

early

stages

of the

colony's

development,

Champlain's authority rested less upon recognition by the
crown than upon his dynamic leadership.
was established as a French post.

The city of Quebec

With no intendant it was

Charelvoix, classify the commandant of the colony as the
actual governor. Pierre Frangois-Xavier de Charlevoix, S. J. ,
History and General Description of New France, trans. John
Gilmary Shea (New York, 1870; repr., Chicago:
Loyola
University Press, 1962), 2:64.
2William J. Eccles, France in America (New York: Harper
& Row, 1972), 14. Champlain, Voyages of Samuel De Champlain.
1604-1618. ed. W. L. Grant (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1907),
220; Marc Lescarbot, The Conversion of the Savages Who Were
Baptized in New France During This Year, 1610 (Paris, 1610)
in The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents: Travels and
Explorations of the Jesuit Missionaries in New France. 16101791. (hereafter referred to as JR) ed. Reuben Gold Thwaites
(New York: Pageant Book Co., 1959), 1:63.

70

up to Champlain as commandant to establish the foundation
for patriarchical authority and gain recognition by the
Indian tribes as their friend and protector.

When a crisis

of authority enveloped the regency of Marie de Medici in
1616, Champlain's right to command had to be reaffirmed.3
In America, his prowess as a warrior protecting friendly
Indians against the attacks of the Iroquois did more to
cement his relationship with his Indian allies than did his
credentials as a royal officer, though royal recognition
became more and more important as the colony developed.
Actually, Champlain's authority in the New World rested
on two pillars:
Indians.

service to the king and service to the

On the basis of his service in navigation, which

he called "the most useful and excellent" of all arts,
Champlain established his connection to the crown through
the admiralty.

He reinforced that bond at court through a

marriage alliance with the daughter of an official of the
king's chamber.4

His letters addressed to the young Louis

XIII and the regent mentioned the "sense of honor

[he]

received during the last ten years in commissions, not only,
Sire, from your Majesty, but also from the late king, Henry

3Morison, Champlain. 176.
4Champlain to the Queen Regent (Marie de Medicis) in
Voyages, 17; Morison, Champlain. 123.
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the Great."

His treatise and maps would

"serve as an

example in your kingdom for increasing the glory of your
Majesty, the welfare of your subjects, and for the honor of
the very humble service" owed by Champlain to the king.5
Service to the king and provision for the welfare of the
king's people, including the native Americans, promoted the
health of a corporate structure which encompassed the king
as head and the Indians and colonists as members.
Champlain's military and civil authority derived from
the admiral of France, but as a gentleman entrepreneur, he
exercised the authority of a pere de famille.

The urban

foundation of French maritime institutions can be seen in
the parallels between the etiguette required of apprentices
and sailors.

Four basic principles governing the behavior

of an apprentice in the home of his master were summarized
in the third quarter of the seventeenth century by Jacques
Savary:

the love and fear of God; fidelity toward his

master; blind obedience in the performance of everything
commanded by the master, provided that he demands nothing
contrary to the service of God; and paternal respect.

The

apprentice, or servant, was supposed to remove his hat when
speaking to his master, just as he would when addressing his

5Champlain to Louis XIII, V o y a g e s . 16.
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father.
was

A master, whether he was a merchant or a captain,

expected to govern his servants in accord

principles

ofa

good

pere

de

famille.6 The

with the
maritime

ordinances actually transformed the popular leader into a
royal agent.
between

The four principles governing the relationship

masters and

relationship

apprentices

were

applied

to the

between a captain andhis crew and could

be

applied to the relationship between a village leader and his
people.
Compare

these

four

principles

with

description of the duties of a good seaman.

Champlain's
A "good and

finished navigator," he wrote,
should above all be a good man, fearing God and
not allowing on his ship His holy name to be
blasphemed
.... He should be pleasant and
affable in his conversation, absolute in
his
orders, notcommunicating too readily with his
shipmates,
unless with those who share
the
command.7
Savary, of course, described the appropriate behavior of an
apprentice,

while

maritime officer.

Champlain

described

the

duties

of

a

Both, however, outlined roughly similar

principles of a master-servant relationship including the

6Jacques Savary, Le Parfait Neqociant in Oeuvres. 2
vols. (Paris, 1713), 1:41-42.
7Treatise on Seamanship and the Duty of a Good Seaman
appended to Morison, Champlain. 24 0-241.
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fear of God and absolute obedience which were to govern the
relationships between peres de famille and their families,
masters and apprentices, and captains and crews.
No doubt there was a great cultural chasm between the
old world and the new, but the village world of the American
Indians was not as distant from the urban base of the
maritime captains as Richard White's recent work on native
American culture would have us believe.

Because nothing

"resembling a state existed in the pays d'en haut."8 the
agents

of

the

French monarchy

acted

less

like

modern

bureaucrats and more like paternalistic masters of urban
trade "families."

As such they had much in common with

their native American counterparts.
On both sides of the Atlantic there were big chiefs and
little

chiefs.

Capitaine"

The

to describe

Jesuits
any

adopted

Indian

the

chief

term
who

"Grand

exercised

authority over several villages, but they gradually came to
realize that the native Americans gave more lip service than
substance

to

the

principle

cherished by Europeans.

of

hierarchical

authority

Nevertheless, the knowledge and

experience of governing the Indians can be traced back to
the Indian captains who were the original "captains" of the

8White, Middle G r o u n d . 16.
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"savages".

As represented by European mediators, the Indian

discourse reflects the importance of the captain's office in
the bonding process by indicating that allegiance to a
French captain brought with it a fictive kinship with the
king.
Jesuit missionaries applied the domination principle
and interpreted the fictive kinship established between the
Canadian

Indians and the French king according to

European principle of state sovereignty.

the

The Jesuit priest

who reported the conversion and baptism of the Grand Sagamos
in June, 1610 explained that this grand capitaine. as the
French rendered his title, was the chief and sovereign of
New France before the arrival of the French.9

This great

sagamore encountered by Champlain during his second voyage
was an old man named Membertou who claimed to be over a
hundred years old.

After the voyage when Champlain related

that Membertou promised to take care of the two Frenchmen
who volunteered to remain in Canada, the "captain of the
savages" had declared "that they should be treated as kindly
as

his

own

children."10 The

kinship

bond

established

9Father Bertrand, "A Letter Missive in regard to the
Conversion and Baptism of the Grand Sagamore of new France,
who was before the arrival of the French, its chief and
sovereign," JR 1:120-1.
10Champlain, V o y a g es . 85.
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between

the

sagamore

and

Champlain

involved

a

deeper

relationship than a simple alliance with a technologically
superior partner, but Canadian tradition had no concept of
a chiefdom with supreme power over wives, children, and the
village community.

The wide gap between native American

custom and the European concept of the pater familias would
have to be bridged by the ancien capitaine.
Capitanal, Membertou's successor, continued to maintain
friendly relations with the French.

In 1633, this chief of

the Montagnais made an impressive speech, as Pere Paul Le
Jeune reported at the time and recalled two years later, had
"delighted

all his hearers."11

Capitanal's

speech,

as

recounted by the Jesuit priest, provides a sample of the
discourse describing the relationship between Frenchmen and
Indians.
I am ... only a poor little animal, crawling
about on the ground; you Frenchmen are the great
of the earth, who make all tremble.
I do not
know how I dare to talk before such great
Captains .... Thou hast assisted us in our wars,
we love thee all the more for it.15
The Indian captain related that the Montagnais invited the
French to make their home at Quebec and that the French
settled there promising to defend and protect them from

1;L"Le Jeune's Relation," 1635, JR 8:55.
15JR 5:205-207.

76

their enemies.16

The relationship established between the

great French captains and the Indian sagamore implied the
acceptance of French sovereignty, but the Jesuits gradually
discerned that the Indian captains lacked the power to
command and that the tribes were reluctant to submit to any
yoke.
Marc Lescarbot, whose report on The Conversion of the
Savages Who Were Baptized in New France was published in
Paris in 1610 and included in the Jesuit Relations. compared
the authority of the Great Sagamore over his subjects with
that of the French king.
He has under him a number of families whom he
rules, not with so much authority as does our
King over his subjects, but with sufficient power
to harangue, advise, and lead them to war, to
render justice to one who has a grievance, and
like matters.17
More apt would be to compare the Great Sagamore with the
governor or commandant-general who exercised the king's
authority,
commandants.

and

the

village

sagamores

with

the

Lescarbot referred to each village

company of savages.

post
as

a

No taxes were imposed on the people,

but Lescarbot reported that the village sagamores did share

16Ibid., 5:207.
17Lescarbot, Conversion of the Savages. JR 1:75.
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"any profits of the chase" with the Great Sagamore.18
Likewise

French

commandants

profited

from

the

trading

activities carried on in their posts.
The baptism of the Great Sagamore provided an important
cornerstone of the new structure established by Champlain in
Canada.

The anciens capitaines became the agents of "great

chief" who lived in the "big village" across the water.
After all, according to Charlevoix the French king derived
his authority from the same God who, as pere de famille sent
missionaries into his vineyard.19
because,

according

to

Pere

Baptism was important

LeJeune,

souls

formed

the

materials of a new edifice designed to be inhabited by one
people.

LeJeune

recognized,

nevertheless,

that

the

conversion and transformation of the "savages" was a long
term process.20
were

He pointed out that the needs of the body

the door to the soul of the

French perspective

the process

of

Indian.21

From the

Christianization

and

18Ibid.
19Charlevoix, New France. 2:95
20"This metamorphosis is not accomplished by a word nor
in a moment." "LeJeune's Relation," (1636), JR 9:91. Pere
LeJeune envisioned that the converted Indians and the French
would become "little by little, only one and the same
People." 9:265.
21Ib i d . . 9:107.
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civilization required a radical change of behavior on the
part of the native Americans.

The starving Indians received

food and supplies from the French, but the Jesuits exacted
courtesy in exchange.22
As reported by optimistic Jesuits, the Indian discourse
indicates

that the

idea

mutually acceptable goal.

of becoming

one

people

was

a

Admittedly, the Jesuits made only

slightly more progress than the Franciscans in their efforts
to convert the Indians, but Pere LeJeune had a plan.

A

hospital would draw adult Indians who would willingly seek
nursing care for their bodies.

Seminaries would be filled

by the children of those who died in the hospital regardless
of whether or not the souls of their parents were saved.
second

approach

involved

supporting

young

girls

A
and

providing dowries to help them to marry. By these means, the
Jesuits hoped to progress toward the goal of becoming one
people.23
The major obstacle standing in the way of unity was the
stubborn reluctance of the Indians to depart from their
culture.

The tactic employed by Pere Lejeune was to

tell them that, if they are going to be stubborn
about their customs, we will hold fast to ours;

22I b i d . , 9:261.
23I b i d .. 9:101,

103.

79

that, if they do not care enough for us to give
up some of their acts of cruelty for our sake, we
will certainly not do them any harm, but we will
not cherish them to the extent of taking the
morsel from our own mouths to assist them in
their needs; that we will observe very carefully
those who perpetrate any public indecency, or who
take part in these outrages and insane acts, so
that we may close our doors against them and open
them to those among them who are good.24
LeJeune was referring here to the practice of Indian women
receiving scalps as "great trophies."

They were also said

to torture prisoners by cutting off fingers and roasting
them for their children.25

In view of Indian dependence

on the French for food and supplies, Lejeune went on to
suggest that more "civilized" behavior could be promoted "if
we all should agree to exclude without doing them any harm,
those who

commit

acts

so at variance with

reason

nature."26

He first chided an Indian leader who had taken

an enemy prisoner and then
explained to him that he ought to take all I had
said to him as a mark of my affection for him
that I was heartily sorry that he, who professed
to love the French, should permit to [have] done
in their presence deeds that they hated like
death; that our soldiers, upon returning to
France, would say to our countrymen that these

24I b i d . . 9:263.
25I b i d . . 9:253, 257.
26I b i d . , 9:263.
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People here are dogs; — and that I, who love
them, would be annoyed at such statements.27
Pere LeJeune reminded the Indian captain that Monsieur le
General (the French commandant) had protected and aided him
in quarrels among the Indians.

By arranging for him to

spend time in Quebec near '"the great Captain of all the
French

Captains"

who

are

in

Canada,

LeJeune

hoped

to

convince the Indian captain that French leaders were gentle
and humane men, "not fond of blood nor of carnage, unless in
the fury of war."28
behavioral change.

The Jesuit bargained for a radical

"We sometimes grant you what you ask of

us; grant us also what we ask of you, so that we may come to
be, little by little, only one and the same People."29
Neither the Montagnais nor the Hurons had any problem
with accepting the protection and benevolence of a great
father,

but

the native

American

concept

of

fatherhood

diverged from the French concept of the pere de famille on
the principle of absolute obedience.

Authority among the

Indians was based more on reciprocal giving than on rank in
a hierarchical structure.

For the Indians, the willingness

to shed one's blood in defense against mutual enemies was

27Ib i d . , 9:263,
28I b i d . . 9:265.
29Ibid.

265.
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essential to the maintenance of the alliance.30

The great

captain wielded powerful arms and inspired the loyalty of
his warriors and allies.

When "the Savages came in a body

to see Monsieur the Commandant," the Indian leader who had
captured a young Iroquois woman gave the following speech
upon presenting her to the Commandant in compensation for
three Frenchmen who had been killed.
Listen, Frenchmen, I am going to chide you, for
what else could be done by a great beast like me,
who has the boldness to speak in the presence of
Captains?
If I were Captain, I would have the
right to speak; I am only a dog, yet I must
speak, and have a friendly quarrel with you. Our
Fathers and our old Captains loved each other;
they are dead now; we love each other, both
French and Savages; we love each other, yes, we
love each other; therefore it would have been
very fitting to see some of your young men with
us in the war; but as that failed us, we have
done as well as we could.31
An

Indian

earned

his

right

to

speak

and

generosity and service to the village or tribe.
Captains had more military resources,

command

by

The French

but by the Indian

captain's standards, they should have been willing to do
more.

Even so, the Indian captain presented the young

Iroquois woman.
Here is a young female prisoner whom we present
to you, to take the place of one of the three

30Ibid.. 10:231; 9:233.
31Ibid., 9:267.
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Frenchmen who was killed quite near here, some
time ago.
I still see the deep red blood that
accuses the cruelty of our enemies and of yours;
this present will conceal a part of it; it is a
little thing, but it is all we have, the rest
having been killed; if we had been helped, we
would have done more, but we were deserted on all
sides.32
The young woman expressed gladness for being "given to so
gallant a Captain."

Arrangements were made to send her to

France "accompanied by some girls of this country."

Pere

LeJeune told her that she should inform the Captain or one
of the Jesuits if anyone insulted her during the passage.
She replied that she was now of their Nation;
that she did not fear they would do her any harm;
that, if she were commanded to marry, she would
obey; but that no one, except he to whom she had
been given, should approach her.33
Male prisoners were customarily tortured and killed by their
enemies.

Women who were fortunate enough to be spared often

married into the tribe of their protector.

By accepting the

national identity of their captors, women prisoners played
a role

in the process

of merging

different

peoples.

The native Americans expressed a willingness to embrace
the

French

increasing

nation.

Pere

French glory

32I b i d .
33I b i d . . 269.

LeJeune

placed

in the New World

emphasis
so

that

on
the

barbarians "will respect them, and the more fear they will
have of offending them."34

Yet he also fretted that the

French might not measure up to the challenge.

What if the

French failed to live up to the image of "power, ingenuity,
and

morality"

that

great

captains

like

Champlain

had

projected into the Canadian wilderness?
The goal of convincing the Canadian Indians to accept
French standards of rationality and humanity constitutes an
important strand of the discourse.

Champlain had exhorted

the Hurons to embrace the Christian religion as a means of
cementing a very close alliance with the French.35
listening

"attentively

in their

assemblies,"

the

By

great

French captain had discovered that the Indians carefully
evaluated the spiritual and rational standards promoted by
the French.

Champlain summarized what he heard them say:

You say things that pass our knowledge, and which
we cannot understand by words, being beyond our
comprehension; but if you would do us a service
come and dwell in this country, bringing your
wives and children, and when they are here we
shall see how you serve the God you worship, and
how you live with your wives and children, how
you cultivate and plant the soil, how you obey
your laws, how you take care of animals, and how
you manufacture all that we see proceeding from
your inventive skill. When we see all this, we
shall learn more in a year than in twenty by

34I b i d . . 97.
35I b i d .. 10:27.
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simply hearing you discourse; and if we cannot
then understand, you shall take our children, who
shall be as your own. And thus being convinced
that our life is a miserable one in comparison
with yours, it is easy to believe that we shall
adopt yours, abandoning our own.36
The Jesuits responded to the challenge of providing the
Indians with the choice of adopting a comparatively better
lifestyle, though they expressed concern about whether the
French

could measure up to the

rational

standards

Americans.

For

that

were

example,

when

European

demanded
Pere

spiritual
by

Jean

the
de

and

native
Brebeuf

established his mission among the Hurons, he learned that
"the French who had been here had never spoken to them of
God, but had been as much addicted as they to run after and
dally

with

...

women."37

Although

Champlain

and

the

Jesuits enunciated and promoted the acceptance of French
standards,

the cultural chasm that remained had

to

be

bridged by mediators who used and developed the language of
the ancien capitaine.
Barbarian Customs and French Discourse
The

old captains used

language to bridge the gap

between popular leader and royal agent.

Tribal leaders

36Champlain, Voyages, 323.
37Ibid., 10:63.
Volume 10 is a continuation of
LeJeune's relation of 1636, which contains Brebeuf's report
from the Huron mission.

bound by village customs were enticed by "rational" French
captains to embrace a "superior" lifestyle based on loyalty
and obedience to a European monarch committed to serving his
"adopted" people.

By acknowledging the fatherhood of the

French

people

king,

the

were

gaining

a

provider

and

protector, but the Indian leader and the French captain had
to combine mediation with mastery to bridge the real gap
between

native

American

and

European

culture

with

a

diplomatic language that permitted the captain to exercise
sovereign power in the name of the king or resist imperial
pressure by appealing to the needs and interests of his
people.
Office and language were used by French and Indian
captains to exercise authority and control over their local
communities, but the cultural chasm described by Champlain
and the Jesuits was too wide to cross.

By accepting the

"civilization" of the French, the Indians would emerge from
barbarism.

By civilizing native Americans,

hoped to produce one people.

the Jesuits

In Augustinian terms, it would

be a "superior people in proportion as it

[was]

bound

together by higher interests, inferior in proportion as it
[was]

bound by lower."38 France was a country full

38Augustine, City of God. 706.
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comfort and politeness while Canada was to French eyes a
country of rudeness and barbarism.39

Pere Brebeuf noted

that the Hurons spoke of "overturning the Country."

In this

way, he pointed out, the Indians styled "the change from
their Pagan and Barbarous life to one that is civilized and
Christian."40 The old captain as spokesman for his people
developed a language to bridge an unbridgeable gap.
The captain secured his authority by professing to
accept the higher rational standards of the French and by
demanding that the French provide the iron and protection
needed to retain the affection of his people.

The Indian

leader earned his privilege of "speaking" for his people by
exhorting his followers to do what must be done "for the
good of the village."

Before the arrival of the French, the

feeble

the Montagnais

authority

of

and Huron

captains

derived from the affection they could generate by advocating
policies to promote the welfare of village and nation.41

39LeJeune's Relation of 1636, JR 9:103.
40Ibid.. 10:27.
41Ibid, 10:231-235. In his Relation of 1633, Le Jeune
wrote that "the Captain is elected for his eloquence alone,
and is obeyed in proportion to his use of it, for they have
no other law than his word." JR 5:195.
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The language used to bridge the cultural chasm issued
from the interaction between Jesuit priests and Canadian
Indians.

The Jesuits resolved to "overturn the country" by

putting a flea in the ear of Indian leaders who desired to
exercise

authority over their

own people.

The

simple

process of learning to communicate with the Montagnais and
Huron Indians created opportunities for Pere Le Jeune and
his

fellow

knowledge

missionaries
available

to

to

demonstrate

those

who

would

the

power

accept

and

French

standards.
Pere Brebeuf had wintered among the Montagnais and
spent

three

years

with

the

Hurons

captured Acadia and Quebec in 1628.

before

the

English

When Pere Le Jeune,

learned in Greek and Latin, arrived in Canada in 1632, he
took up residence at Notre Dames des Anges the little Jesuit
house just outside of Quebec which had been ransacked by the
English.

Greeted as brother,

Indians if he was "captain."

he was asked by curious

"Ania Kir Capitana?" literally

means "My brother, art thou Captain?" but they meant to find
out if he was the "Chief of this house?"42
visitors was Manitougache.

One of his

His son and a little Negro left

42Edna Kenton, With Hearts Courageous (New York:
Liveright, 1933), 28, 35-36; Le Jeune's Relation, 1632, JR
5:59.
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behind by the English became the Jesuit's first pupils.43
Not only did Pere Le Jeune have to learn the language and
customs of the Montagnais Indians among whom he had taken up
residence, but he and his fellow missionaries had to compete
with Indian sorcerers.
The language and authority of the old captain emerged
as the bridge between French imperial and native American
culture.
between

The terminology developed
Huron

shamans

and

in the competition

Jesuits

lengthened

and

strengthened the old maritime chain linking nation and city
in Northern Europe.

The discourse of the ancien capitaine

emphasized the use of both words and force, but the ability
of the old captains to straddle the wide crevice between
European and native American culture depended heavily on the
meaning of words that emerged from contact and conflict
between the Jesuits and those who resisted their cultural
imperialism.
When Pere Brebeuf returned to Huronia in the summer of
1634, he and his fellow missionaries had to contend with
sorcerers who were quick to point out the incompatibility
and

inconsistency

of

European ways.

As

far

as Huron

religious leaders were concerned, native American practices

43Kenton, Hearts Courageous. 38; JR 5:63.
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were effective and the Jesuit way of living made no sense at
all.

The desire for trade goods and presents and the

competition between Huron villages to attract a missionary
who might open opportunities to bring prosperity to their
people encouraged Huron leaders to journey to Quebec to
invite

Brebeuf.

back

to

their

land.44

To

overcome

resistance of those villagers who opposed their peculiar
activities, the Jesuits took advantage of the curiosity and
material needs of any native who was receptive to their
teaching.
The Jesuits charmed their students by bringing them
into their cabin.

Upon entering the dwelling which appeared

much like a Huron cabin on the outside, the natives were
intrigued by the small hall leading to different rooms.45
The new language developed as the curious guests tried to
assimilate the marvelous things they saw into their world
view and communicate with men whose goal was to transform
the native world by establishing a principle of hierarchical
authority and structure.
Just as the reputation of Frenchmen as great captains
stemmed from the deeds of Champlain, the fame of Frenchmen

44Le Jeune's Relation, 1633, JR 5:259-263; 6:19.
45Kenton, Hearts Courageous. 109-110.

as masters of iron can be traced to "wonders" performed by
the Jesuits.
little

The guests were astonished by mattresses, a

steel

mill

for

grinding

corn,

a

prism

multiplied single objects, and a magnifying glass.

which
The

missionaries astounded great "medicine men" by inviting them
to hold the corners of a sheet of paper.
placed on the paper.
magnet

concealed

Some needles were

One of the Jesuits would then use a

in the palm of his hand to move the

needles, making them stand up and lie down with a wave of
his hand.

The Jesuits did more than demonstrate that

Frenchmen were masters of iron.

They also painted speech on

paper that other Frenchmen could "hear" with their eyes.46
Within

the

framework

of

their

animistic

religion,

the

natives interpreted all these things as manifestations of an
animating spirit.
The best example of this animistic interpretation was
the Huron appellation of the Jesuit clock.

The Jesuits

responded to the clock and expected their guests to obey its
voice.

When the clock "spoke" the priests would pray, eat,

call the children to school, or send them home.

Throughout

the day, all were expected to obey its commands.

No wonder,

46Ib i d . , 110-114.
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the Hurons named it the "Captain of the Day."47

Quite

often the leaders feigned the decision to embrace French
culture and the Christian religion, agreeing to worship the
spirit that taught the French because they hoped to "obtain
all

the

knowledge

that

the

French

had."48

Brebeuf

observed that the barbarians were content to approve the
beauty of truth "without embracing it."

They would justify

the refusal to change their ways by saying that "Such is the
custom of our country."49
According to the Jesuits, the Indians appealed to their
customs

and

tradition

to

justify

cruelty

and

torture.

Champlain at one time attempted to convince his

Indian

allies that their treatment of women and children prisoners
was "foreign to the kindness natural to man."50

An Island

native responded by taking a nursing child by the foot and
striking "its head against a rock or a tree."51

After

47Ibid., 112-113.
48Claude Charles Le Roy, Sieur de Bacqueville de La
Potherie, History of the Savage Peoples Who Are the Allies
of New France, in Emma Helen Blair, ed., The Indian Tribes
of the Upper Mississippi Valiev and Region of the Great
Lakes. 2 vols. (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark, 1911), 1:332.
49LeJeune's Relation of 1636, JR 10:19.
50Ibid.. 9:259, 261.
51Ibid., 261.
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recalling the incident, LeJeune recommended that the French
and their Indian converts should "agree to exclude ... those
who commit acts so at variance with reason and nature."52
The distinction between "reasoning men" who eschewed such
behavior and "brute beasts" committing inhumane acts became
an

important

element

in

the

discourse

of

the

ancien

caoitaine.53
The

Jesuits

and

Governor

Montmagny,

Champlain's

successor, encouraged the Indian leaders to abandon their
traditional customs by granting favor and intimacy to those
who showed an inclination to accept French instruction and
authority.54

By becoming a "Frenchman" an Indian captain

could enhance his authority and obtain French merchandise.
By allying with the French an Indian captain stationed
himself on the middle ground.

Whether or not Indian leaders

were willing to accept European standards of rationality,
intelligence, and authority, the French captains who came to
trade under the sovereign authority of their king produced
a cultural legacy that owes more to the American natives
than their common discourse would lead us to believe.

52Ibid., 263.
53Champlain, Voyages. 308.
54LeJeune's Relation of 1637, JR 11:149.
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move the muscle of Canada in the interest of the king French
captains had to embrace Indian ways even as the Indians had
to adopt French ones.
Speech, Office, and the Derivation of Authority

The

Indian

leader

earned

his

right

to

speak

by

demonstrating his ability to do something for the village,
tribe, or nation he wished to represent.

The Jesuits used

the word "Captain" to describe any one of a number of tribal
leaders.

Some captains were bigger than others, but every

Indian leader had to obtain merchandise and protection to
sustain and defend his band, company, village, or villages - in short, his nation —

from enemy attack.

Yet when any

Indian captain embraced French culture he would face the
consequence of having to abandon tribal rules and customs
which might ultimately cost him the support of his "people"
from whom his "office" was derived.55
In her

description

of Huron

government,

Elizabeth

Tooker has observed that there "were as many kinds of chiefs

55LeJeune's description of Makheabichtichiou, the
Montagnais captain, who "gave the young Hiroquois woman whom
Monsieur the General took to France," refers to his position
in his tribe in terms of office and function: "he is strong
and hardy, a good warrior, and has a very ready tongue. It
is for this reason that, although he is not really the
Captain of his Tribe, yet, as it divides into squads he is
generally taken as the chief of his band.
From this he
derives his title of "Captain," since he often performs the
office of one." LeJeune's Relation of 1637, JR 11:149.
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as there were 'affairs'.56
Jesuits
promoted

and

their

the

The language developed by the

native

development

American
of

a

designed to house one people.
captains,

all

guests

hierarchical

effectively
structure

There was a multiplicity of

of whom could potentially

function

in a

hierarchical structure under the authority of one great
chief or "grand capitaine."
capitaine

The language of the ancien

bridged the gap between the two cultures

by

permitting the spokesman of each band or tribe to enhance
his position by accepting the authority of and beginning to
speak in the name of the French king.
The peace

and prosperity

of a village

or company

depended upon the ability of its leader to speak and obtain
gifts and merchandise.

The leader derived his power to

exercise authority over men and nature from the spirit that
enabled him to speak.57

The Hurons spread the news about

the return of E-chom (Pere Brebeuf) to Huronia by explaining
his deeds by reference to O-Ki, the "Great Spirit."

"E-

56Elisabeth Tooker, An Ethnography of the Huron
Indians. 1615-1649. Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin
190 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), 43.
57Cornelius J. Jaenen, "The Role of Presents in FrenchAmerindian Trade," in Duncan Cameron, ed., Explorations in
Canadian Economic History:
Essays in Honour of Irene M.
Spry (Ottawa:
University of Ottawa Press, 1985), 232;
White, Middle Ground. 36; JR 10:193-197.
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chom's cabin is built! He is O-ki!" they said.

"He lives

with the Captain of the Day which speaks and tells him when
to put on the kettle!

He paints speech! He hears with his

eyes!

The association of the concept of

He is O-ki!"

captain

(okima) with the idea of a wealthy and powerful

father who was "Captain of all captains" opened the door for
Indian leaders to become powerful spokesmen for their people
while professing obedience to the French king and placing
themselves under the umbrella of his protection.58
An

ongoing

discussion

between

Pere

Lejeune

and

Makheabichtichiou, the Montagnais captain who presented the
Iroquois woman prisoner as a gift to take the place of three
dead Frenchmen, helps us to understand the references to
obedience in the speech of the old captains.
captain's

instruction

concerning

the

As part of the

articles

of

the

Christian faith, Lejeune explained "how the animals would
have been obedient to man if man had been obedient to
God."59

Although he seemed inclined to accept the basic

teaching, Makheabichtichiou found it difficult to adapt his

58Kenton,
Hearts Courageous. 99,
261-262; James
Clifton, "Potawatomi Leadership Roles: On Okama and other
Influential Personages," in William Cowan (ed.), Papers of
the Sixth Alqonquian Conference. 1974. National Museum of
Man, Mercury Series, Canadian Ethnology Paper no. 23 (Ottawa
National Museum of Canada, 1975), 53-54.
59LeJeune's Relation of 1637, JR 11:151.

behavior to the French standard of rationality.

He promised

"in the presence of his compatriots ... that he would never
give eat-all feasts, that he would not summon the Sorcerers
to treat him in his sicknesses, that he would no longer
believe in dreams, and that he desired to be baptized and to
believe what the French believe."
after

"all

that he

still

crawls

LeJeune observed that
upon

the

understanding acknowledges what his will,

ground;

his

accustomed to

evil, cannot or will not wholly embrace."60 The professed
desire of Makheabichtichiou to embrace French values may or
may not have been genuine, but the persistent practice of
equating savagery and barbarism with the behavior of animals
and children is a persistent theme of the written record.
Anger, insolence, and rebellion made breaches in the
wall of authority.

To defend his rationality after an

emotional outburst, Makheabichtichiou assured Sieur Olivier
"that anger had carried him away, that he was not a child."
He expressed a desire to acknowledge his
governor.

fault to the

"No, I am not a child, I will remain firm in the

promise I have given you."61

60Ibid.. 179.
61Ibid.. 173.
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Later

in the century,

Nicolas Perot reported that

Indian captains in the Western wilderness used strictness
and severity "against those who failed to obey" village
procedural rules for hunting buffalo.62

Indian captains

acknowledged the value of steadfastness and obedience, but,
according

to

Pere

Lejeune,

they

were

often

unable

to

discipline their followers.
Being kind to the Savages, helping them in their
need, doing them no wrong or injury, exercising
some kind of Justice toward those individuals who
are insolent, especially if their Captains cannot
make them listen to reason,— these are the means
of holding these Barbarians a long time in the
line of duty.63
The Indians, he wrote, refer to all those who have authority
as "captains."64

The Indians and the Jesuits associated

captains with arms and the use of force.

Indeed,

the

Jesuits purported to have only their voice to counteract
insolence and cruelty whereas the natives were bold enough
to insult a captain whose arms were within reach.65

Yet

Pere Brebeuf reported that Huron captains "do not govern by

62Nicolas Perot, Memoir on the Manners. Customs, and
Religion of the Savages of North America, in Blair, Indian
Tribes. 1:120.
63LeJeune's Relation of 1636, JR 9:199.
64Ibid., 9:201.
65Ib i d . , 9:261.
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means of command and absolute power; they have no force at
hand to compel them to their duty."
The principles of obedience and royal sovereignty were
used

by

French

captains

and

Jesuits

as

measures

of

rationality, but the Indian captains had to obtain gifts and
protection for their companies to maintain their position
and

increase

assemblies.

their

stature

in the

village

and

tribal

To maintain the affection of his people, the

Indian captain brought gifts and merchandise to distribute
in his village.
was

Speaking through gifts at regional councils

a means of motivating

followers.
village.

leaders

and prompting

their

The gifts restored the losses suffered by a
The right to replace a dead captain could be

earned by presenting gifts to the "Old Men" in a village
assembly.66

The Indians recognized the ability to restore

and replace dead warriors as a manifestation of O-Ki.

The

deeds

the

of

Champlain

and

the

Jesuits

established

reputation of the French as "masters of life" and their king
as "the Great Captain."
use

of

rituals

languages

and

which

With the power of oratory and the
reflected

customs,

French

a knowledge

of

Indian

captain-traders

and

66Le Jeune's Relation, 1636, JR 10:235; Kenton, Hearts
Courageous. 151.
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missionaries developed the ability to advise and lead tribes
and nations as units of a French imperial structure.
The ancien capitaine built a linguistic bridge between
himself as a popular leader and the French crown by using
words and gifts to secure obedience to the great French
father who provided protection and iron for his "children."
La Potherie quoted Tioskatin, the chief of the Sioux:

"All

nations have a father who gives protection and iron, but I
am a bastard searching for a father."67

The use of iron

in the form of knives, hatchets, and guns was associated
with spirit, rule, and protection.

The giving of gifts and

smoking the calumet ritualized the transfer of spiritual
power over nature and men.68

La Potherie, who tells us

more about the deeds of Nicolas Perot than the trader's own
Memoir does, relates that Perot worked to establish peace
between two rival tribes by explaining that God gave iron to
the French to distribute to those willing to live as men and
not as beasts.69

67La Potherie, Histoire de L'Americme Septentrionale.
4 vols. (Paris:
Chez Brocas, 1753), 4:31.
Emma Helen
Blair's edition contains only vols. 2 and 4. Hereafter the
French edition will be cited as La Potherie, Histoire.
68La Potherie, History of the Savage Peoples, in Blair
(ed.) Indian Tribes. 1:307-09.
69I b i d . , 1:312.
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I have come to embrace all the men whom Onontio
..., the chief of all the French who have settled
in this country, has told me to join together, in
order to take them under his protection.70
In another place, La Potherie quotes a chief who approached
the Comte de Frontenac, governor of New France from 167 2 to
1682.

He expressed his joy for the Count's protection and

referred to him as the "the great captain, the one who is
the

master

of

iron."71

Among

the

many

different

and

diverse tribes of American Indians, there were leaders who
could be described as great "chiefs" or "captains,"72 but

70Here La Potherie uses the more general term— le
chef— to refer to the Canadian governor, who at the time was
de Coursel. La Potherie, History of the Savage Peoples.
1:312; Histoire 2:93. Many times the governor is referred
to as the great captain of all the French in America. Here
he is called Onontio and described as le chef, the "chief of
all the French who are established in this country."
Richard White explains that Onontio "was an Iroquois word
meaning great mountain. It was the Mohawk rendering of the
name of Charles Jacques de Huault de Montmagny, an early
French governor.
Both the Iroquois and the Algonquins
applied the name to all later French governors. Middle
Ground. 36.
71La Potherie, Histoire 4:34.
72The Great Chief of the Miamis exercised more
extensive authority than most Indian leaders in the pays
d'en haut. but the changing leadership patterns are
indicated by the decline of the power of these hereditary
chiefs during the eighteenth century. White, Middle Ground.
217.
In his study of European contact in the Southeast,
Jerald T. Milanich refers to "one chief who ruled 90 vassal
villages and another who could summon thousands of
warriors." "The European Entrada into La Florida," in David
Hurst Thomas, ed. , Columbian Consequences. (Washington:
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989-1990), 2:17. But even
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the Indian rulers of the pavs d'en haut sought refuge in the
arms of the French primarily to gain the mastery of iron and
come under the umbrella of sovereign authority. The Indian
leader needed to defend and supply his people to command the
respect and obedience of his followers.
who

found

a

automatically

father
became

to

provide

a company

A community leader

protection

commander who

and

iron

exercised

effective control of his "people."
Assemblies and Councils
The native-American version of the head and members of
a body politic is reflected in the Huron tradition which
referred to a worthy captain as Enondecha. "the same name by
which they call the Country, Nation, district, —

as if a

good Chief and the Country were one and the same thing."73
Like

the medieval

European village

the

native-American

village was a crucible of diverse tribal interests.

The

traditional authority of the elders was rooted in age and
courage in the service of the community.

Family structure,

the more powerful chiefdoms of the Southeast fluctuated in
size and stability as individual chiefs competed "with
varying success for status and power in the arenas of
warfare and ritual." Janet E. Levy, J. Alan May, and David
G. Moore, "From Ysa to Joara:
Cultural Diversity in the
Catawba Valley from the Fourteenth to the Sixteenth
Century," in Consequences 2:156.
73LeJeune's Relation of 1636, JR 10:231.
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tribal custom, and rational authority shaped the choice of
an agent to act in the best interest of the community.
Smoking the calumet symbolized peace among brothers and
unity against enemies.74

An irrevocable bond of loyalty

was cemented by the ritual.

The ability to reciprocate with

gifts and produce a new tribal identity created a fictive
kinship

legitimized by the breath of ancestors

through

the

spokesman

calumet.75

before

he

The

could

Indian

aspire

to

leader
become

inhaled

acted
a

as

a

company

commander.
James Clifton describes how a Potawatomie chief stood
up and acted as a "speaker" for five tribes at a meeting in
Montreal.

The "chief" acknowledged that "he has little

power over his own tribesmen himself, but wants to derive it
from the Governor."76

Richard White writes that this same

chief "identified so strongly with French chiefs" that he
told Governor de Callieres that "Perrot was his

'body,'

74La Potherie, History of the Savage Peoples. 1:311,
313.
75Kenton, Hearts Courageous. 275; Le Jeune's Relation,
1636, JR 10:219.
76Clifton, "Potawatomi Leadership Roles," 68.
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aiding him in all the lands of Algonquins to autoriser the
parole of Onontio."77
Assemblies and Councils sanctioned the authority of the
spokesman or captain who earned his right to speak by
service to his tribe or confederation.
included people

General assemblies

from distant regions.

If the

council

involved the nation, it usually met in the village of the
principal chief of the entire country and sometimes in the
house of this chief.78

La Potherie informs us that the

Saut de Sainte Marie became the place where the general
assemblies of all the tribes were held.79
Decisions in the assemblies were made by a plurality of
votes, but this was not necessarily a democratic process.
Brebeuf relates that the "authority of the Captains draws
over many to their views" and that "the usual way of coming
to a decision is to say to the Old Men, Do you give advice;
you are the Masters.1180 According to Peter Farb, Iroquois
council decisions had to be unanimous, so representation did

77White, Middle Ground. 40.
78Tooker, Ethnography of the Huron Indians. 48-49.
79La Potherie, History of the Savage Peoples. 1:343.
80LeJeune's Relation of 1636, JR 10:251.
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not matter.81

Whatever the mechanism for group decision

making within the various tribes and councils, the function
of the leader was to speak and act for the welfare of the
village and service of the community.
French Sovereignty and the Canadian Amalgam

Among the Canadian Indians, effective, popular leaders
became royal agents.

The combination of tribal leadership

and royal sovereignty produced a Canadian amalgam in the
person of the old captain.

Despite appearances of eguality

on the middle ground, however, French sovereignty in the New
World was based on the potential of exercising overwhelming
force.

The Indians were told that the French would not

tolerate quarrels among Indian allies.82

They would only

go to war strong and powerful and not return until they had
destroyed entire villages.83
The exclusive right to use overwhelming force is an
important

characteristic

of a modern

nation

control over the territory of its state.
monarchy

was

expanding

such

control

over

exercising

As the French
its

European

81Peter Farb, Man's Rise to Civilization: The Cultural
Ascent of the Indians of North America. Rev. 2d ed. (New
York: E.P. Dutton, 1978), 91.
82Ib i d . , 9:269
83Ibid.
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possessions in North America, it was forced to rely on the
old Indian and maritime captains who in turn were dependent
upon the affection of their people.

The old captains were

mediators who promoted themselves as masters performing
services for both the king and the people they served.
Onontio was the "Great Captain" of all the French and his
chiefs exercised his authority over their local territories.
The old captain was both mediator and master.

By using

language and ritual to establish a linkage between the
people of his post and the king of France, he was able to
exercise sovereignty over the territory of his post in a way
that

permitted

authority

him

rooted

to

in

escape
local

the

limitations

traditions

on

his

and

customary

Huron

captains

practices.
The
presented

Montagnais
themselves

sagamores
to

French

and

the

commandants

missionaries as spokesmen for their people.

and

Jesuit

Further west,

Onanghisse, a Potawatomi leader, assumed that his adoption
by the French governor would increase his power over his
tribesmen.

The Sioux chief, Tioskatin, presented himself to

the French as a bastard searching for a father.84

With

words and ritual they established mutual assistance pacts

84Clifton, "Potawatomi
Potherie, Histoire. 4:31.

Leadership

Roles,"

68;

La
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with the French maritime captains who counted on the French
crown

to

support

their

own

commercial

and

missionary

activities in Canada.
The discourse of the ancien capitaine bridged the
cultural chasm between the village world of the pavs d'en
haut and the urban base of European maritime captains.
diplomatic

language

permitted the

captains

sovereign power in the name of the king.

to

The

exercise

At the same time

the need to motivate and retain the loyalty of his followers
allowed the old captain to resist imperial pressure by
appealing to the needs and interests of his people.
The identification of French captains as animating
spirits opened the way for them to mediate between hostile
tribes and establish the domination of the French king who
was represented as the fountain of life and the producer of
iron.

The authority of the old captain depended on the

giving of gifts associated with the right to speak for his
people.

The language of mediation and mastery linked the

king to his people in the New World, but the old Canadian
captains would resist any attempt of the crown to introduce
bureaucratic

controls

distribution of gifts.

to

regulate

commerce

and

the

CHAPTER 4

Canadian Captains:

Defense and Territorial Expansion

The contrast between the old decentralized Canadian
system

through

themselves

which

with

a

handful

of

Frenchmen

friendly

Indians

to

defend

allied

the

early

settlements and the more centralized system of Louis XIV
became apparent with the arrival of Alexander Prouville,
Marquis de Tracy in 1664.
the

crisis

that

had

While the French crown weathered

led

to

the

Fronde,

New

France

experienced a time of troubles.

War with the Iroquois

disrupted

Church,

commerce,

missionaries,

became

and
the

the

mainstay

of

through
the

its

colony.

Meanwhile, the Company of New France worked to eliminate
unprofitable ventures to stave off the bankruptcy which
came anyway in 1645.1
A Communaute des Habitants, largely supported by the
Jesuits, shouldered the administrative costs of the colony

^•Eccles, France in America. 38, 52; Gustave Lanctot,
L'Administration de la Nouvelle-France (Paris:
Honore
Champion, 1929), 83.
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during this time of troubles.2
the

Communaute

Serious divisions within

became evident as the Jesuits

and the

Congregation of St. Suplice struggled over the right to
nominate the first bishop of New France in 1657.3

The

Jesuits prevailed with the appointment of Frangois de Laval
in 1659.
The new bishop of Petraea used his influence in France
to secure a stronger royal commitment to support the colony
of New France.

The bishop recommended the appointment of

Augustin de Saffray de Mezy as governor.
to

When Mezy failed

live up to his expectations and began to exercise

tyrannical authority, the bishop requested his recall.

In

the meantime de Tracy was sent with vice-regal authority.
The arrival of Daniel de Remi, seigneur de Courcelles as
governor and Jean Talon as intendant ushered in a new era
of centralized government.
Whereas the successors of Champlain had exercised
judicial authority in what was termed by Charlevoix "quite
a sovereign style,"4 the Sieur Gaudais who had been sent
as commissary along with de Mezy began the process of

2Eccles, France in America. 52.
3Ibid., 54.
4Charlevoix, New France. 3:66.
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establishing a Superior Council.

This redistribution of

authority was designed to place the military commander
under financial and judicial controls.

Both the governor

and the intendant would serve on the Council,

but the

intendant was given primary responsibility for justice,
police, finance, and commerce.5

The sovereign authority

of the governor was diluted by the division of functions.
The governors were bound to resist this diminution of their
prerogative.

Traditionally the governor exercised full

royal power as head of the provincial community, but the
appointment of an intendant responsible directly to the
king

represented

a major

step taken

by the

crown

to

restrain the governors from acting as miniature kings, to
divide their jurisdiction, and to establish bureaucratic
controls.6

Further

removed

from

royal

control,

the

commandants of the small frontier posts would continue to
exercise

effective

sovereign

authority

by

promoting

themselves as mediators and the king as master of the
people they served.

Tradition and local customs did place

real limits on the authority of post commanders, but these

5Ibid.. 67.
6Lanctot describes the attempt of the crown to
diminish the "civil11 authority of the governor as a true
"diminutio capitis.11 Administration. 21.
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limitations

could

be

overcome

by

coaxing

the

native

Americans to accept the sovereign authority of Onontio, the
great captain and master of iron.
The loyalty of the Indian captains who welcomed de
Tracy was no doubt based more on self-interest than the
chivalrous ideal of honor, but their willingness to render
homage "to the greatest of all Onontios on earth" echoes in
the discourse of the French captains who adopted Indian
ways and offered their talent in the service of France and
ultimately of Spain.

The following narrative of the words

and deeds of French and Indian captains participating in
the defense and expansion of New France in the St. Lawrence
and Mississippi

river valleys

of America

reveals

how

leaders who presented themselves as mediators actually
established themselves as masters in the territories where
they established military outposts for the French king.
The old Canadian captains expected their father to provide
the things they needed, but they were not always willing to
obey their sovereign's wishes concerning when, where, and
how they should conduct their trading activity.
Defending Canada Against the Iroquois
De

Tracy

reached

Quebec

in

June

1664

with

four

companies of the Carignan-Salieres regiment famous at that

Ill

time for its exploits in the war against the Turks.7

The

settlers and the Indians at Three Rivers welcomed the
regular troops commanded by de Tracy and the company of
volunteers brought along as reinforcements from Quebec.8
The king was making good his commitment to protect his
children from their enemies, the Iroquois.

The relation

ship between the Huron Indians and the crown described in
the speech of the Huron captain is essentially the same as
that developed between the crown and the posts in the lower
Mississippi Valley.

In French North America from the time

of Champlain until the British conquest of Canada and the
transfer

of

Louisiana

to

Spain,

the

post-commandants

maintained the conviction that the contract established
between the captain and the king was based on their mutual
obligations to provide for the tranquillity and welfare of
the local community.
The French crown took charge of New France during the
interregnum between the Company of a Hundred Associates and
the new West India Company.

The Jesuit Relations heralded

the arrival of de Tracy as indicative of the monarch's

7Jack Verney, The Good Regiment:
The CariqnanSalieres Regiment in Canada. 1665-1668 (Montreal: McGillQueen's University Press, 1991), 80-81.
8JR 49:235-239.
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determination to restore the life of the colony and rescue
New France from "the fires of the Iroquois."9

Jesuit

reports of the excitement stirred by the arrival of such a
large regiment of regular soldiers may well have sparked
the development of a "golden haze" of legend about the
"Good Regiment."
With the advantage of hindsight, Jack Verney has drawn
a more realistic picture of the Carignan-Salieres regiment
as "a workaday seventeenth-century infantry unit sent to
fight

overseas."10

At

full

strength

the

regiment

consisted of twenty captains commanding companies each of
which included a lieutenant, an ensign, and fifty enlisted
men recruited and paid by the captains with funds provided
by the minister.

Those who enlisted in the Carignan-

Salieres regiment were designated as volunteers in France
but were considered regular soldiers in Canada by way of
contrast with the Canadian volunteers led by the capitaines
de milice.
The regiment was not well-equipped for warfare on the
Canadian frontier, and the lack of snowshoes and blankets
contributed as much as poor leadership to the fiasco of the

9Ibid., 49:213.
10Verney, Good Regiment, ix.
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first winter campaign.

Courcelle's expedition against the

Mohawks, one of the five Iroquois nations, lost its way in
the blinding snow and attacked a few Indian cabins on the
outskirts of Schenectady, an Anglo-Dutch settlement.

After

a skirmish in which the Mohawks had the advantage,

the

burgomaster notified Courcelle that he had wandered into
English

territory

occupation

of

and

his

offered
village.

no

resistance
Fearing

to

the

diplomatic

complications and not knowing that war had broken out
between France and England, Courcelle returned to Canada.
Fewer than one hundred soldiers survived the campaign.
Possibly as many as four hundred had died, most of them
casualties

of

the

Canadian

winter.11

The

Canadian

volunteers proved more effective in the wars against the
Iroquois, and when the regular soldiers learned from them
the techniques of warfare and survival in the Canadian
wilderness, the campaign against the Iroquois made some
headway.12
Despite the limited success, the excitement about the
arrival of the regiment is understandable. Champlain had
won the respect of the Indians by his courage in the face

n lMd. , 45-53.
12Ibid., 55, 71.

114

of danger and by the fear he instilled in the enemies of
his Indian allies by the use of firearms.13

One of the

most effective techniques of the ancien capitaine was to
convince a potential enemy that he could call upon the
governor and the great chief of all the French to send a
force so powerful that it would be impossible to resist.
The

arrival

of

six

ships

with

over

six

hundred

men

encouraged the Canadians and their Indian allies and gave
them good reason to celebrate.
The

relation

of

1664-1665

reception by the Hurons.
Quebec,

ten

welcoming

or

twelve

delegation.

spokesman.

describes

de

Tracy's

When the Indians assembled at
of
One

their
of

chiefs
these

constituted

elders

acted

a
as

Using gestures and a symbolic presentation of

gifts, the old Huron captain hailed the "arrival of so many
soldiers"
preserve

as evidence of the monarch's willingness
and protect the Hurons

from their

to

enemies.14

His speech began as he dropped a moose-skin at the feet of
de Tracy.
Great Onontio, thou seest at thy feet the wreck
of a great country, and the pitiful remnant of a
whole world, that was formerly peopled by
countless inhabitants.
But now thou art

13Eccles, France in America. 20-21.
14JR 49:229.
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addressed by mere carcasses, only the bones of
which have been left by the Iroquois, who have
devoured the flesh after broiling it on their
scaffolds. There was left in us nothing but the
merest thread of life; and our limbs, most of
which have passed through the boiling cauldrons
of our foes, had no more strength, ■— when,
raising our eyes with extreme difficulty, we saw
on the river the ships that were bringing thee,
and, with thee, so many soldiers sent us by thy
great Onontio and ours.15
Hecontinued to present a series

of six gifts. The last

gift was the mutual understanding to be used "to promote
the

continued

nations."

firm union of the

Upon presenting the

French and Algonquin
last gift,

the

Indian

captain signaled the Algonquin chiefs "to step forward, and
offered them to M. de Tracy, to march with him and attend
him on the expedition that he was about to undertake." The
Huron "captain" stressed that the French and Algonquins
were "both Christian peoples" united in a common cause with
"one and the same end in view —
Iroquois

and

the

publication

of

the destruction of the
the

Gospel."16

The

15Ibid., 49:227, 229.
16JR 49:227. For details concerning what the Ursuline
nun, Marie de 1'Incarnation termed the "great progress" of
the gospel among the Hurons see her letter to Mere Ursule
de Ste-Catherine, Superieure des Ursulines de Tours, 29
September 1642 in Marie De L'Incarnation. Ursuline (15991672): Correspondance. ed. Dorn Guy Oury (Solesmes: Abbaye
de Saint-Pierre, 1971), 167-169.
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Indians were allies bound by a profession of loyalty to
march with their French brothers against a common enemy.
The arrival of the soldiers displayed the ability of
Champlain's

successors to deliver on their promise to

defend their Indian allies based on their relationship to
the king.

With the very visible show of force that so many

soldiers and ships furnished, the Canadian militiamen who
represented forty per cent of the adult male population of
New France,17 along with their Indian allies, proved to
be very effective during the course of three campaigns. The
French

settlers

and

their

Indian

allies

successfully

employed a tactic which later anciens capitaines continued
to use effectively.

They convinced their Mohawk enemies to

sue

presenting

for

peace

by

them

with

a

convincing

demonstration of the vast and powerful military resources
of their lord and master, the French king.
It is now known that the peace did not last because
there were deep factional divisions within the Mohawk camp.
Jack Verney has noted the failure of the French to pursue
the enemy and eliminate the three or four hundred Mohawk
warriors who survived,18 but the question of when to end

17Verney, Good Regiment. 43.
18Ibid.. 71-72.
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a conflict is always a difficult decision, and the anciens
caoitaines were always quite conservative.
their blustery rhetoric,

In spite of

they exhausted every possible

alternative before they entered into a conflict, and they
were always willing to halt a war when they were presented
with tangible evidence of satisfaction for the insult or
injury incurred.

They needed only to maintain the respect

of the Indians and habitants for the Great Chief who was
responsible for the justice essential for the tranquillity
of his vast territories.
The caoitaines de milice were the oeres de famille in
their

village

communities.

By

starting

families

and

engaging in trade, some of the soldiers of the CarignanSalieres

Regiment

built

on

the

European

tradition

of

village assemblies and perhaps adopted the practices of the
Indian

village

assemblies.19

When

they

performed

a

military function they were under the authority of the
governor.

Civilian

service

was

performed

under

the

authority of the intendant who was given responsibility for
police,

justice,

and

finances.

Yet

on

the

Canadian

frontier every subject of the king was a potential soldier,
and the legal distinction between military and civilian

19Ifeid., 104-112.
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duties gave way to the practical performance of whatever
needed to be done by Canadian habitants and their Indian
allies.20
The anciens capitaines were volunteer officers —
experienced

frontiersmen

responsible

for

recruiting,

mustering, and leading their militia companies.

Under the

old maritime system, most of them made their living in the
fur trade.
Members of the Carignan-Salieres regiment remained on
the Canadian frontier to become peres de famille. Not only
did

they

adopt

frontier

tactics

for

fighting

in

the

wilderness, but some remained in Canada, engaged in the fur
trade,
New

and established their families there.21

World

French

soldiers

were

encouraged

to

In the
become

settlers to populate the colony and relieve the king of
heavy military expenses.
With or without rank and salary under the Ordonnance
de la Marine, the Canadian pere de famille. responsible for
the defence and protection of his family and constantly
participating in frontier conflicts, performed functions

20I b i d .. 92.
21Verney, Good R e g i m e n t . 104-112.
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analogous to those of the medieval militia captains in the
cities of northern Italy and the Sagamores of Canada.
The old Huron captain who brought his warriors to
welcome de Tracy at Quebec conducted a ceremony designed to
symbolize the bond of

loyalty established between the

French king and his people.

The French captains would

employ similar language and symbols.

They became adept at

performing civic rituals on the American frontier devised
to symbolize and promote peace and tranquillity among the
allies of the French monarch while instilling fear in the
hearts of any enemy who would insult the French and their
allies and disturb or threaten the welfare of the king's
people.
The distribution of gifts became part of the bonding
process that was designed to transform many different
nations into one "obedient" city.

The Indians expressed

their willingness to sacrifice their persons and their
goods in the service of the French king, but the acceptance
of

French

sovereignty was

always

contingent

upon

the

ability of the great French captains to insure the peace
and tranquillity of their adopted people.

As in the cities

of northern Italy, peace was the ultimate goal of the
mutual assistance pact.

On the Canadian frontier peace

required reparation rather than punishment.

In the case of
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murder, for example, French justice required the execution
of the murderer, but the Indian tradition demanded that the
dead be "covered" or "raised" by the gift of a slave or
valuable goods.22

Pere Brebeuf reported that among the

Hurons
the relatives of the deceased pursue not only
him who has committed the murder, but address
themselves to the whole Village, which must give
satisfaction for it, and furnish, as soon as
possible, for this purpose as many as sixty
presents, the least of which must be of the
value of a new Beaver robe.23
Local justice also required that the ancien capitaine be
able to harangue,

advise,

and lead his people to war.

Village and provincial liberty depended on the faithful
performance of duty by members of each "obedient" company
forming an "elect" nation under the "anointed" French king.
Expanding the French Frontier:

Henri de Tonti

The language of the Canadian captains who claimed and
possessed in the name of their sovereign king the lands
drained by the Mississippi River stressed obedience and
service.

The relationship between the king and people was

built on service, but the Canadian captains established
new posts under royal sovereignty by mediating between

22White, Middle Ground. 77.
23LeJeune's Relation of 1636, JR 10:215, 217.
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Indian

tribes

and

administering

provincial inhabitants.

royal

justice

to

the

The identity of the "old" captain

developed when the Canadian captains resisted bureaucratic
controls by acting in accordance with their interpretation
of colonial interests.

The technique of using words and

force to shape the development of new European posts on the
American frontier was reflected

in the activities and

discourse of Henri de Tonti, Pierre Le Moyne, and PierreCharles Le Sueur.
When Governor Frontenac built Fort Frontenac on Lake
Ontario in 1673 as part of a complex scheme for gaining
control of the western fur trade,

he was flouting the

directives of the minister of marine.

Colbert was not

interested in new settlements which would be difficult and
expensive to protect, and
foreign policy.

Louis XIV was preoccupied with

When Rene-Robert Cavelier de La Salle

undertook two missions to the French court —

the first in

1675 to gain the approval of Louis XIV for the new fort and
the second after his famous journey to the mouth of the
Mississippi

in 1683 —

he used the standard arguments

linking economic advantages and missionary activity to the
service

of

God

and

king.24

Judging

from

24Allain, French Colonial P o l i c y . 39-42.

the

king's
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response,

La Salle quickly

learned that the strategic

argument highlighting the harassment of the king's enemies
proved most effective.

How could Louis XIV pass up an

opportunity to conquer New Biscaye at the cost of a few
ships,

two

freebooters

hundred

men,

and

the

from Saint-Domingue?

enlistment

of

fifty

After all,

La Salle

intended to recruit 15,000 Indian warriors to defeat the
Spanish.25
After the disappearance of La Salle in 1686, Tonti
tried to establish a post where the Arkansas river drains
into the Mississippi.
Salle

who

compact

had

colony

location

where

Tonti received his authority from La

himself

advanced well

policy.26
later

Tonti

commandants

beyond

chose
would

an
be

Colbert's
excellent
able

to

supplement their meager salaries with profits from the
Indian

trade.

Tonti's

early

effort

failed,

however,

because he needed soldiers to establish military control
over the territory and his retainers deserted him. He then
petitioned the king for a captain's office to tide him over

25Ibid., 40, 44.
26Allain, French Colonial Policy. 32-33. See also
Colbert's letter to Jean Talon (April 5, 1666) in Pierre
Margry, ed., Decouvertes et etablissements des francais
dans 1'ouest et dans le sud de l'Ameriaue septentrionale.
1614-1754. 6 vols. (Paris: D. Jouaust, 1876-1886), 1:7778.
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until the volume of trade would begin to offset the heavy
overhead costs of territorial control.
If he had successfully occupied the land, Tonti
would have held it under the indirect authority of the
French king who would not even impose taxes on
land.

the

As a seigneur he would be expected to fight as

vassal

to protect the

land and could himself

a

collect

"feudal dues" from the concessions granted to his men.
La Salle and Tonti opened the way for French expansion
into the lower Mississippi Valley, but Pierre Le Moyne,
sieur d'Iberville, convinced Louis XIV and his minister of
marine,

Jerome

Phelypeaux,

Comte de

Pontchartrain,

to

support his project to establish a colony and develop the
Mississippi River as an avenue of commerce.

Iberville

lived as a soldier of fortune before his appointment as a
royal

naval

captain

in

1691.27

As

commander

of

the

expedition to establish a military outpost near the mouth
of

the

Mississippi

in

1698,

he

exhibited

the

basic

qualities of a man of action who could instill loyalty in
a band of followers by engaging in exploits and developing
a reputation for achieving success against overwhelming
odds.

A brief examination of his early career and a review

27MPA:FD 2:10, n. 1.
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of his relationship with his subordinates reveals that
Iberville engaged in private enterprise and and performed
royal service in the fashion of an old Canadian captain.
The purpose of Iberville's expedition was to thwart a
possible
river's

English

attempt

mouth,28 but

to

his

establish

ability

to

control
control

of

the

his

men

depended as much on personal and familial loyalty as on the
exercise of royal authority.

Jack Holmes has recently

described Iberville as a "French army officer and colonial
explorer and administrator," the heir of a "remarkable
Norman family whose exploits helped create permanent French
Canadian settlements from the pristine wilderness."29
As a young adventurer in the American skirmishes of
the Anglo-French conflict known as "King Williams' War" in
1686, Iberville used two canoes and eleven men to capture
an English ship with twelve canons.
entire Hudson Bay in 1688,

Given command of the

he defended his crude fort

28Marcel Giraud, Histoire de la Louisiane Francaise.
5 vols. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 19531990). A History of French Louisiana. Vol. 1, The Reign of
Louis XIV. 1698-1715. trans. Joseph C. Lambert (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1974), 16-24.
29Jack D.L. Holmes, "Pierre Lemoyne, Sieur d'Iberville
et d'Ardillieres: Colonial Explorer, 1699-1702" in Joseph
G. Dawson III, ed. , The Louisiana Governors: From Iberville
to Edwards (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1990), 1.
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against an attack by three English vessels.

He did not

receive his appointment as captain of a frigate until he
went

to

France

in

1691.30 In the American wilderness

royal recognition and royal authority often came after an
aspiring adventurer performed exploits in the name of the
king with his own limited resources.
In 1698 Iberville took advantage of an opportunity to
follow the trail blazed by La Salle when he was given
command of the expedition to establish a colony at the
mouth of the Mississippi.

He was able to accomplish his

mission because he had the assistance of his brothers and
kinsmen such as Louis Juchereau de St. Denis, as well as
the ability to gain the loyalty of adventurers like Henri
de Tonti and others.

His success,

according to Jack

Holmes, lay in having "blocked both the English and the
Spanish

expansion

Iberville,

into

North

Holmes explains,

America's

heartland."

"coordinated initial Indian

policy and created the economic base on which later French
governors and intendants could build and expand" while also
setting

the

stage

for

an

"international

control over the Gulf of Mexico.31

30MPA:FD. 2:10, n. 1.
31Holmes, "Iberville," 1-3.

struggle

for
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Iberville built his case for the establishment of a
French colony at the mouth of the Mississippi River with
essentially the same arguments used by La Salle to overcome
the reluctance of Colbert to permit the expansion of French
Canada.
Iberville profited from La Salle's experience.
stressed the reality of the English presence

and

He
the

possibility of an English establishment on the Mississippi
or at Mobile Bay, and gained command of the Mississippi
expedition intended by the French crown to establish a post
near the mouth of the river designed to prevent the British
from occupying the area.

Pontchartrain postponed the

decision to support a "prolonged occupation" until after
Iberville's second voyage in December 1699.32

Even then

the crown's commitment to colonization was, according to
Allain,

"half-hearted,

at best."33

It would maintain

Louisiana only as a strategic outpost.
Iberville began his expedition in June 1698 with two
ships armed and manned with funds provided by the marine
ministry.

Charles Le Vasseur, a Canadian officer who had

served in Louisiana with La Salle was added to the crew of

32Giraud, History. 1:36.
33Allain, French Colonial Policy. 54.
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Iberville's ships along with other men with experience on
the

American

protection,

frontier.34

two

Chdteaumorant

warships

also

To

provide

commanded

sailed

from

La

by

additional

the Marquis

Rochelle

to

de

Saint

Domingue.
Iberville

gingerly

bypassed

the

best

harbor

at

Pensacola when he discovered that it had been occupied by
the Spanish.

After making his initial contact with the

Bayougoula Indians he chose a site for the first French
post,

named Fort Maurepas,

on Biloxi Bay.

Except for

Ensign de Sauvole, who was placed in command by Iberville,
the major officers of the small garrison were Canadians.
The roll of the garrison, dated August 25, 1699, listed
Iberville's brother,

Jean Baptiste Le Moyne,

Sieur de

Bienville, as Lieutenant of the King with a salary of 100
livres

and

Le Vasseur

as major.

The roll

indicated

expenditure of 326 livres for five petty officers,

63

livres for four sailors, 719 livres for eighteen Canadians,
425 for thirteen freebooters, 229 for ten laborers and 66

34Giraud, H i s t o r y . 1:23.
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for six cabin boys.

The twenty soldiers would not be paid

until the end of the year.35
The list of officers at Fort Maurepas on May 28, 1700
includes Mr. de Boisbriand, major, and Mr. de St. Denis,
Canadian officer.

Le Vasseur is listed this time as a

Canadian officer along with St. Denis.

Pierre Sidrac Dugue

de Boisbriand and Louis Juchereau de St. Denis, described
as "captains of the Canadians," by Intendant Begon, were
officers of a contingent of sixty Canadians who "arrived
from Newfoundland with Serigny."

Pontchartrain ordered

Begon to keep them as reinforcements for Iberville who
subsequently returned with the Canadians and their captains
to Fort Maurepas in December 1699.36
Iberville and his captains needed the king to supply
the capital for the start-up costs of the colony.

Royal

funds were used not only to equip the ships and pay the
recruits but also to supply the king's warehouse with gun
powder and gifts for the Indians along with food supplies.
Despite the fact that Iberville and Bienville served
the interest of the colony in a struggle against disease

35"Roll of officers, petty officers, sailors and other
persons, left in the garrison at Fort Maurepas, in the Bay
of Biloxi," in Jay Higginbotham, Fort Maurepas; The Birth
of Louisiana (Mobile: Colonial Books, 1968), 81-82.
36Giraud, H i s t o r y . 1:34-36.
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and hostile Indians,37 it suffered from the neglect of a
mother country preoccupied with continental power politics
and more often than not either unwilling or unable to
sustain

and

protect

the

new

colony.

Iberville

took

advantage of the window of opportunity that opened between
the Treaty of Ryswick, which ended the War of the League of
Augsburg in 1697,

and the outbreak of the War of the

Spanish Succession in 1701 to secure the royal resources
required by a frontier captain to establish a post.

For

Iberville and his captains the harassment of the enemies of
France was important but the ultimate goal was to establish
a French peace that would provide an atmosphere conducive
to

their

commercial

activities.

They

followed

the

directives of the crown to concentrate on the search for
mines,

but

when

it

became

clear

that

mining

in

the

Mississippi Valley would never support the colony, and that
the Canadians could not be induced to develop agriculture,
the question of the trading interests of the Canadian

37John Brice Harris,
From Old Mobile to Fort
Assumption;
A Story of the French Attempts to Colonize
Louisiana, and Destroy the Chickasaw Indians (Nashville:
The Parthenon Press, 1959), 7, 14. Patricia Dillon Woods,
French-Indian Relations on the Southern Frontier. 1699-1762
(Ann Arbor:
UMI Research Press, 1980), 171.
Holmes,
"Pierre Lemoyne, Sieur d'Iberville, 3; and "Jean Baptiste
Lemoyne, Sieur de Bienville," in Dawson, ed. , Louisiana
Governors. 12.
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officers and the poverty of the people became a central
issue in the rivalry between the commissioners and the
military commandants.
The Canadian officers were placed on the original
payroll

lists because of their ability to control the

Canadians and their frontier experience.38

Tonti and Le

Vasseur, however, died during the yellow fever epidemic.
Bienville

began

Lieutenant,

his

service

in

Louisiana

as

King's

and later reguested to be commissioned as

captain of a ship with the added honor of the Cross of St.
Louis.

Louis Juchereau de St. Denis separated himself from

the king's service rather than obey Bienville's order to
abandon a fort and did not request another commission until
1720. St. Denis and Boisbriand were called captains of the
Canadians because they knew how to muster a troop of
coureurs de bois and place themselves at the head of Indian
warriors to harass the king's enemies.
St.

Denis has achieved fame through his exploits

described in detail by Penicaut and since recounted by
numerous Louisiana historians, but his memoirs have never
been found, and his surviving correspondence is skimpy.
Consequently,

the best sources for an analysis of the

38Giraud, H i s t o r y . 1:23,

35, 39, 147.
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discourse of the anciens capitaines are Iberville's journal
and especially the report of Pierre-Charles Le Sueur's
conversations with the Indians contained in the journal
originally thought to have been written by J. B. Bernard de
la Harpe.

These experienced Canadian captains,

their

children, and the French officers who learned from them,
exercised royal authority in the Mississippi Valley and
established the French king as the great father of the
Indian nations.

The expenses of maintaining good relations

with the Indians began with Iberville and proliferated
later because it was important for an experienced captain
to impress the Indians with the wealth and power of the
king he represented.
Iberville's Journal
No doubt there is a wide gap between the rhetoric of
Iberville and the reality of the actual relations between
the captains, the Indians, and the king.

Nevertheless, his

account suggests how the French made their initial contact
with the Bayagoulas,

the Houmas,

and the Sioux and it

illustrates how the experienced captain established his
control

over the Indians by distributing presents

and

promising trade while the king received loyal servants who
expressed a willingness to harass the king's enemies.

On February 12, 1699, as Iberville traveled in a small
boat along the coastal islands searching for the mouth of
the Mississippi, he saw a campfire.

The next day he found

fresh Indian tracks which he followed until nightfall.
Knowing that the two Indians he was tracking had returned
to observe him at daybreak, Iberville placed "two hatchets,
four knives, two packages of porcelain beads, and a little
Vermillion" at the site where he and his men had camped.
Later that day, when he sighted a canoe and the Indians
fled into the woods, he crossed over to a place where the
Indians had concealed their canoes.
encountered
explorers

an
gave

"ancient
him

and

Not far from there he

very

something

to

ill

Indian."

eat

and

The
smoke.

Communicating by sign language, the old Indian requested a
campfire which they provided.

Two days later Bienville

captured an Indian woman in the woods a few miles away, and
that night Iberville brought her to the sick Indian where
he left her after giving her presents and tobacco to take
to her people.39

39Carl A. Brasseaux, ed. ,
A Comparative View of
French Louisiana. 1699 and 1762: The Journals of Pierre Le
Movne
d'Iberville
and Jean-Jacaues-Blaise
d'Abbadie
(Lafayette, La.: Center for Louisiana Studies, 1979), 31.
Hereafter cited as Journals.

The next day the old Indian died and five Indians
(including two women) who had been captured by Iberville's
Canadians began chanting.

The Indians remained distrustful

in spite of the gifts, but the next day Iberville coaxed
three Indians to come on board one of his ships.

There he

"greatly impressed them" by firing several cannon loaded
with solid shot.40

When Iberville arrived at Bienville's

campsite on February 17, he found a Bayougoula "chief or
captain" who greeted him at the seashore by rubbing his
hands on Iberville's face and chest.
ceremony,

After the greeting

the explorers and the Indians gathered near

Bienville's tent where they all smoked an "iron peacepipe,
made in the form of a ship with a white flag marked with a
fleur

de

lvs. and

embellished

with

beads."

While

presenting the Indians with "hatchets, knives, blankets,
shirts, beads, and other things valued by them," Iberville
"made them understand that with this calumet I had rendered
them

united

nation."41

with

the

French

and

they

were

now

one

When Iberville and his Bayagoula brothers

arrived at the Houma village on March 20, the Houmas began

40Ibid., 33.
41Ibid.. 34. On the history of the calumet ceremony
see Donald J. Blakeslee, "The Origin and Spread of the
Calumet Ceremony," American Antiquity 46 (1981): 759.
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singing and the Bayagoulas sang on his behalf.

They

greeted the French in their customary manner and escorted
them to a village assembly where they smoked the peace pipe
and

participated

in

festivities

which

lasted

until

midnight.42
Iberville thus began the process of establishing a
French peace among the Indian tribes.

Once again he was

able to build on the work of La Salle and Tonti.

He noted

in his journal that the Houmas "spoke very highly of Tonti,
who had spent five days at their village."43

His Indian

allies provided guides to lead him further up the river.
With information provided by a Taensa warrior, he was able
to compose a chart of the various tribes and calculate the
distance in leagues from one tribe to the next along the
Mississippi.

He traveled north from the Houma village

until he was certain that a fork of the river reported in
several accounts of the Mississippi explorations did not
actually exist and that he was indeed on the great river.
Iberville departed the Houma village to return to his
ships on March 23.

On April 8 he began construction of

42Journals. 53-54.
43I b i d . , 56.
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Fort Maurepas.

He set sail for France on May 4 and reached

Rochefort on July 2, 1699.44
Le Sueur's Account

Pierre-Charles Le Sueur, born in Artois in 1659, made
the voyage to Canada as a young man.
the

fur

trade,

he

Initially involved in

was commissioned

by the

Comte

Frontenac, the governor-general of Canada, to

de

construct a

fort on an island in the Mississippi in 1695.

Le Sueur

began immediately to bring the Indian tribes under royal
control. He brought a Sioux chief to Montreal so that the
Comte de Frontenac could receive his tribesmen "among the
number of his children, as he had done to all the other
nations."

Things did not go smoothly, however.

The chief

died before he left Montreal, and Le Sueur feared that the
Governor

might interfere with his effort to

exploit the

lead and

copper mines he had discovered.

traveled to

He

France where the crown granted him permission to open the
mines in 1697, but he was captured by the English on the
return voyage and he destroyed his commission authorizing
him to exploit the mines to prevent it from falling into
the hands of the English.
Sueur

returned

to

After securing his release Le

France where

he was

awarded

a

new

44Higginbotham, Fort Maurepas. 24, 31-32; Journals.
72, 76.
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commission in 1698.

Another transatlantic crossing proved

fruitless so the year 1699 found Le Sueur back in France
where he learned of Iberville's Mississippi enterprise.45
Le Sueur sailed with Iberville on his second voyage.
He arrived at Biloxi along with St. Denis and Boisbriant by
January, 1700.

Pontchartrain authorized Le Sueur to join

the expedition to develop the mines he had previously
discovered in the Illinois country.46
appear

on the

Biloxi

officer

lists,

indication that he was paid a salary.

His name does not
and there

is

no

Apparently it was

after completing the Illinois expedition where Le Sueur
established a post called Fort Huilier that Iberville gave
him the rank of "lieutenant general of the jurisdiction of

45[Jean-Baptiste Benard de La Harpe], Historical
Journal of the Settlement of the French in Louisiana, ed.
Glenn R. Conrad, trans. Virginia Koenig and Joan Cain
(Lafayette: University of Southwestern Louisiana, 1971),
28-29. The manuscript of the journal is signed by Benard
de La Harpe, but Marc de Villiers says in his Histoire de
la Fondation de la Nouvelle Orleans [(Paris:
Imprimerie
nationale, 1917), 24] that it was not written by La Harpe.
His suggestion that it might have been written by the
Chevalier de Beaurain is accepted as a fact by Marcel
Giraud in Histoire de la Louisiane francaise. 3:399.
Conrad notes, however, that "neither Villiers nor Giraud...
offer
documentary proof"
on behalf
of
Beaurain's
authorship. See the editorial note on p. 1 of his
translation of the Historical Journal.
46Giraud, H i s t o r y . 1:36.
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Mobile" in July 1702.47

Le Sueur was sixteen years older

than St. Denis and Boisbriant, described as captains of the
Canadians and listed on the officer roll of the garrison at
Fort Maurepas.

His age, experience, and extensive exercise

of royal authority place him on the same level as Iberville
and Tonti.

Marcel Giraud characterizes Le Sueur and Tonti

as examples of men who "contributed effectually to the
diffusion

of

French

influence

by

their

loyalty

and

achievements."48
Serious obstacles had delayed Le Sueur's effort to
open the mines in Illinois, but now he would be able to
pursue

his

authority.

project under

the umbrella

of

Iberville's

He was related to Iberville and Bienville by

his marriage to their aunt.

His son, Jean Paul Le Sueur,

would later mobilize the Choctaw against the Natchez in
1730 and play an important role in Bienville's campaign
against the Natchez and Chickasaws.49
Through his experience in Canada Pierre-Charles Le
Sueur learned how to control and maintain the loyalty of

47Ibid., 1:47.
48Ibid., 1:6.
49MPA:FD. 2:16, n. 1 and Ibid.. 4:52, n. 2.
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men

who had

taken

up

"the

ways of

the

Indians."50

According to Sauvole, there would be "no lack of French
travelers" in Louisiana, but the men he termed "Canadians"
were hard to manage and not very helpful.

On August 4,

1701, Sauvole informed the Ministry of Marine that
Mr. Iberville will
doubtless agree about their
unruliness and their inconstancy on his arrival when
his brother and the other Canadian officers will
assure him of their disobedience and of the
independent air that they would like to assume.51
Sauvole felt that they had left Canada to wander around the
Mississippi Valley "only in order not to work at all and
not to be dependent

on any one whomsoever."

He was

convinced that regular soldiers "are unquestionably more
suitable to guard posts and ... would cost the King much
less."

Yet if the minister "thought that it was not

possible to do without them," Sauvole indicated that the
best

of the Canadians might be selected for duty.52

After all, Le Sueur had demonstrated that they could be
controlled. Sauvole went on to say:
There were bets here that the people whom he had
brought from France for his journey to the Sioux
would
not
take
him
to
the
Bayagoulas.

50Sauvole to [Pontchartrain?], August 4, 1701, MPA:FD.
2:13.
51I b i d ., 2:12.
52 Ibid.
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Nevertheless he went where he wished and
returned with the same men.
I would agree,
however, that the Canadians are strong, quick
and alert for journeys but it is necessary that
the game please them. They take up the ways of
the Indians, but the surest way among them is to
have something to give them.5-*
Sauvole equated Canadians with savages, characterizing them
as motivated by greed,
revenge.

hate,

and a strong desire for

Noble Frenchmen, by contrast, were motivated by

honor, justice, truth, and service of the king.
Tonti, Iberville, and Le Sueur not only demonstrated
their ability to control the Canadians, but convinced the
crown that Canadian militia units and loyal Indians could
supplement the few regular troops sent over from France.
Canadian officers constituted a separate classification
during the early years of the colony.

The king could

depend on them to control the Canadians who were not
classified as regular soldiers.

Pontchartrain and his

successors, however, remained suspicious of the Canadians.
The minister would probably have preferred to depend on
regular officers and troops, but neither Ponchartrain, nor
Antoine Crozat, nor the Company of the West were willing to
underwrite

the

cost

of

additional

regular

troops.

Iberville, Bienville, Boisbriant, St. Denis, and a well-

53I b i d . . 2:13.

140

connected relation by marriage like Le Sueur could use
Canadian recruits and Indians to supplement the few regular
troops.
Effective

control

over

the

territory

of

the

Mississippi Valley was established by Iberville with the
help of Tonti, St. Denis, Bienville, and Le Sueur.

They

all used similar methods in dealing with the Indians.

Much

later, these methods were described by Pierre Frangois de
Rigaud, Marquis de

Vaudreuil as part of the knowledge and

experience necessary to deal effectively with the Indians
that he, as governor of Louisiana, attributed to the ancien
capitaine.54

The

effectiveness

of

these

methods

was

recognized by George Rogers Clark who was able to adopt and
use the same basic procedure to establish control over the
Illinois country during the American Revolution.55
The

basic procedure used by Le

Sueur during his

expedition in 1700 is described in La Harpe's journal.

La

Harpe shows that Le Sueur was sensitive to the needs and
desires of the Indians.

For example, upon his arrival at

54Vaudreuil to Rouille,
5:69-70.

April 28,

1751

in MPA:FD.

55George Rogers Clark, Col. George Rogers Clark's
Sketch of His Campaign in the Illinois in 1778-9.
(Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Co., 1869; repr., Arno Press
& The New York Times, 1971), 38.
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a Sioux village on July 30, 1700, Le Sueur presented its
chief with "some merchandise to persuade him to maintain
the peace."

He had previously promised the Illinois chief

that he would establish a peace with the Sioux.

After

distributing the gifts, Le Sueur informed the chief "that
the king of France did not wish anyone to bloody further
this river, and that he had sent him to tell the chief that
if the Indians were obedient to his message, the Frenchmen
would give them everything they needed."56
La Harpe also records that on September 5, Le Sueur
met five Canadians who had been attacked by Indians.

When

the Canadians recognized their attackers, Le Sueur had his
men shout to them "not to approach nearer or they would
shoot."

When the Indians acted surprised by the hostility

of the French, Le Sueur
responded that after what they had done to the
five [Canadians] who were present, there was
reason to be distrustful of them.
For the
security of his commerce, however, it was
absolutely necessary to be at peace with all
nations, and so he did not insist that the
Indians pay for the pillage they had committed.
He added that the king, their master and his,
wished all his subjects to be able to navigate
this river without fear of being insulted.57

56Historical Journal. 45.
57Ibid.. 47.
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Another

group

of

Indians

expedition on September 15.
he had more

threatened

Le

Sueur's

He tricked them into thinking

men than he actually did.

toward the Frenchmen with a calumet.

The Indians moved

They explained to Le

Sueur that a member of their tribe had accidentally killed
a

Canadian

deserter.

The

Indians

then

produced

companion of the accident victim as a witness.

the

Le Sueur

used a name recognized by the Indians as referring to the
governor of Canada.

He said to the Indians that Onontio,

"being their father and his, they only needed to go to the
governor as soon as possible" and the Frenchman's blood
would be washed from their hands.58

Le Sueur explained

to them that the king "had sent him to find the entrance of
the river" and that he "wished the nations who were living
along it, as well as anyone under his protection, to live
in peace."59
Le Sueur was careful to respect the hierarchy that
existed among the Indian tribes that he encountered.

One

tribe requested that he "settle on the Mississippi in the
area around the mouth of the Saint Pierre River, where the
Ayavois,

the Otoctakas,

58I b i d ., 50.
59 Ibid.

and the Sioux,

as well as the
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French could come and go freely."

These Indians made their

speech and "began, as was their custom, to weep on the head
of M. Le Sueur and said ... have pity on us."

Le Sueur was

aware that "his settlement on the Blue River would not
please the eastern Sioux who are, so to speak, the masters
of the other Sioux ... probably because they were the first
provided guns by the French." Le Sueur carefully explained
his situation.

He "told the Indians that he was sorry not

to have known their wishes sooner,

since he had come

expressly for them and had settled on their land."

He

explained why it would be difficult to change his plans,
gave them gifts, and "invited them ... to the fort that he
was going to build."

He went on to say "that when all were

assembled there, he would instruct them about the wishes of
the king, their master and his."60
The French had introduced the concept of the king as
pere de famille to the Indians in Canada.

Champlain and

the Jesuits certainly instilled in the Canadian Indians the
idea that they consider themselves children professing
obedience to a powerful father.

One finds in the Indian

dialogue reported by the French a recurring reference by
the Indians to themselves as obedient children.

60I b i d . . 51.
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When the Mantantous and the Oujalespoitous reached
Fort

Huilier

on November

26,

1700,

Chief

Quacantapai

reported to Le Sueur that Tioseate, the chief who had died
in Montreal in 1696, had asked Le Sueur "to forget the
insult of the Mendeouacantous and to have pity on his
brothers by giving them powder and bullets."

Pointing out

that powder and bullets were necessary both for defense
against

enemies

and

for

hunting

game

to

feed

their

families, Quacantapai said: "here are your children, your
brothers and sisters.

It is up to you whether they live or

die.

[They] will live if you give them powder and bullets

and,

on

the

contrary,

they

will

die

if

you

refuse

them."51
Le Sueur was adept at taking advantage of the Indians'
respect for the patriarchal authority of the king as well
as their need for European goods.

Too weak to subdue the

Sioux and recognizing their traditional propensity for war,
Le Sueur gave them the task of cultivating the land.

He

promised them the king's protection if they would "abandon
their wandering life and come form a village near his
fort."

Le Sueur was also able to find a way around a royal

61I b i d . . 55.
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order preventing Frenchmen from hunting for beaver.

He

explained to the Indians that the
king, their chief and his, ... had forbidden him
to traffic in beaver skins, knowing that hunting
obliged the French to separate and expose
themselves
to
being
attacked
by
their
enemies.62
As a result Le Sueur settled in an area where there was an
abundance of animals.

The Indians could bring the skins

and exchange them for the supplies they needed.

Le Sueur

warned the Indians that "they could not get along without
French merchandise, and that the only way to secure it was
to

cease

waging

war

on

the

nations

allied

with

the

French.1163
On December 1, the Mantantous entertained Le Sueur at
a feast in their village.

The speech of Quacantapai, chief

of the Mantantous, recorded in La Harpe's journal makes it
clear that since the Mantantous and the French were the
children

of

the

same

father,

his

tribe

and

the

Mendeouacantous whom he would invite to unite with the
French,

should

Frenchmen.

no

longer

be

viewed

as

Sioux

but

as

"The few men that you see in this tent accept

the present that you gave them, and have decided to obey

62I b i d ., 56.
63Ibid.
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this great chief of all nations of whom you have spoken,"
Quacantapai said.
Thus, you no longer need look upon us as Sioux,
but as Frenchmen.
Instead of saying that the
Sioux are unfortunate men who are not properly
disposed, and who are only suited to pillage and
stealing from the French, you will say, 'My
brothers who do not have the proper disposition
are unfortunate; we must try to change this.
They steal from us, but to prevent them from
doing so, I shall see that they do not lack
iron, that is to say, all kinds of merchandise.'
If you do that, I assure you that in a short
time the Mantantous will become French, and they
will no longer have the vices with which to
reproach them.64
The exchange between Le Sueur and the Sioux chiefs
focused on the need of the Indians for European merchandise
and the determination of the French to maintain peace among
the Indian tribes so that the Mississippi river could be
used as an avenue of commerce.

As obedient children, the

Indians had to avoid "insulting" the French by injuring
Canadians and interfering with their commerce.

Then the

king and their Canadian father would have pity on them and
provide the powder and bullets that meant the difference
between life and death.

The purpose of the new French post

was not only to provide protection for the Indians whose
task was to cultivate the land.

64I b i d . . 57.
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bring skins to Le Sueur's fort to exchange for the things
they needed.
The dialogue between Iberville and his captains and
the Indians in the Mississippi Valley clearly reflects
methods and procedures that originated in Canada with the
social interaction of maritime captains, Indian leaders,
and missionaries.
the

door

for

the

The calumet ceremony was used to open
trading

of

European

merchandise

in

exchange for pelts and deerskins and set the stage for the
experienced Canadian captains to establish frontier posts
as part of a colonial infrastructure which would not only
support,

but

also

extend

well

beyond

exigencies of a strategic military outpost.

the

immediate

The career of

Louis Juchereau de St. Denis provides more insight into the
functions of the old captain as a link between the king and
his people in the new Louisiana colony.

CHAPTER 5

Louis Juchereau De St. Denis, Ancien Capitaine

Louis Juchereau de St. Denis used the techniques of
the ancien capitaine with amazing effectiveness.
Natchitoches

Post he

created a frontier

With the

institutional

structure that provided a means for controlling frontier
territory under French, Spanish, and, eventually, American
dominion.

But although St. Denis has achieved fame in

Louisiana as the founder of Natchitoches, the first French
settlement west of the Mississippi, his true historical
significance lies in the way he embodied the ideal of the
ancien capitaine.

In this chapter I will discuss St.

Denis's position as a royal officer responsible for Indian
relations and the connection between his trading activity
and

royal

service

which

typified

that

of

the

ancien

capitaine. It will then become clear why, by the time St.
Denis died in 1744, the Natchitoches Post had developed
special

importance

in

Louisiana

History.

As

its

commandant, St. Denis had successfully defended his post
during the Natchez revolt which had threatened the very
148

Louis Juchereau De St. Denis
1676-1744

Bust at the North End of Front Street
in the Natchitoches Historic District
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survival of the colony from 1729 until 1732.

He had also

established a clandestine trade with Mexico against
overwhelming odds, and under his leadership Natchitoches
supplied

New

Orleans

with

cattle,

horses,

and

other

commodities.
St.

Denis'

career demonstrates

first that

in the

eighteenth century a young man's opportunity to gain wealth
and territory in Louisiana depended as much on his position
in the Canadian kinship network as it did on his rank as an
military officer of the crown.

St. Denis was a cousin of

Iberville and the eleventh child of a father who received
letters of nobility for service in defense of Canada.
Members of the Juchereau-Duchesnay family were prominent
jurists near Chartres when Louis's grandfather emigrated to
Canada.

There

Nicolas

Juchereau,

Louis's

father,

established a seigneurie at Beauport located across the
river from Quebec.1
As a young Canadian captain in 1700, St. Denis joined
Iberville on his second voyage to Louisiana at the head of
his own company.

He presented himself to French and Indian

refugees in Louisiana as the father who would supply the

1Ross Phares, Cavalier in the Wilderness: The Story
of the Explorer and Trader Louis Juchereau de St. Denis
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1952), 5859.
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things they lacked. He retained Canadians and Indians in
his personal militia company because men were willing to
follow a "master of iron" who mastered also their languages
and symbolic rituals.

He presented himself as a noble

servant of the French king, but he earned the respect of
friends and enemies as the "Great White Chief." St. Denis
needed the support of the French crown to create his
trading station which developed as a microcosm of the
French kingdom.

The king,

in turn,

needed the

loyal

service of St. Denis and his successors to maintain royal
control

of

the

frontier

territory

and

its

diverse

population.
St. Denis gained the loyalty of a band of Indians and
Frenchmen that eventually became the basis for a legend
expressed vividly in the "Ballad of St. Denis," but his
reputation for being a "valiant Frenchman" aspiring to
"prove his monarch's claim,"2 must be critically assessed
as a product of nationalistic thinking that places too much
emphasis on the role of the modern state and has caused
many

historians

to

overlook

the

importance

of

local

2Germaine Portre-Bobinski and Clara Mildred Smith,
Natchitoches: The Up-to-Date Oldest Town in Louisiana (New
Orleans: Dameron-Pierson, 1936), 57. See the Appendix for
the complete text of Grace Tarleton Aaron's "Ballad of St.
Denis."
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autonomy in colonial Louisiana.

St. Denis's success as an

ancien capitaine depended less on his loyalty to France
than his ability to satisfy his people with the power,
prestige, and material goods they demanded.
At the dawn of the new century, St. Denis explored the
river valleys of Louisiana and with Bienville chose a site
to build the first French fort on the Mississippi.

He led

several expeditions up the Red River after his first trip
with Bienville.

In 1702 he assisted Tonti in diplomatic

negotiations with various Indian tribes which produced a
temporary cessation of hostilities between the Chickasaws
and Choctaws. Only after Bienville went to Biloxi in 1701
to take command of the colony at the death of Sauvolle was
St. Denis placed in command of Fort St. John, the fort he
helped Bienville build on the Mississippi.3
When a decision was made to abandon the fort in 1707,
St. Denis took up residence along the river.
exercised

control

over

the

Indians

under

There he

Bienville's

authority, but he refused to obey his commander's order to
rejoin his company at Mobile.

3Phares, C a v alier. 27-33.
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he did not wish to serve the Icing any longer.4

St.

Denis's action was a response to the crown's failure to
provide adequate funds for the salaries of officers and
soldiers during the critical years of the War of the
Spanish Succession, 1703-1712.

Bienville had been advised

to compensate the officers with goods from the king's
warehouse, but supply ships were never on time and for
several years not a single ship reached Louisiana from
France.5

Apparently St. Denis felt that he stood to gain

more by trading with the Indians than by living on an
unpaid salary.
St. Denis thus went to live among the Indians. The
Indians supplied food, and though there was little in the
way of goods that could be exchanged, he somehow gained the
loyalty of the Indians, perhaps by helping defend them from
their enemies.

St. Denis may well have established contact

4Bienville to Pontchartrain, October 27, 1711, MPA;FD
3:166; Giraud, History. 1:216; Phares, Cavalier. 34; Jay
Higginbotham, Old Mobile:
Fort Louis de la Louisiane.
1702-1711 (Mobile, Ala.:
Museum of the City of Mobile,
1977), 293.
5Marcel Giraud, "France and Louisiana in the Early
Eighteenth Century," Mississippi Valley Historical Review
36 (1950), 662.
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with the Spanish in Pensacola,6 and it could have been in
response

to

his

initiative

that

Antoine

de

La

Mothe

Cadillac, appointed governor in 1712, ordered him to go to
Natchitoches to find Father Francisco Hidalgo and establish
trade with the Spanish.
The Natchitoches Post and The Western Trade
Father Hidalgo was a Franciscan missionary who had
written a letter to the governor of Louisiana when Spain
decided to abandon his mission in Texas in 1711.7

By

seeking French help to support his work among the Tejas
Indians, the Franciscan friar may have been motivated by
the desire to take advantage of the competition between
France and Spain to convince the Spanish government to
maintain

his

mission.8 For

whatever

reason

and

from

6Andre Penicaut, Fleurs de Lvs and Calumet: Being the
Penicaut Narrative of French Adventure in Louisiana, trans
and ed. Richebourg Gaillard McWilliams (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1953), 104-105.
7Abstracts of Letters from Cadillac, Dirigoin and
Bienville to Crozat, October, 1713, MPA:FD 3:176.
8Phares, Cavalier. 39; Donald E. Chipman, Spanish
Texas. 1519-1821 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992),
110-111; Robert S. Weddle, San Juan Bautista: Gateway to
Spanish Texas (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1968),
93-97; Elizabeth A. John, Storms Brewed in Other Men's
Worlds: The Confrontation of Indians. Spanish, and French
in the Southwest. 1540-1795 (College Station: Texas A&M
University Press, 1975), 196-198, 203-205; Carlos E.
Castaneda, Our Catholic Heritage in Texas. 7 vols. (Austin:
Von-Boeckmann-Jones, 1936-1958), 2:21-23, 45-69.
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whatever source it came, the letter was placed in the hands
of the newly-appointed governor.
Cadillac had instructions from Antoine Crozat, the
wealthy French financier who agreed to relieve the king's
colonial financial burden in return for a trading monopoly.
As head of the colony's proprietary government,

Crozat

ordered the new governor to search for mines and establish
trade with Mexico.9

St. Denis was ready to assist the new

governor at a time when Bienville nursed jealous feelings
toward the man who had been placed in command of the
colony.10

In supporting Bienville, St. Denis was acting

9Ibid., 37-38; Lamothe Cadillac to Pontchartrain,
October 26, 1713, MPA:FD 2:180-181; Historical Journal. 8990.
10Bienville had never actually been appointed governor
of Louisiana. From the death of Sauvolle to the appointment
of Cadillac in 1710, he served in the capacity of
commandant-general, but as late as 1711 his official rank
was that of a naval guard. Bienville to Pontchartrain,
October 27, 1711 in MPA:FD 3:169. Giraud, History 1:225.
O'Neill, Church and State. 113, n. 42. By 1715 Bienville
had been promoted to the rank of captain commanding the
Mississippi river area.
Technically he was no longer
commandant-general, but he functioned as such and even
presented himself to the Indians as governor while Cadillac
was absent in Illinois. Bienville to Pontchartrain,
September 1, 1715, MPA:FD. 184-189. Historical Journal. 8990. At the time he was commissioned as Commandant General
of Louisiana on September 20, 1717 Bienville was addressed
as "our King's Lieutenant in our said province of
Louisiana." Commission For Bienville As Commandant General
of Louisiana, September 20, 1717 in MPA:FD 3:224-225.
Bienville to the Regency Council, May 10, 1717 in Ibid..
219-220.
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as an ancien capitaine. as more of an independent operator
than his status as a soldier would suggest.

And that is

precisely what Governor Cadillac needed when he called on
St.

Denis to lead the expedition to Natchitoches:

frontier

diplomat

who

could

establish

an

a

economic

enterprise in a hostile environment.
By the time Cadillac "contracted" with St. Denis to
undertake the expedition up the Red River, a French effort
to sell merchandise
failed.11
"would

not

in both Havana and Vera

Cruz had

According to Penicaut, the Spanish governor,
even

hear

of

any

trade."12

The

viceroy

ordered the captain of the ship to "set sail immediately
and go home," and the French were told to keep their goods
out of Mexico.

Bienville, now serving as commandant under

the new governor, wrote in October 1713 that he did not
think it "possible to carry on commerce in Louisiana large
enough for a company."

Trade with the Spaniards, he went

on to say "is very uncertain both by way of the Red River
and by St. Bernard's Bay."

He did not think that St. Denis

would "succeed in his journey by the Red River because
there are four hundred leagues to travel through several

11MPA:FD 3:177; Chipman, Spanish Texas. 103.
12Penicaut, Fleurs de Lvs. 144.
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Indian nations [that are] always at war with each other."
Moreover, a long distance lay between these Indians and the
Spanish settlements, and St. Denis was likely to find only
"half-breeds who have nothing but livestock and little
money.1,13
Like Robert Cavelier de La Salle and Iberville, St.
Denis would do the job now for Antoine Crozat, the new
proprietor (indirectly for the crown) at a minimum
cost —

always a primary consideration.

St. Denis needed

only a few soldiers because he recruited the Natchitoches
Indians who had been forced to leave their ancestral home
when floods destroyed their crops in 1705.

At that time

the Natchitoches had asked St. Denis for a place to settle,
and he had sent them to live among the Colapissas.14
St. Denis must have used the words and rituals of the
ancien capitaine to resettle the refugees and earn their
trust because according to Penicaut, they now followed him
willingly.15
In 1713 St. Denis returned with the Natchitoches to
their ancestral

lands where traders,

13Abstract of a letter
October 1713, MPA:FD 3:178.

from Bienville

14Penicaut, Fleur de Lvs. 100-105.
15Ibid.. 145.

missionaries,

and

to Crozat,
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soldiers would interact with the native Americans to create
a fictive kinship network called the Natchitoches Post.
When the War of the Spanish Succession disrupted supplies
from France, it was a simple matter for St. Denis to send
Penicaut, who had lived among the Natchitoches and the
Colapissas

"to

the

Colapissa

village

to

get

the

Nassitoches [sic] and bring them with their families to
Biloxi, so that he could take them along with him to their
old home on the Red River."16
"people"

began

when

St.

The process of creating a

Denis

instructed

concerning their duties and obligations.

the

Indians

His tedious and

difficult task of opening avenues for intercolonial trade
would

strengthen his position with the

Indians,

while

producing the happy side effect of a marriage alliance with
the family of Diego Ramon, the Spanish commandant of the
presidio protecting what would become the northern border
of Mexico.
bride,

Long before St. Denis married his Spanish

however,

he used

the techniques

of the

ancien

capitaine to become the "father" of many "children."

16Ibid. Penicaut indicated that St. Denis brought the
Natchitoches back to their ancestral lands during the year
1712.
It is possible that the migration took place in
stages, but the written passport issued to St. Denis is
dated September 12, 1713. Chipman, Spanish Texas. 104.
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Penicaut

describes

St.

Denis's

meeting

with

the

Natchitoches and the Doustinony, who joined their brothers
as clients of their French patron. The Doustiony had never
left their ancestral lands.

"When M. de St. Denis got

there, writes Penicaut,
he assembled the chiefs of the Doustiony and the
Nassitoches and told them, in the presence of
the Chief of the Tonicas, that they must sow
seed in their fields, and that he was going to
have grains distributed among them, which he had
brought along for that very purpose; for
henceforth there would always be Frenchmen
living among them.17
St. Denis presented himself to the Indians as a pere de
famille responsible for the cultivation of the patriarchal
domain.

But he also established himself as master of the

household and the Indians as the servants of their French
master.
of

In "the future theirs would be the responsibility

feeding the Frenchmen who

stayed there"

Penicaut

reports that he told them, and
therefore, he exhorted them to work at the task
unceasingly and informed them that they would
have nothing to fear from other savages as long
as they all stood closely united.
Penicaut went on to describe how St. Denis gave the Indians
iron tools and instructed them to clear the forest and
build a warehouse and living guarters for the French.

17Penicaut, Fleurs de Lvs. 148-149.
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two huts

of the primitive trading

station were

built

before St. Denis made his long trek into Mexico in search
of Father Hidalgo.
possibly

in

Fort St. Jean Baptiste was built later,

1716,

after St.

Denis helped the

Spanish

Franciscans to return to their abandoned missions.18
Between 1714 and 1716 St. Denis proceeded with his very
difficult task of establishing commercial relations with
the Spaniards.

First he made contact with the Assinais who

promised to lead him to the Spaniards after he gave them
presents.

St. Denis persuaded the Assinais to give him

four guides who

then

led him to

the

identified as the Presidio del Norte.19
made

contact

with

the

Spanish

family

Spanish

village

Here St. Denis
responsible

for

protecting the border of the Spanish Empire and maintaining
its restrictive trade regulations.
After waiting six weeks for the Spanish captain at the
presidio to contact his superior about the possibility of
trading with the French, St. Denis was escorted to the
Spanish governor in Coahuila.

St. Denis sent orders back

to his men at Presidio de Norte to return to Natchitoches

18Ibid., 149; Fray Juan Agustin Morfi, History of
Texas. 1673-1779. 2 vols. (Albuguergue: Quivira Society,
1935), 1:169-170; Chipman, Spanish Texas. 104; Giraud, A
History of French Louisiana. 2:187.
19Penicaut,

Fleurs de L v s . 150-51.
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because the governor had decided to send him to the viceroy
of Mexico.

St. Denis stayed in Coahuila almost a year

before undertaking the journey to see the viceroy.

It was

during this time that he established his connections with
the family of Captain Diego Ramon whose granddaughter he
would later marry and then leave with her family, promising
to return later to bring her to Mobile.20
St.

Denis's

relationship

with

the

Ramon

family,

however, remained tenuous until after his journey to Mexico
City.

It was the duty of every official to enforce the

trade

laws which

merchandise.

strictly prohibited

importing

French

St. Denis was imprisoned in Mexico City, and

after his release, it became apparent that open trade was
impossible.

Before St. Denis began his journey back to

Coahuila, the viceroy offered him a company of calvary in
order

to

persuade

him

to

serve

the

King

of

Spain.

According to Penicaut, the Louisiana cavalier "told him
that he had taken an oath of fidelity to his King, whose
service he would quit only at death."21
Ross Phares' account of St. Denis's adventures, based
on an extensive study of Spanish documents, clearly reveals

20I b i d . , 153,

193.

21Ibid., 183-84,

193.
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that St. Denis did not have an easy time pursuing his goals
in Texas
territory

and Mexico.
with

Canadians.

a

He

He marched

small

returned

Assinais to Mobile.

force

into hostile

of

twenty-one

Spanish

twenty-four
of

them

French

from

the

Then, finding himself a prisoner of

the Spaniards, he "boasted that his imprisonment at the Rio
Grande had been voluntary and enjoyable.1,22

Ultimately,

St. Denis succeeded in captivating his captors.
Legal proceedings in Mexico City produced documents
which demonstrate that the experienced Canadian captain was
"a master at the art of choosing his topics and phrases"
and "a past master at the art of omission."23

St. Denis

was obviously guilty of bringing merchandise across
frontier that was closed to foreign trade.24

a

Hostile

Spaniards had accused him of lying and cheating and would
continue to do so.

The old captain cleverly omitted any

reference to the merchandise he brought with him or the
storehouses he had built on the Red River.

He concentrated

on Father Hidalgo's

invitation and the service he was

rendering

and

to

God

king.

22Phares, Cavalier. 66-69.
23Ibid., 70.
24Ibid., 51.

He

recommended

the
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reestablishment of the Spanish missions in Texas, which of
course implied the reoccupation of Texas by Spain.25
may

or

may

not

have

boldly

proclaimed

his

He

perpetual

allegiance to the French king as Penicaut reported, but he
did sidestep the question of becoming a Spanish subject.
After his release from prison in Mexico, St. Denis
accepted a position as guide for a Spanish expedition to
reoccupy the Texas missions.
salary

as

the

Spanish

independent operator,

He would receive the same

commanding

officer.26

As

an

St. Denis bargained for the best

deal.
Upon his return to the presidio of San Juan Bautista,
St. Denis took advantage of an opportunity to gain favor
with his fiancees's grandfather who, up to that point had
envisioned another marriage alliance for his granddaughter.
The Indians had deserted the presidio,

and failure to

control frontier Indians threatened a loss of revenue and
prestige for the Ramon family.27

The task of restoring

the loyalty and services of the Indians opened the way for
St. Denis to demonstrate his expertise and prepare the

25Ibid., 70, 76-77.
26Ibid.. 79.
27I b i d . , 85. See also Penicaut, Fleurs de L y s . 190-92.
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ground

for

establishing

trading

activities

with

the

Spaniards.
St.

Denis

caught

traveling slowly.

up

with

the

Indians

who

were

They gathered around him in a circle,

and he addressed them in Spanish.

He acknowledged their

longstanding grievances, reminded them that the governorhad "always been kind and upright" and was not personally
guilty of having "wronged any one of you."

He went on to

say that "the old chief has been too weak with his own
people— that is all you can say against him."

St. Denis

then explained that the governor
pledges his faith that no Spaniard shall be
allowed to set his foot in your village without
your express consent, and that every sort of
protection which you may claim shall be extended
over your tribe.
He then suggested the futility of leaving the land of their
ancestors without knowing where they would go or what
hostile tribes they would have to fight.

St. Denis ended

his speech with the observation that they could always
undertake their "desperate enterprise of emigration" if the
governor failed to abide by his promises.28
The Indians were persuaded to return to their homes,
the Spaniards were greatly

28Quoted by Phares,

impressed,

Cavalier. 86-88.
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empire in Texas received a new lease on life.

Soon after

his return to San Juan Battista, St. Denis's marriage to
the granddaughter of Captain Ramon took place, no doubt as
a result of the young captain's success. By April 17, 1716
the expedition had begun the long march back into Texas.
The occupation force that left San Juan Bautista in
April consisted of Captain Domingo Ramon, Fathers Hidalgo
and Espinosa, six other priests, two lay brothers, twentyfive soldiers including two Diego Ramons (Domingo's son and
the father-in-law of St. Denis both named Diego), three
Frenchmen, a mixed group of Spanish civilians with their
families, one black slave, and two Indian guides —

a total

of some 75 or 80 persons.29
St. Denis and the young Diego crossed the Brazos to
assemble the Tejas Indians and prepare them to receive the
Spaniards.

The

ceremonies

included

a

procession,

distribution of gifts, smoking the peace pipe, and firing
salutes.

Playing his part in this civic ritual on the

Texas frontier, Captain Ramon, carrying a banner, marched
in the center alongside the clergy.

At one point in the

ceremony, St. Denis fell on his knees before the standard
"on which were painted the images of Christ Crucified and

29I b i d ., 94-96.
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Our Lady of Guadalupe."30
and all the religious.

He then embraced the Commander

St. Denis was "followed by all the

captains and the other people."31
Father Espinosa's diary relates that there was more
than one occasion when the Indians assembled to celebrate
the return of the Spanish friars.

The ceremony described

in detail by Espinosa took place on Sunday, June 28.

On

the previous Saturday he had recorded that 34 Indians,
including five leaders, had arrived.

On this occasion the

soldiers lined up in double file with the captain and the
religious in the center.

"There was a general salute on

our part, and in the meantime we went to the place prepared
for the reception, which was a hut of boughs of trees,
carpeted

with

stools."32

blankets;

the

pack-saddles

serving

as

The Saturday assembly ended

with a very serious discourse by an Indian
chief, in which he gave us to understand the
pleasure with which all desired to receive us in
their midst, as Don Luis de San Dionisio ... who
understands and speaks much of their language,
made known to us.33

30Gabriel Tous, ed. , "Ramon Expedition:
Espinosa's
Diary of 1716," Preliminary Studies of the Texas Catholic
Historical Society 1 (April, 1930): 21.
31Quoted from Ramon's diary by Phares, Cavalier. 108.
32T o u s ,

33Ibid.

"Espinosa's Diary," 20.
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The larger Sunday assembly attended by 96 Indians took
place after the caravan had traveled nine leagues to the
northeast.
In the process of reestablishing the Spanish missions
in East Texas St. Denis served as translator and spokesman
for the Indians.

He also conveyed to the Indians the

message of Captain Ramon that the "Spaniards had come to
look after the welfare of their souls and to bring them to
a recognition of the authority of King Philip V."34
The viceroy of Mexico had ordered the establishment of
the missions and the presidio for the express purpose of
preventing the commercial and military incursion of the
French into territory claimed by Spain.35 While St. Denis
helped the Spanish king to achieve his immediate goal, he
undermined its purpose.
between

Indians

and

He saw himself as an intermediary
Europeans

and

as

an

independent

entrepreneur who to achieve his own ends presented himself
as the servant of a sovereign king.
Derbanne, the Second Expedition, and Fort St. Jean Baptiste

After the Spaniards had been found and brought back to
Texas, St. Denis returned to Mobile in the company of his

34Phares, Cavalier. 109.
35I b i d .. 72.
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father-in-law,

Diego

Ramon,

whom

he

introduced

prospective business associates as a horse trader.36

to
One

of these traders was Frangois Dion Deprez Derbanne,
Canadian

who

served

as

storekeeper

in

charge

of

a

the

warehouse on Dauphin Island in Mobile Bay as early as
1710.37 In January, 1716, a month before the departure of
the Ramon expedition, Derbanne and Ensign Claude-Charles du
Tisne departed from Dauphin Island to prepare supplies for
Bienville's Natchez expedition.38

By October,

Derbanne

had returned to Mobile where he became a partner in a
commercial company which included St. Denis, Graveline,
Joseph Chauvin de Lery, Nicolas Chauvin de La Freniere, and
the Beaulieu brothers.

St. Denis and his partners arrived

at Natchitoches on November 25.39
Fort St. Jean Baptiste no doubt enhanced St. Denis's
clandestine trading network.

The existence of the fort

provided a cover for the commercial activities of the Ramon
family as the clan continued the pretense of enforcing

36Phares, Cavalier. 111.
37Katherine Bridges and Winston De Ville, eds. and
trans., "Natchitoches and the Trail to the Rio Grande: Two
Early Eighteenth-Century Accounts by the Sieur Derbanne,"
Louisiana History 8 (Summer, 1967): 240-41.
38Ibid., 241. Giraud, Histoire. 2:77.
39Phares, Cavalier. 113.
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Spanish

trade

Louisiana trade.

regulations

while

profiting

from

the

Apparently St. Denis had little to do

with the actual establishment of the fort which, according
to Giraud, grew out of Bienville's resolve to prevent the
Spanish from advancing into the Red River Valley.40
In 1716 Spanish missions did not present a military
threat to the French.

On the contrary, when St. Denis

returned to Natchitoches, prepared to bring the merchandise
purchased with capital supplied by Derbanne and his other
partners, the Spanish missions needed his help to survive
a crisis caused by a severe winter, flooding rain, malaria,
desertion,

shortage

of

supplies,

and hostile

Indians.

Going to their aid, St. Denis not only pacified the Indians
but put them to work building two additional missions.

He

made three trips back to Natchitoches to purchase maize for
the Spanish missionaries.41
While St. Denis promoted Spanish missionary activity
and created a market for French merchandise, Cadillac and
Bienville decided to send a detachment of French soldiers
to Natchitoches.

According to Giraud, a sergeant and six

soldiers were dispatched during the summer of 1716, but du

40Giraud, H i s t o r y . 2:187.
41I b i d .. 113-114.
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Tisne

did

not

arrive

in Natchitoches

until

later.

Penicaut relates that Cadillac sent "twenty-five soldiers
off

with

one

sergeant

and three

boats

loaded

with

merchandise, munitions, and food supplies, with a letter to
M.

de

Bienville who was

at the Natchez."

The

letter

instructed Bienville to
send M. de Tissenet— [an experienced] Canadian
officer, who understood the savage languages
very well — at the head of this detachment that
was to go up the Riviere Rouge to build a fort
at the Nassitoches.42
In his

"Memoir on Louisiana" dated

1725-26,

Bienville

states that "it was in 1716 when I was still at the Natchez
to punish them for their first revolt that
detachment

to

take

possession

establish the Natchitoches.1,43

of

the

Red

I sent a
River

and

He goes on to say that he

"had received information that the Governor of Mexico was

42Penicaut, Fleurs de Lvs, 193. Du Tisne had come to
Louisiana from Canada where he had developed a reputation
for being an amazingly active officer who had the knowledge
and experience of governing the Indians. His rank in the
French navy was that of an ensign, but his background and
experience certainly indicate that he was an experienced
Canadian officer. Dictionary of Canadian Biography. 2:215.
A good summary of du Tisne's exploits in Illinois and west
of the Mississippi can be found in Gilbert C. Din and
Abraham P. Nasatir, The Imperial Osages: Spanish-Indian
Diplomacy in the Mississippi Valley (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1983), 35-37.
43"Memoir on Louisiana, the Indians and the Commerce
that Can Be Carried On with Them," MPA:FD. 3:515.
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having a large convoy march there" and that the Spanish did
indeed

establish

themselves

at

Los

Adaes

when

they

discovered that the Red River had been occupied ten days
before they arrived.
built

cannot

be

Exactly when and by whom the fort was
determined

from

the

available

documents,44 but St. Denis did leave some of his goods at
the little trading post when he headed for Mexico in March
1717.45
During the years that preceded the death of Louis XIV,
the financial crisis precipitated by the War of the Spanish
Succession had opened the door for St. Denis to make his
contract with

Cadillac.

The experienced captain took

advantage of the opportunity to create a market for his
goods and services that was large enough to support himself
and his extended family but not capable of sustaining
Crozat's monopoly.

Crozat's decision to give up his

proprietorship came at a time when the Duke of Orleans, now
regent for the young Louis XV, had put royal finances in
the hands of the Scottish banker and adventurer, John Law.
Cadillac

was

recalled

and

Law's

Mississippi

44See Giraud, Histoire 2:181-182, n. 3.
45Phares, Cavalier. 114.
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produced

a

capital

transfusion

which

temporarily

resuscitated the nascent colony.46
Discord continued at the highest levels of colonial
administration after Crozat surrendered his monopoly on
August 23.

Jean Michiele Lepinay briefly replaced Cadillac

until Law's Company of the West gave command of the colony
to Bienville.47

By the time St. Denis returned from his

second expedition to Mexico,

Philippe Blondel had been

placed in command of Fort St. Jean Baptiste, but the real
Spanish

threat

to

Spanish

recaptured

French Louisiana
Pensacola

which

occurred
had

been

when
taken

the
by

Bienville shortly after he received word of the outbreak of
the dynastic conflict between French and Spanish Bourbons
in April, 1719.
Defense of Mobile and the Siege of Pensacola
From the very beginning of French penetration into the
Mississippi Valley, the ability of the Canadian captains to
carry on commerce and provide for the subsistence of their
companies depended on control of the Indians.

Iberville,

46John G. Clark, New Orleans. 1718-1812: An Economic
History (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1970), 8-19.
47Mathe Allain, "Antoine
Cadillac;" Brian E. Coutts,
Louisiana Governors. 16, 19.

de Lamothe,
Sieur de
"Jean-Michiele Lepinay,"
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Le Sueur,

and Tonti had worked diligently to establish

peace among the Indian tribes so that the rivers under
French control could become avenues of trade.

St. Denis

proposed to use the Indians to counter any attempt to
extend

Spain's

influence

in

the

Louisiana

territory.

Bienville later expressed the doubts he had felt about St.
Denis' ability to defend the western boundary and later
boasted about sending French soldiers to Fort St. Jean
Baptiste to counter the Spanish threat.48
The events of the Franco-Spanish War gave St. Denis
the opportunity to demonstrate the effectiveness of the
ancien

capitaine's alliance with

the

reliance

on

the

Indians for defense.
In 1719 before St. Denis had returned from his second
expedition to Mexico, Bienville convoked a council of war
and

a

decision

Pensacola.49

was

made

to

expel

the

Spanish

from

The easy capture of Pensacola by the French

was only the prelude to a more difficult war.

The Spanish

recaptured the the Pensacola fortress with a force of 1,200
men before Bienville's brother, Joseph Le Moyne de Serigny,

48Bienville to the Navy Council, December, 1721,
MPA;FD 3:314-315; "Memoir on Louisiana, the Indians and the
Commerce that Can Be Carried On with Them (1725-26),"
MPA:FD. 3:515.
49Phares, Cavalier. 152.
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and his nephew, could muster reinforcements.

Another of

Bienville's brothers, was captured and taken to Havana.
Contemplating

a

Spanish

attack

on Mobile,

the

French

colonists began to fear for the very survival of French
Louisiana.50
With only sixty French soldiers, Bienville and his
brothers had to depend on approximately 400 Indian allies.
St. Denis was released from prison in Mexico in time to
summon additional Indian allies to the defense of Mobile,
but the minutes
discuss

what

of the Louisiana

happened

after

the

Council
Spanish

of

Commerce

recaptured

Pensacola and launched an attack on Mobile without even
mentioning

St.

Denis.51

Denis with the victory.

Phares,

however,

credits

St.

He maintains that the danger of an

imminent attack on Mobile and the arrival of St. Denis with
a

contingent

of

Indians

from Biloxi

motivated

French

settlers to stream in from the concessions.
The Spanish assault on Mobile was delayed by a single
French ship positioned to defend the fort.

By the time the

Spaniards launched a frontal assault on land, St. Denis had
arrived with a small force.

The battle was engaged, and

50Giraud, H i s t o i r e . 3:301.
51MPA:FD 3:242-290.
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the Spaniards fought their way into a wooded area where the
timely

arrival

of more

Indian allies gave

the

French

advantage in numbers and the cover of the forest.

The

decimated Spanish force retreated to their ships and sailed
away.

At that point the arrival of a French fleet of five

ships commanded by Desnos de Champmeslin opened the way for
a land and sea assault to retake Pensacola.

The second

siege of Pensacola by the French was much more difficult
than the easy takover that had marked the beginning of
hostilities, but more Indians responded to the call of the
Great White Chief and they were compensated with the booty
of the campaign.52
Though Bienville failed to give St. Denis any special
credit

for the recapture

Penicaut

described

his

of Pensacola

role

in

the

by the

French,

celebration

that

followed.
M. de St. Denis arranged to entertain M. de
Chamelin and the captains and naval officers
with a dance of the savages, who sang a calumet
of peace to him.
Next, in the name of M. de
Chamelin, M. de St. Denis made them an oration
in their own language, exhorting them to be
friends of the French forever.53
After the festivities, Champmeslin distributed presents.

52Phares, Cavalier. 155-59.
53Penicaut, Fleur de Lvs. 232-34.
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Bienville

did not

acknowledge

military skill of St. Denis.

the

diplomatic

and

Penicaut, on the other hand,

may have idealized his deeds, but the old captain's success
was

based

on his ability to mobilize

confederates.
arriving

at

France's

Indian

St. Denis no doubt had the advantage of
just

invincibility

the

enhanced

right
the

time,

and

message

communication with the Indian tribes.

of

his
his

legendary
ritualized

Whatever St. Denis's

actual role was in the defense of Mobile and the recapture
of Pensacola by the French, he made sure that his Indian
allies believed that he was the man who had, with their
assistance, saved the day.
Whereas
Pensacola,

Bienville
he

Natchitoches.

downplayed

exaggerated

the

St.

Denis's

Spanish

role

threat

at
to

Disinformation may have been disseminated to

convince the Company to repair the fort and send gifts and
supplies to the French frontier post.

When the Council was

informed in October, 1719 "that the Spaniards were sending
three

hundred men

to Texas,"

an order was

issued to

Derbanne and Blondel, to build a new fort and "give one
hundred

livres

worth

of

presents

to

the

Natchitoches

nation, the same sum to the Dulchionis, sixty livres to the
Adais, three hundred livres to the Cenis"

In a letter

dated June, 1720 Bienville informed the Navy Council that

177

"the viceroy of Mexico was sending by land one thousand
men"

to

"attack the

Mississippi.54

French on the Red River

and the

Yet when Philippe Blondel and his troops

attacked San Miguel de los Adaes in the only engagement in
the Western theater of the war, he sacked the fort and
captured a lay brother, one ragged soldier and a flock of
chickens.55

It

seems

clear

that

Bienville

not

only

exaggerated the threat but refused to acknowledge

St.

Denis's ability to control any Spanish attempt to launch an
attack on the Red River post.
St. Denis and the Natchitoches Post
The administrative record suggests that St. Denis took
a giant

step

forward

in his military

career when

he

received his appointment as captain and commandant of the
Natchitoches Post during the winter of 1721-1722. He had
re-entered the King's service as a lieutenant on March 23,
1720.

His appointment as Commandant of the Upper Cane

River on July 1 of that year has been interpreted by
Portre-Bobinski as a step in a series of rapid promotions
which culminated in his appointment as commandant of the

54Minutes of the Council of Commerce, MPA:FD 3:267;
Bienville to the Navy Council, Ibid., 295.
55Phares, Cavalier. 160-61. According to Marcel
Giraud, the Red River frontier remained peaceful during the
entire war. Histoire. 3:304.
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Natchitoches Post.56

Yet what really mattered on the

frontier was control over the Indians and the ability to
mediate between the French and the Spanish.57
By 1722 Natchitoches was beginning to realize its
potential

as a trading post capable

of supplying New

Orleans with horses, corn, and bear grease.58

There was

hope that it would provide a market for goods imported from
France.

The 1722 census listed fourteen men including the

commandant and Derbanne, St. Denis's business partner who
now served as warehouse keeper.
children,

There were ten women, ten

twenty black slaves and eight Indian slaves.

Twelve horned cattle and 74 horses are also listed.

By

1726 the Europeans numbered 94, and there were 35 slaves,
38

horned

cattle

and

72

horses.59

Evidently

these

figures do not include the military garrison which was

56Portre-Bobinski and Smith, Natchitoches. 44-48.
57Phares, Cavalier. 143.
58Giraud, History. 5:265-266, 385; Histoire. 3:367.
John G. Clark, New Orleans. 28. Surrey, Commerce of
Louisiana. 262.
59Elizabeth S. Mills, comp., Natchitoches Colonials:
Censuses. Military Rolls. and Tax Lists.
1722-1803
(Chicago: Adams Press, 1981), 3-7.
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reduced from 29 men to 20 in 1727 as a result of the
company's effort to reduce expenditures.60
Although his debt to the company increased from 12,2 05
livres in 1723 to over 18,000 by 1742, St. Denis was able
to build a house and accumulate a large herd of cattle.
The

inventory made

included

24

black

after his
slaves

death

and

100

on June

11,

cattle.61

1744

Neither

Natchitoches nor Louisiana as a whole thrived economically
under the French regime, but Natchitoches was more selfsufficient than most other areas.

Enough wealth could be

derived from trade with the Indians and the Spanish to
support St. Denis comfortably.
After 1722 St.

Denis performed his duties

in the

service of the Company of the Indies which was under
contract to the king.

St. Denis now held a patent of

nobility along with his commission as a royal officer.

He

was also a private individual with a contract to sell
company merchandise for a commission of 5 per cent.

His

60Giraud, History. 5:385.
61Germaine Portre-Bobinski, trans., Natchitoches:
Translations of Old French and Spanish Documents (Rutland,
111.: Privately printed, 1928), n.p.
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relationship with the company was based on mutual interest
and reciprocal obligations.62
St.

Denis's

authority

in

Natchitoches

surrounding area was now unassailable.

and

the

Charles Gayarre

writes that Indians over a hundred miles away "submitted to
his

sway

chief."

... and

... acknowledged him as their great

His decisions in tribal disputes were readily

accepted, and anywhere from five to six thousand warriors
stood ready to fight at his command.

And although Gayarre

goes on to say that the "Natchez feared him more than
anything

else,"63

in

1731

St.

Denis's

reputation

for

invincibility was challenged by an attack on Natchitoches
by the Natchez.
Two years had passed since the "entire white male
population of Fort Rosalie"64 had been massacred. For two
years the Natchez Indians and their allies had threatened
the very existence of the French colony in Louisiana.

When

Saint Denis received word that the Natchez were headed
toward Natchitoches, he immediately sent runners in all

62Phares, Cavalier. 182-183.
63Charles Gayarre, History of Louisiana. (New Orleans:
Armand Hawkins, 1885; repr., New York: AMS Press, 1972),
1:418.
64Phares, Cavalier. 201.
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directions.

Relief troops from New Orleans never arrived.

The Spanish commandant at Los Adais sent only sixteen men,
but hundreds of loyal Indians responded immediately to St.
Denis's call to arms.

There were not enough weapons

available and St. Denis had to supply the Indians with guns
that belonged to him.

The attack began on October 5, 1731

and the battle raged

for two weeks.

St.

Denis used

defensive tactics until the attackers burned a French woman
in full view of the defenders.

At the right moment, St.

Denis led his army of Frenchmen, Spaniards, and Indians in
an offensive charge.

Stiff resistence was followed by a

truce and then three or four more days of fighting before
the Natchez broke and ran.

With no help from the Governor,

St. Denis had mobilized the "people" of his post to repel
the Natchez invasion.65
In his letter of November 2, 1731 addressed to the
commissaire-ordonnateur, Edme Gatien de Salmon, St. Denis
simply stated that the Natchez had fled, that the company
had failed to meet its obligations, and explained how he
had to use his personal resources to sustain all
volunteers who responded to his call.

the

He criticized the

company for failing to maintain an adeguate defense force.

65Ib i d . , 203-211.
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If the company had performed its duties, he wrote,
could have been avoided.

war

The old captain had done his duty

to uphold the invincibility of the French king.

The fault

lay with the Company.66
Before the end of November St. Denis wrote a memoir in
which he clearly stated the defense needs of the colony.
He recommended a garrison of 500 troops at New Orleans, 400
at Mobile, and 250 for the Alabama Post.

He also made it

clear that a frontier post required more than a military
garrison.
The company had failed in its task of promoting the
settlement and economic development of the colony.

"I will

say that it is necessary to have honest family folk and not
at all those useless people and vagabonds that are nearly
always brought in by the company."67

The old captain

knew how to manage the Indians and govern settlers, and he
did not hesitate to inform the king that the company was
responsible for the Indian uprising.
The successful defence of Natchitoches became a source
of inspiration and encouragement for Commandant-General

66Extract of the letter from St. Denis to Salmon,
November 2, 1731, AC C13, 13:162-164. Phares, Cavalier.
211.
fi7

•

•

•

Memoir of St. Denis, Commandant of Natchitoches,
November, 1731, AC C13, 13:169.

fitienne de Perier and Commissary Salmon.

Perier described

St. Denis as a "brave man: le plus ancien des officiers de
la colonie." Salmon informed the minister of marine that
many had confidence only in him.68 The city planted by
Louis Juchereau de Saint Denis on the border between two
empires

had

community.

become
The

the

failure

nucleus
of

the

of

a viable

Company

frontier

created

new

opportunities for those who were ready to learn and apply
the techniques of the ancien capitaine.

68Etat des Officiers entretenus a la Louisiane avec
apostelles, 1733, AC C13, 13:169; Salmon to Maurepas, May
12, 1732. AC, C13, 15:100.

CHAPTER 6
Company, Captains, and Crown

From 1717 to 1731, the reorganized Company of the
Indies administered Louisiana for the crown.

The Company

streamlined its operations in Louisiana, cut its expenses,
and reduced the military garrison.

The crown was unwilling

to subsidize a colony which had originally been established
for the strategic purpose of preventing the British from
controlling the mouth of the Mississippi, and the Company
ventured to promote economic development and produce a
profit for its investors.1

In keeping with this policy,

the Company instituted stricter financial controls over the
ancien capitaines who ran the frontier posts.

The attempt

of the Company to turn a profit on its investment

in

Louisiana stirred up the tension between the purse and the
sword which was inherent in the system of centralized
control

installed

by

Colbert.

In the

end,

however,

commercial failure and the Natchez uprising ultimately

1Clark, New Orleans. 10.
184
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forced the crown to revert to reliance on the old captains
when the company surrendered its monopoly in 1731.

At that

point the legendary adventures of St. Denis provided an
example and a model of how to control a vast territory with
minimal expense to the crown.
St. Denis's contract with the Company of the Indies
did not sever his ties with the French crown or change the
status of his oath of loyalty to the king.

The king

recognized the Company as a "moral person" to whom he as
head of the body politic gave "regalian rights."

As an arm

of the state, the Company was subject directly to the king.
The

king was

the

seigneur

of the

Company which held

Louisiana (and other territories) as a fief.

In exchange

for "fealty, counsel, and aid," the king owed the Company
protection and supervision.2

The old captain who served

the Company under contract would continue to serve the
crown after the Company relinquished the colony.
Military Officers,
People

Controlling
persistent

Commissaries,

supplies

problem

that

and
fueled

and the Poverty of the

expenditures
the

conflict

was

the

between

commissioners and commandants throughout the period of
French dominion in Louisiana.

From the time of Iberville

2Roland Mousnier, The Institutions of France. 474.

186

the governors and captains could usually depend upon the
support of the Jesuits, while first Pere Henri Roulleaux de
La Vente, the seminary priest appointed pastor of Mobile by
the Bishop of Quebec, and then Pere Raphael de Luxembourg,
the Capuchin superior, sided with the commissioners.
The appointment of Crasse as scrivener in 1700 to keep
track

of the king's

supplies

marked

apparatus

the

designed to

accounts

and the distribution

institution

of

an

administrative

insure financial accountability.

Nicolas La Salle replaced Crasse two years later.
La

Salle,

Iberville

acting
of

as

of

naval

commissioner,

fraudently manipulating

the

It was

who

accused

accounts

and

misappropriating the king's funds while outfitting ships
for naval combat in 1705. At the beginning of what became
a perennial conflict between the Louisiana governor and the
commissaire-ordonnateur,

Iberville

and

his

Canadian

officers were charged with serving their own personal
interests at the expense of the king and his people.
a

long

inquest,

Pontchartrain

remained

convinced

After
that

Iberville had been guilty of diverting funds and placing
his personal

interest above that of the king when he

exercised his prerogative as commander to draw supplies
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from

the

storehouse.3

The

accounts

indicated

that

merchandise worth more than 47,000 livres was taken out
between 1702 and 1706.

Iberville and his brothers were

accused of selling the goods (sometimes at a profit as high
as 600 percent) without any return to the royal treasury.4
The issue of financial accountability centered on
whether

the

governor

distributed

gifts

and

allocated

supplies in the interest of the king and his people or
whether he and his captains exploited the king and the
colony

by

using

the

crown's

resources

for

personal

advantage that adversely affected the colony and disturbed
the peace

and tranquillity

of the people.

Bienville

followed Iberville in his determination to control the
consumption

and

distribution

of

supplies.

La

Salle

continued to complain about Bienville's failure to follow
strict accounting procedures.

Bienville justified his

actions by the need to "ease the public poverty."5

La

Salle had the support of Pere La Vente who was only too
glad to blame the poor condition of the colony on Bienville
and his officers, whom they accused of profiting from the

3Jay Higginbotham, Old Mobile. 59; Giraud, Histoire,
1:35, n. 1, 115-118.
4Surrey, Commerce of Louisiana. 155.
5Giraud, History. 1:226-227.
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sale of the king's merchandise at the expense of the poor
inhabitants who were forced to pay exorbitant prices.

The

implication was that the officers pilfered the warehouses
and then sold the goods to the inhabitants.

The conflict

between Bienville and his officers on the one hand, and La
Salle and La Vente on the other, divided the population
because any discontented inhabitant was prone to side with
the commissary.6
The response of Pere La Vente, who arrived at Mobile
on August 1, 1704, to the adverse conditions in the colony
set the stage for the later criticism of Canadian officers
by

Pere

Capuchin

Raphael
superior

functioning
and

cure

in
with

the

dual

capacity

jurisdiction

over

of
a

territory which stretched from the Gulf Coast to the Ohio
River.

While arranging marriages for the young ladies

placed in his care during the voyage of the Pelican. Pere
La Vente expressed suspicion about the moral character of
Commandant Bienville, an eligible batchelor in his twenties
who kept a female housekeeper while apparently showing no
interest in marriage.

The commandant reluctantly expended

scarce resources to provide a house and church for an order
of priests who lacked the determination, the endurance, and

6I b i d . , 1:229.
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the manpower to serve as pastors and evangelists in a vast
frontier territory.
property

La Vente received gifts of money and

from those who died during the yellow

fever

epidemic which raged for two years after the arrival of the
Pelican and profited from his personal trading activity
while constantly complaining about the state of the colony
and the poverty of the people.

The young commandant who

matured with the colony itself promoted the activities of
the Jesuits who cleverly adapted themselves to the austere
lifestyle

of the frontier

in Canada

and the

Illinois

country. The mature Bienville would later carry for the
Company

of

the

Indies

the

burden

of

protecting

and

defending the colony established by his older brother
increased by the weight of Pere Raphael's criticism and a
replay of the charges against the military officers leveled
by Pere La Vente.7
The

special

commission

appointed

to

investigate

complaints against Iberville and his brothers before the
governor died in 1706 had produced evidence implicating
Iberville and several others associated with the Le Moyne
clan.

Consequently, Ponchartrain bypassed Bienville and

placed Daneau de Muy in command of the colony.

Jean-

7Higginbotham, Old Mobile. 176, 246-257, 292-298, 410421; Giraud, History 5:29, 61, 187-188.
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Baptiste-Martin

Dartaguiette

d'Iron,

a

young

marine

commissary accompanied de Muy across the Atlantic, but when
de Muy died on January 25, 1708 enroute from Havana to
Mobile, the full responsibility for investigating the Le
Moyne brothers fell on the commissary.8
Martin Dartaguiette developed a respectful regard for
Bienville as an officer well-qualified to command the
colony,

and

Bienville.

his

investigation

helped

to

exonerate

The younger Le Moyne was ultimately able to

convince Dartaguiette that he had never exploited his
office for personal benefit and justified what he had to do
by the necessity of receiving Indians on a less than
adequate salary that he did not even receive for seven
years.9 Bienville was thus able to continue in command of
the colony from the death of Sauvolle in August 17 01 until
Antoine Lamothe Cadillac arrived in 1712.
During Cadillac's administration,

Bienville allied

himself with the commissary against the governor, but the
conflict between the purse and the sword reignited when
Jacques de La Chaise arrived in 1723.

La Chaise had been

commissioned by the Company as a special investigator, and

8Higginbotham, Old Mobile. 314-323.
9Giraud, History. 1:226-227; 5:26-27.
Bienville to
Pontchartrain, October 27, 1711, MPA:FD. 3:169.

he began the process of determining why there was a gap
between the value of merchandise distributed and the amount
of notes received

in exchange for it.10 As La Chaise

searched for evidence of embezzlement by the Le Moyne
family,

Pere Raphael accused the military officers

exploiting

the people

by dividing

themselves

and selling them

to

quadrupling the original price.

scarce

the

of

goods among

inhabitants after

La Chaise and Raphael

revived the old accusations of immorality and profiteering
advanced by La Salle and La Vente while

ignoring the

problem of delayed salaries and the niggardly reimbursement
for expenses which characterized royal administration in
the early years of the colony.11

La Salle had accused

Bienville of ignoring the correct accounting procedures,
and

though

distribution
extenuating

D'Artaguiette
of

royal

concluded

supplies

circumstances,

had

that
been

Bienville's
justified

Pontchartrain

by

remained

suspicious of him, and now the directors of the Company
were prepared to back La Chaise as he began to accuse the
commandant

and his

distribution of

officers

ofprofiteering

from

the

supplies from the king's warehouse.

10Giraud, History 5:20.
1■’■Raphael to Raguet, May 15, 1725, MPA:FD 2:478, 483;
Giraud, History 5:38-41, 269-270.
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The reorganized Company of the Indies

sent Jean-

Frangois Choplet Du Sauvoy to Louisiana along with La
Chaise as its commissioners in addition to several newly
appointed members

of the Superior

Council.

When

the

commissioners and councillors arrived at Ship Island in
1723, they were met by Henry de Louboey, the commandant of
the Biloxi post.

Like most military officers in colonial

Louisiana, Louboey supplemented his meager and often unpaid
salary by engaging in commerce, a forbidden practice that
had been tolerated by the crown during the crisis of the
War of the Spanish Succession.

Unaware that La Chaise had

been appointed to investigate and eliminate such practices,
Louboey rowed out to their ship, inquired about its cargo,
and informed the Captain that he had Spanish piastres for
commerce de pacotilles (private trading). When the ship's
captain reported this conversation to La Chaise, he was
ordered to inform Louboey that all of the ship's cargo must
be unloaded at New Orleans.12
Later, Louboey returned with orders from Bienville to
ignore

La

Chaise's

instructions

and

unload

the

cargo

12De La Chaise to the Directors of the Company of the
Indies, N.O., September 6, 1723 in MPA;FD. 2:295-296;
Giraud, History 5:17.
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because

Biloxi

and

Mobile

supplies.13 Bienville had
command

of

the

colony,

were

badly

in

need

of

still

in

supported

by

shown that he was
but

La

Chaise,

Bienville's discontented opponents, would work to establish
the dominance of the purse over the sword. From the time of
his initial conflict with Bienville over unloading cargoes,
La Chaise was determined to establish strict procedures for
the distribution of the king's merchandise in order to
prevent the military officers from profiteering by buying
the goods on credit at low prices and reselling them for
profit.
Meanwhile, La Chaise presented his warrant and letters
to

Bienville,

who

was

surprised

to

learn

that

Sieur

Delorme, a director of the Company, had been recalled.

La

Chaise asked Bienville if seals could be placed on all
Delorme's

property

"because

his

Royal

Highness

was

convinced that he had accumulated many piastres."14

The

commissioners then accompanied Bienville to Delorme's house
where they informed him of his recall.

They then proceeded

to place seals "on all the warehouses and the chest in
which we found only ninety-one piastres almost all in small

13MPA:FD 2:297.
14La Chaise to
MPA:FD. 2:299.

the Directors,

September

6,

1723,
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copper coins."

La Chaise concluded that Delorme had been

forewarned.15
In his reports to the directors of the Company of the
Indies,

La

superior)

Chaise
accused

(with the
the

support

captains

of

of

the

serving

Capuchin

their

own

interests. The officers not only neglected the interests of
the king, but, in effect, they exploited the king's people
by profiting from the sale of merchandise from the king's
warehouse.16
In his first report, La Chaise vividly described the
poor condition of the warehouses and outlined numerous
problems that needed to be addressed by the company.

He

blamed Bienville and concluded that the commandant should
be replaced.
needed

Good workmen could not obtain the things they

from the

soldiers,

warehouse

sailors,

neglected

Bienville."
poultry-yards.

Bienville

gave

the

and the Canadians preference in the

distribution of supplies.
were

because

by the

Bienville

The patients in the hospital

surgeon,
and

a

Delorme

"protege
failed

of Mr.
to

De

provide

Rations were given to women "who do nothing

but cause disorder."

The adjutant general rendered little

15Ibid., 2:300.
16La Chaise to the Directors, September 6 and October
18, 1723, MPA:FD 2:294-357, 358-391.
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service to the colony.
his

farm which

Bienville

had

sergeant,

and

is

on

raised
he

was

He "resides throughout the year on
the

other

side

of

him up the ranks
Bienville's

the

from

"favorite

confidant of his most secret business."

river."
a simple
and

the

This officer who

bore arms against the King in the Cevennes, owes
the Company nearly eight thousand livres by the
private account that I have drawn up, without
speaking of what he will possibly owe by two
other accounts with which he is charged."1'
La Chaise insisted that Bienville and his relatives
should be recalled and another commandant or governor
appointed. He also expressed the need for an intendant with
the authority to "restrain everybody."

Pointing out that

the "sword must not in any manner meddle with commerce,"
the commissioner warned the directors that "As long as the
commandants meddle with the warehouses they will always be
badly managed."18
La Chaise accused Bienville of "seeking only to cause
the downfall of the colony in order that the King might
take control of it and that he might be able to do what he
wished."19

He was clearly telling the directors that the

17Ib i d . , 2:308-17.
18I b i d .. 2:323.
19I b i d .. 2:306.
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colony would never develop economically and the inhabitants
would never be treated fairly until the stranglehold of
Bienville and the Canadian officers on the resources of the
colony was broken.

Bienville had to go because the people

were being mistreated.

"There is not one who does not

complain."20
After discoursing at length on the complaints about
Bienville, the commissioner concentrated on the need for
reliable bookkeepers who could maintain proper records and
audit the warehouse accounts.

In his effort to stop those

who would take advantage of the Company and to insure the
appointment of reliable officials, La Chaise returned again
and again to the problems of appraising property, setting
prices,

and

examining

accounts.21

In

his

effort

to

institute financial controls, La Chaise attacked the very
foundation

of the Canadian kinship

system by which

Canadian governor controlled the colony.

a

The old captains

and the linkage they maintained between their "companies"
and the governor would be replaced by officials who would
protect

the

"people"

by

insuring

merchandise was fairly distributed.

20I b i d .
21I b i d . . 2:326-30.

that

the

king's
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La Chaise soon discovered Frangois Duval a deputy
bookkeeper who impressed him while serving as assistant to
the New Orleans storekeeper as a man "acquainted with the
affairs of the colony," capable of managing the audit of
accounts. Noting that Duval "has the misfortune of not
being liked" by Bienville,

La Chaise suggested to the

directors that he deserved a "place in the Council with so
much the more right because he would immediately be in a
position to render an account of everything that might
arise.1,23
When complaints were made about Duval's price-setting
policies, La Chaise ran into serious difficulties from the
councillors who were unwilling to support the position of
La Chaise and Duval against that of Bienville and his
officers.24

The councillors also refused to accept La

Chaise's appointment of Louis-Auguste de La Loire Flaucourt
to

replace

Louis-Alexandre

Durand

as

storekeeper

in

Mobile.25
The commissioners had secret orders to stop abuses,
audit accounts, and make full reports, but the question of

23Ibid., 2:331.
OA

•

See also Giraud, History 5:21-23.
#

^*La Chaise to the Directors of the Company of the
Indies, N.O., October 18, 1723, MPA:FD 2:361-62.
25I b i d ., 2:366.
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whether they had the authority to appoint officials to
replace those they removed created a wedge between La
Chaise and the councillors.

When Du Sauvoy died in August,

1723 some councillors began to go over to Bienville's camp,
and the council as a whole asserted its sovereign authority
to resist a commissioner who refused to provide them with
a copy of his secret orders.26

In his report of October

18, La Chaise made it very clear that someone with the
authority of an intendant was necessary to restrain the
commandant and the councillors.

Otherwise, the warehouses

would revert back to their former condition.27

With the

strong recommendation of Pere Raphael, La Chaise secured
the support of the Company's directors.28
Even

though

his

intention was

to

reorganize

the

administration of the colony and leave it in capable hands,
by the time La Chaise died in 1729, he was being accused by
Commandant Perier of placing his private interest above

26Ibid., 2:365-67, 379-80; Giraud, History 5:17, 28.
27La Chaise to the Directors, October 18, 1723, MPA:FD
2:379; see also 323.
28The council called into question the extent of La
Chaise's authority, and it was not until the appointment of
Salmon in 1731 that the crown resolved the question by
according to "Salmon the same honors as were due to an
intendant. since the ordonnateur took the place of an
intendant in Louisiana, the function of the intendant being
confined to Canada." Giraud, History 5:313.
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that of the colony.

The Council could and did claim that

its powers derived "from the King and not the Company,"29
but the real issue was whether the inhabitants were being
cared for by those engaged in royal service.
Pere Raphael added fuel to the fire of the complaints
that caused La Chaise to demand constraints on the Canadian
captains. His letters written to Abbe Gilles-Bernard Raguet
a Sulpicien priest who had been named to the reorganized
Company's board of directors in 1724, helped to convince
the

directors

Boisbriant.30

to

recall

first

Bienville,

then

Raphael managed to persuade the board to

back the efforts of La Chaise to "restrain everybody."31
After the recall of Bienville, Raphael reported to Raguet
that Boisbriant had an "extreme weakness for the officers
and .. . lets himself be completely governed by them, and is
unwilling to hear anything that
soldiers,

he asserted,

condemns

them."

The

walked away with anything they

wanted, and then sold the goods for three or four times the
original price.

The Council was not "in a position to

oppose anything because it has everything to fear from an

29Giraud, His t o r y . 5:46.
30Giraud, Histoire,
31MPA:FD 2:323.

4:32.
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undisciplined soldiery and from a discontented populace."
Raphael made it clear to Raguet that the weakness of the
government had to be remedied by a "chief of a totally
different character."
task.

Boisbriant could not handle the

He was a "good Canadian accustomed to the free life

of the Indians, an enemy of affairs and so slack that he
would never use his authority if he were not in some way
forced to it by others."32 Raphael's charges against the
Bienvillists confirmed earlier accusations made against
Bienville and his brothers.

The memoir of Charles Le Gac,

a company official in Louisiana from 1718 to 1721, referred
to decisions being made and measures "undertaken by Serigny
and Bienville without the participation of a single [local]
director."33
The correspondence of La Chaise and Pere Raphael
reveals

that

the

issue

of

controlling

supplies

and

expenditures was the most visible part of the broader
question of how to govern the colony.

La Chaise and Pere

32Pere Raphael to the Abbe Raguet, New Orleans,
September 15, 1725, MPA:FD. 2:512. See also Pierre Hamer,
Raphael de Luxembourg; une contribution Luxembourqeoise a
la colonisation de la Louisiane (Luxembourg:
Section
Historique de l'Institut Grand-Ducal, 1966), 87-89.
33Glenn R.
Conrad,
ed., Immigration and War.
Louisiana: 1718-1721
from the Memoir of Charles Le Gac
(Lafayette, La. : University of Southwestern Louisiana,
1970), 31.
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Raphael recommended the appointment of a strong personality
who would rule the council and the colony according to the
public interest.

Pere Raphael advised Abbe Raguet that La

Chaise was a man of proven integrity who knew how to deal
with "les murmures du peuple."34

He suggested that if La

Chaise had been willing to exploit the people by profiting
from the sale of merchandise he would not have as many
enemies on the Council.35

La Chaise and Raphael advanced

the argument that Bienville, Boisbriant and the officers
had violated the public trust and used the colony to
advance their private interests.

By backing La Chaise

against the Council, the Company directors gave him control
over

expenditures

that rendered the

powerful than the commandant-general.

commissioner

more

The murmuring of the

people increased, La Chaise's exercise of authority made
him more and more unpopular, and in 1729 the same charge of
promoting his private interest at the expense of the people
was leveled against him by Perier.36
The Company's effort to restrain and restrict the
activities

of

the

Canadian

captains

by

attacking

34Quoted in Hamer, Raphael de Luxembourg. 98.
35Ibid.
35Giraud, History. 5:45, 107.
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Canadian kinship system languished with its failure to
expand and develop the economy of the colony.

The real

question at issue in the struggle between commandant and
commissary was whether the French inhabitants

and the

native American population of the colony were being cared
for by those engaged in royal service.

La Salle, La Vente,

La Chaise, and Raphael criticized the Canadians and their
Jesuit

supporters

challenge

to

the

for

exploiting

governor's

the

authority

people.
to

Their

control

the

distribrution of goods from the king's warehouse backfired
because the old captains maintained their position in the
frontier posts and villages by providing supplies and
protection for their followers.
The retrocession of the colony to the crown and the
return of Bienville revived the Canadian kinship system as
a means of reducing expenditures, but the proclivity of the
Chicasaws

and

Choctaws

to take

advantage

of

economic

rivalry between the French and the English to demand more
French goods at competitive prices made it difficult for
Bienville and his successors to control royal expenditures.

CHAPTER 7

Needs and Service:

Captains and Storekeepers

The governor of Louisiana commanded the officer corps
which served the king of France by protecting his people and
supplying them with the things they needed.

The determina

tion of the crown to curtail expenditures in a colony where
commerce was threatened by the English and the Indians
forced

the

governors

to

rely

on post

commandants

who

exercised patriarchal authority and used the techniques of
the ancien capitaine. The attempt to introduce financial
controls created a dilemma.

The duty of the commissary-

general and his storekeepers to serve the king by implement
ing measures designed to stem the flow of a financial
hemorrhage clashed with the duty of the governor and his
commandants to supply the needs of the colony.
After the Company surrendered its responsibilty for the
colony, the royal governors stressed the threat of English
encroachment on Indian trade, the need to supply merchandise
to Indian allies at a competitive price, and the difficulty
of governing a vast territory with only a handful of French
203
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soldiers.

The conflict between commandants and commissaries

in the Louisiana posts resulted when the Company of the
Indies and later the crown attempted to dilute the authority
of

the

commandant

by

giving

the

commissary

general

responsibility for financial, judicial, and police matters.
As troubleshooter for the Company before the recall of
Bienville, Jacques de La Chaise had advised the Directors in
France to prevent the commandants

from controlling the

storekeepers and warehouses.1
The death of La Chaise and the Natchez Massacre opened the
way for restoring the commandants' control over storekeepers
and warehouses, but the crown and the Ministry of Marine
were not willing to abandon the effort to control

the

military officers by using commissaries and storekeepers to
manipulate the purse strings of the colony.
Immediately after the Natchez disaster,
General

Etienne

de

Perier,

who

followed

Commandant-

Bienville

and

Boisbriand and performed the functions of governor in the
service of the Company from 1726 to 1733, reported to the
minister of marine that he did not have "sixty ... soldiers
in condition to march from about four hundred men who are
scattered about the posts of this colony."

Moreover, there

1De La Chaise to the Directors of the Company of the
Indies, March 8, 1724 in MPA:FD 2:323.
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were few officers who would be reliable
calling for vigorous action."2

"in an affair

It was clear by then that

Perier had to count more on the Choctaw nation than his own
forces to preserve the colony, but the Bienvillists were
able to cast enough doubt on his skill in Indian relations
to convince the ministry of Marine to give the governorship
to Bienville.3
Before that decision was made,

Comptroller-General

Philip Ory chided Perier for not reporting complaints about
the administration of affairs which reached France "from all
sides."

Colonists bombarded Ory with their grievances.

There are complaints about the enormous usury
that prevails in the colony, about the prices of
the goods that are sold exorbitantly dearly when
they come from the warehouses as well as at the
shop, and in this latter place even more dearly
under the pretext that these goods come from
private stocks that have been sold very dearly;
that this shop is in the hands of the Councilors
and principal employees of the Company or of
people protected by you such as the Abbe
Berthelen or by them, who abuse the authority
that their protector gives them; and that finally
speculation has continued more than ever in
copper money and notes in spite of the precise
orders that the Company has given; all these
facts are serious, and you do not say one word to
me about them.4

2Perier to Maurepas, December 5, 1729, MPA:FD. 1:55.
3See Gayarre, Louisiana. 1:450-52.
4Ory to Perier, November 1?, 173 0, MPA:FD 4:50.
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Thirteen months later Perier and the commissary-general,
Edme Gatien de Salmon, recommended two ways of conducting
trade to prevent abuses and drive off the English traders.
First by means of the merchandise that the King
might send here and that would be delivered from
the warehouse in small lots to inhabitants who
would bring the skins for which they had traded
to the warehouse in payment; the second to grant
a firm of merchants permission to carry on trade
in deerskins and to give them without charge both
the freight of the merchandise on his Majesty's
vessels and the return freight for their skins,
in which case these merchants would be obliged to
sell their merchandise to the Indians on the
basis of the tariff that would be drawn up for
this purpose, and recommendations would be given
to the officers established in the different
posts to act to prevent the traders from doing
injustices to the Indians.5
Perier and Salmon intended to establish harmony among the
officers, but the question of the commandant's authority
over the storekeeper had to be resolved again and again.
Governors and commandants demanded the right to issue
orders during military emergencies,

but the attempt to

divide military and financial responsibility and establish
guidelines fills page after page of correspondence between
the crown and the colony and between the governor and the
post commandants.

The king had instructed Jean-Baptiste du

Bois du Clos, the commissary who served with Cadillac, that

5Perier and Salmon to Maurepas, December 5, 1731, Ibid..
89-90.
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the "administration of the King's funds ... commerce and
everything that may relate to it concern him exclusively."
Exclusive
"dignity

responsibility for everthing
of

command and the military"

relating

to

the

belonged

to the

governor.6 The triumph of the purse over the sword by La
Chaise was followed by a relatively peaceful relationship
between Bienville and Salmon until a big flare up occurred
when Sebastien Frangois-Ange Lenormant de Mezy interfered
with the Governor Vaudreuil's orders to send supplies to
Mobile and Tombecbe in 1745.

Vaudreuil requested specific

instructions for Lenormant's replacement because of the
"extreme

importance that the commissaries

general

keep

themselves within the boundaries of their power."

When

Lenormant departed Louisiana in 1748, the minister of marine
issued

a detailed

separate

set

of

instructions

delineating

the

jurisdiction of governor and commissary giving

special attention to those areas where it overlapped.7

6Royal Instructions for Duclos, Louisiana
Quarterly. 15 (October, 1932), 603-604.

Historical

7Vaudreuil to Louboey, commandant at Mobile, April 22,
1744, Huntington Manuscript Collection, HM LO 9, The
Letterbooks. vol. Ill, 77; Vaudreuil to Maurepas, October 30,
1745 and November 20, 1746, MPA:FD 4:251-252, 302; Memoire du
roi pour servir d'instruction aux Srs. Vaudreuil gouverneur et
Michel commissaire general de la marine, ordonnateur a la
Louisiane, (December 23, 1748), trans. Donald Lemieux, in
Lemieux, "The Office of Commissaire Ordonnateur in French
Louisiana,
1731-1763:
A
Study
in
French
Colonial
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The La Fontaine affair provides important insights into
the relationship between commissaries and commandants.
the

letter

quoted

above,

Perier

and

Salmon

had

In
also

discussed Sieur Fontaine who would later flee to Mexico to
escape

punishment

Natchitoches.

for

mismanaging

Possibly

before

the

storehouse

Fontaine

had

at

assumed

responsiblity as storekeeper and certainly before Perier and
Salmon had been informed of his involvement

in trading

abuses, Fontaine met a detachment of forty men commanded by
Louboey on their way to relieve the siege of Natchitoches.
Fontaine's mission was to deliver to Perier St. Denis's
letter

of

November

Natchitoches.8

2

On April

describing
1,

1734

the

Bienville

defense
and

of

Salmon

informed Maurepas that La Fontaine, the sergeant "who was
performing the functions of keeper of the warehouse at the
post of Natchitoches," had withdrawn to the Spaniards at the
border post known as the Adais and from there to Mexico.
They assumed that La Fontaine had disposed of the king's
merchandise and property before he left French territory.9

Administration"(Ph.D.
1972), 103-106.

diss.,

Louisiana

State

University,

8Perier and Salmon to Maurepas, December 5, 1731, MPA:FD
88-89.
9Bienville and Salmon to Maurepas,
ibid., 3:640.

April

1,

1734

in
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The

correspondence

indicates

that

the

terrible condition.

relating

to

storehouse

the
at

La

Fontaine

Natchitoches

case

was

in

The accounts were in such a state of

confusion that Duplessis, who replaced La Fontaine, asked to
be relieved.10
Who was responsible for the mess is not clear, but
Salmon had only good things to say about St. Denis.

Perier

and Salmon had not explained how they had learned about the
problem at the warehouse, but they did credit St. Denis with
notifying the governor and the commissary-general that La
Fontaine had gone from the Adais to Mexico.

Salmon reported

to Maurepas that everyone in the colony considered St. Denis
an excellent officer and that many had confidence only in
him.11

In addition,

associate
Salmon.

was

Derbanne,

installed

as

St. Denis's old business

subdelegate

responsible

to

Apparently, the company and not La Fontaine was

blamed for the disorder.

An amnesty was requested for the

old storekeeper and a year later, Salmon requested a pardon
for him.12

10Duplessis to Salmon, April 14. 1732.
Archives
Nationales (Paris), Archives des Colonies, series C13, vol.
15, folio 91.
•^Salmon to Maurepas, May 12, 1732.
12Salmon to Maurepas, May 8, 1733.

AC, C13, 15:100.
AC, C13 17:100.
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One might conjecture that the St. Denis who was himself
engaged in clandestine trade with Mexico could ignore the
administrative practices at the local level.

The fact that

Salmon made a point of praising St. Denis suggests his
desire to develop a good working relationship with the old,
experienced officers of the colony both to further the
interests of the crown and colonial interests of his own.
Guy Fregault has described Salmon as a conscientious
administrator who always promoted the
colony and the colonists.

interests

of the

When the disaster of the Chicasaw

Wars precipitated the fiscal crisis of 1740, Salmon became
the

scapegoat.13

destroy

the

When

the

Chicasaws,

commissary-general.

crown

the

Michael

ordered

pressure
J.

was

Foret

Bienville
put

tells

on
us

to
the

that

Bienville was instructed to "practice all economy possible
in planning the campaign." At the same time, however, he was
encouraged to "make any expenditures necessary to ensure
success.1,14
When the military failure and the financial crisis
suggested that neither the king's business nor the colony's

13Guy Fregault, Le Grand Marquis. Pierre de Riaaud de
Vaudreuil. et la Louisiane (Montreal: Fides, 1952), 182-83.
14Michael J. Foret, "War or Peace?
Louisiana, the
Choctaws, and the Chickasaws, 1733-1735," Louisiana History 31
(Summer 1990): 288.

211

interests were being looked after, the crown sent another
bureaucrat to investigate.

Upon arrival

in Louisiana,

Lenormant de Mezy immediately began looking for evidence of
embezzlement.
affairs

of

the

Salmon was accused of negligence
colony.

He

was

charged

with

in all
selling

merchandise from the king's stores to the Spanish at a
profit

to

himself

and

of

profiteering

by

letters

of

exchange.15
Extending his investigation into the activities of the
post commandants, Lenormant was able to uncover evidence of
embezzlement by Taillefer, the commandant at Tombecbe, and
Maurepas

was

inclined

to

place

restraints

on

the

commandants' control over the distribution of goods from the
storehouses.16

The Tombecbe Post had been

established

during Bienville's first campaign against the Chickasaws,
and the Taillefer case reached a critical point just as
Governor Vaudreuil found it necessary to increase the flow

15Vaudreuil to Maurepas, January 6, 1745, HM LO 9, I, 53.
16Maurepas to Vaudreuil and Lenormant, April 13, 1746, HM
LO 58.
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of trade goods and presents to contain the rebellion of the
Choctaw faction led by Red Shoe in 1746.17
During Vaudreuil's administration, 1743-1753, Lenormant
and Michel de la Rouvilliere his successor as commissary
general, supported the storekeepers in the posts against the
commandants.
governor

At one point, Vaudreuil asked Maurepas how the

was

to

deal

with

the

commissary

general

on

occasions when these gentlemen interfered with his decision
to

"put

a

sufficient

quantity

of merchandise

in this

[Choctaw] nation so that there might be no reason for them
to feel any needs, which was the only device that [Red Shoe]
had for causing the commerce with the English to be desired
there."18

The

need

to

provide

sustenance

for

Indian

allies was an essential element in the military strategy of
the ancien caoitaine.

For this reason, Vaudreuil insisted

that the commissary-general give no orders in the posts when
they related to the service without communicating them to

17Vaudreuil to Maurepas, April 1, 1746, MPA;FD 4:264;
Vaudreuil to Louboey, August 23, 1746, HM LO 9, III, 204;
Vaudreuil to Maurepas, November 20, 1746, MPA:FD 4:298, 302;
Vaudreuil to Rouille, January 28, 1752, MPA:FD 5:110-111; See
also Patricia Galloway, "Choctaw Factionalism and Civil War,
1746-1750," The Journal of Mississippi History 44 (November,
1982), 289-327.
18Vaudreuil to Maurepas,
4:302.

November 20,

1746 in MPA:FD
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the governor, and he declared to Maurepas that it was his
responsibility to see that no abuses were committed.19
Warfare and Sustenance:

Needs of the Colony

The Natchez Massacre and the subsequent Chickasaw Wars
made it apparent that the security of the colony depended
upon

the

military

force

of

France's

Indian

allies.20

There simply were not enough French soldiers to maintain the
tranquillity of the colony.

French officers and Indian

allies stood on a "middle ground" where the king depended on
the old captain to exercise his sovereign will.

Warfare and

the sustenance of the colony hinged on the ability and
willingness of the king to provide for the needs of the
colony.
The Chickasaw Wars and the Choctaw rebellion that
followed in their wake tested the resolve of the crown and
the king's ability to supply the needs of his Indian allies.

19Vaudreuil to Maurepas, October 30, 1745, ibid.. 251-52.
20The Natchez revolt and the Chickasaw Wars have been
discussed within the context of the Indian alliance network by
Daniel H. Usner, Jr. , Indians. Settlers. & Slaves in a
Frontier Exchange Economy:
The Lower Mississippi Valiev
Before 1783 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1992), 65-104. See also Foret, "War or Peace?", 273-292 and
Charles J. Balesi, The Times of the French in the Heart of
North America (Chicago: Alliance Frangaise, 1992), 174-187.
Patrica Galloway has done an extensive analysis of Choctaw
villages and their chiefs in "Choctaw Factionalism and Civil
War, 1746-1750," 289-327.
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When Bienville returned to Louisiana in 1733, there was
tremendous excitement and expectation among the Canadians
and the Indians.

He now had the backing of the king.21

In a 1732 memoir to Bienville and Commissary General Salmon
from

Louis

XV

and

his

minister,

Maurepas,

the

new

administration was informed that "His Majesty is making use
of everything in order to induce the merchants

to send

vessels

for

with

colony."22

merchandise
The

memoir

and
of

wares
1732

suitable

reflects

the

Maurepas's

sophisticated knowledge of Indian relations in Louisiana.
The king and his minister acknowledged that Bienville was
aware of the English efforts to take over the Choctaw trade
and

that

the

preservation

preventing them from doing so.

of

the

colony

depended

on

They instructed Bienville to

"adopt the most fitting measures to frustrate [the English]
and prevent their trade among the nations of Louisiana."23
Even so between 1732 and 1734 when Bienville took the helm,
the colony was faced with a critical shortage of trade

21Patricia Dillon Woods, French Indian Relations on the
Southern Frontier. 1699-1762 (Ann Arbor, Mich.: UMI Research
Press, 1980), 115; Louis XV to Bienville, February 2, 1732,
MPA:FD. 3:541.
22Louis XV to Bienville and Salmon, February 2, 1732,
MPA:FD 3:571.
23Louis XV to Bienville, February 2, 1732, ibid., 3:553.
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supplies.

Maurepas made every effort to keep the colony

well-supplied,

yet

ships were

lost at

sea,

goods were

damaged because of collapsing storage facilities in Mobile,
and disruptions were caused by natural disasters as well as
wars between France and England.24
As commandant-general of Louisiana, Bienville's duty
consisted

in upholding

the honor

interests of the colony.
ancien capitaine.

of

the

king

and

the

His tactics were those of an

The economic progress of Louisiana and

the tranquillity of the people required peace.

Within the

framework of the French frontier mentalite and prevailing
Indian mores, Indians who killed Frenchmen broke the peace,
and the insult to royal authority had to be remedied.
Natchez had massacred Frenchmen,
given them refuge.

The

and the Chickasaws had

The Choctaw Indians had been fighting

the Chickasaw for generations before the arrival of the
French.

They

were

more

than

willing

to

attack

the

Chickasaws to force them to surrender the Natchez refugees.
Yet with the passage of time it became evident that the
English masters of the Chickasaws were more successful than
the French in supplying their Indian allies with the powder,

24Woods,

Indian R elations. 116-17.
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bullets, clothing, and iron pots necessary to protect and
provide for their families.
Governor Perier had tackled the task of repairing the
insult immediately after the Natchez massacre, but then it
became a question of either negotiating an honorable peace
or eliminating the Chickasaws who succored the Natchez and
traded with the English.

Peace could be granted only if the

Chickasaws would surrender the Natchez remnant to the French
and promise not to trade with the English.

Bienville and

Maurepas decided to organize a French force to fight with
the Choctaws against the Chickasaws.
In July 1733 Bienville postponed any type of military
action

that might compromise the honor

of

because of a critical shortage of supplies.25

French

arms

Bienville,

and Vaudreuil after him, continued to ask for more and more
supplies. Maurepas did his best to meet their requirements,
but

there

were

always

unexpected

circumstances

which

prevented the arrival of supplies at a crucial moment.
The least expensive method of punishing the Chickasaws
would be "to put the Indians alone into action," but it
would take too long and would not work if hostilities broke

25Bienville to Maurepas, July 26, 1733, MPA:FD. 1:212.
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out between France and England.26

Maurepas and Bienville

had corresponded about all of these possibilities in the
spring of 1735.
The French attempt to repair the damage done to French
honor by the Natchez massacre had extended over a period of
seven years. Now it would be necessary to undertake a more
costly campaign, a campaign that would ultimately convince
Bienville to retire from the king's service and return to
France.

He feared a second failure,27 but after a few

additional troops arrived from France in the spring of 173 6,
Bienville

obeyed

the

crown's

orders

to

undertake

the

expedition against the Chickasaw.28
Bienville's effort to coordinate his attack in the
first Chickasaw War with the Canadian troops of Pierre
D'Artaguette failed miserably.

D'Artaguette was killed and

the

the

Chickasaws,

aided

Bienville's battle plan.

by

English,

intercepted

The Chickasaws caught the French

in a cross-fire as they approached the village of Ackia on

26Bienville to Maurepas, April 23, 1735, ibid., 1:261.
27Gayarre, Louisiana. 1:460.
28Ibid., 470.
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May 26, 173 6. The French lost over a hundred soldiers.29
The ability of Bienville and the king to protect their
"children” was called into question, and ultimately French
control

of the

lower Mississippi Valley was placed

in

jeopardy.
The crown accepted responsibility for the disaster, and
Bienville

had

confidence.

gained

and

continued

to

hold Maurepas's

Maurepas now offered to provide more men and

bigger cannon, and anything else that Bienville might need.
Bienville was apparently unable to shift gears.

He knew how

to make the best possible use of limited resources, but what
would he do with an army that might succumb to disease
before he was ready to use it?30

How could he transport

big cannons in a wilderness where the roads were old Indian
trails?31
In Europe, colonial conflict had to take a back seat to
balance of power considerations on the continent.32

As

29"Narrative of the War against the Chickasaws attacked
by the army of New Orleans commanded by Mr. de Bienville,
governor of this province," April 1, 1736, MPA:FD 1:316-319;
Woods, Indian Relations. 126.
30Woods, Indian Relations. 132.
31Ibid.. 142-43.
York:

32Walter L. Dorn, Competition for Empire. 1740-1763. (New
Harper Torchbooks, 1963), 165.
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soon as Bienville was ready for men and supplies, Maurepas
had to apologize

for delays

in sending them.

meantime,

was

ground

France

losing

competition with England,

in

the

and the Choctaw

In the
commercial

Indians,

who

needed merchandise more than French protection, began to
visit Carolina and invite the English traders into their
villages.
As early as 1734, Gilles Augustin Payen de Chavoy de
Noyan, a nephew of Bienville, had reported to Maurepas from
New

Orleans

that

a

Choctaw

chief

named

Red

Shoe

had

undertaken a journey to Carolina to discuss the trading
propositions of some English traders.

Pere Baudouin,

Jesuit missionary resident in the Choctaw villages,

a

had

informed Noyan that Red Shoe "was very badly received on his
return by the chiefs

of his nation."33

Bienville had

taken the precaution of sending extra merchandise to insure
the loyalty of the Choctaws,

but after the disaster at

Ackia, Red Shoe secured a truce with the Chickasaw and made
another

trip

Fortunately

to

for

Charleston
the

French,

seeking
Red

English

Shoe

came

supplies.
back

from

Charleston empty handed, his Choctaw followers began to
defect, and he himself returned to the French camp in time

33Noyan to Maurepas, November 8, 1734 in M P A :FD 4:139.
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to

support

Bienville's

second

Chickasaw

campaign

in

1740.34
Once again Bienville failed in his effort to eliminate
the Chickasaws, but he did succeed in forcing them to sue
for peace. The English, afraid that the French might attack
Carolina, put brakes on their trading activity,

and the

Chickasaws offered to deliver the Natchez refugees to the
French.

Bienville insisted that the Chickasaws oust all the

English traders from their lands and delayed the negotiation
until

it became clear that the French could no

longer

prevail upon the Choctaws to continue the campaign.35
The peace with the Chickasaws would not last, and the
failure of the French to supply their Choctaw allies with
merchandise at a competitive price soon provoked a Choctaw
rebellion

in which

Frenchmen

were

killed.36

Governor

Vaudreuil who replaced Bienville in 1743 put a price on Red
Shoe's head, but by the time the rebel Choctaw chief was
assassinated in June 1747, a civil war had broken out among

34Woods, Indian Relations. 135-38.
35Ibid., 144-46; "Canelle's Journal of Campaign against
the Chickasaws," August 1742 in MPA:FD 4:199-201.
36Vaudreuil to Beauchamps, August 28, 1746 and Speech to
the Choctaw Tribe Concerning the Assassination of Three
Frenchmen by Red Shoe on August 14, HM LO 9, III, 213-215;
Galloway, "Choctaw Factionalism and Civil War," 310.

221

the Choctaw tribes between the Eastern villages loyal to the
French and the Western villages which continued to welcome
English traders.37

Vaudreuil and his old captains worked

to achieve the reunification of the Choctaw nation and the
exclusion of English traders,38 but the costs of providing
increased presents for the Choctaw chiefs and of subsidizing
the trade in deerskins proved more than the king was willing
to bear.
The objectives of restoring the honor of French arms
and establishing Louisiana as a productive colony provided
the justification for increasing royal expenditures.

The

crown had accepted financial responsibility for the colony,
but Maurepas insisted on strict accountability for every
dime

expended.39

Bienville,

Vaudreuil,

and the

Jesuit

missionaries insisted that they could accomplish the task at
the least possible cost by securing the friendship and

37Vaudreuil to Maurepas, March 15 and May 10, 1747 and
Louboey to Maurepas, February 16, 1748, MPA;FD 4:305, 310,
312; Vaudreuil to Maurepas, November 5, 1748, HM LO 147
contains a detailed review of Red Shoe's actions prior to his
assassination and described the conflict between loyal
Choctaws and the rebel villages; See also Galloway, "Choctaw
Factionalism and Civil War," 310-23.
38Vaudreuil to Rouille, June 24, 1750 MPA:FD 5:47.
39Louis XV to Bienville, February 2, 173 2, MPA:FD 3:541,
546, 549-556; Louis XV to Bienville and Salmon, February 2,
1732, MPA:FD 3:558-576; Fregault, Grand Marquis. 184-187.
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cooperation

of

allied

Indian tribes.

The disgrace

of

Maurepas in 1749 led to his successor's attempt to rely more
on increased troops and less on Indian allies,

but the

financial drain on the king's treasury ultimately created
the gigantic gap between the king's interest and the welfare
of the colony that would eventually separate the king from
his people.40

While continuing to insist that the gap did

not exist, the governors and their old captains resorted to
using any means necessary for the survival of the colony.
They tried valiantly to bridge the gap,

but the

local

autonomy of the frontier posts proved to be more durable in
the long run than the patience of the French crown.
When

Vaudreuil

arrived

in

Louisiana

to

replace

Bienville as governor, he was greeted warmly even by the
Chickasaw chiefs who described the new governor's father,
Philippe de Rigaud —

governor of Canada, 1703-1725 —

the great chief of the northern Indians.

as

That title, the

chiefs maintained, belonged to the new Canadian governor of

40Beaudouin to Salmon, November 23, 1732, MPA:FD 1:155163; Vaudreuil to Beaudouin, December 19, 1745, HM LO 9, III,
185-189; Rouille to Vaudreuil, September 30, 1750, HM LO 234;
"Memoir for the King," MPA:FD 5:58-59; James Pritchard, Louis
XV's Navy.
1748-1762:___ A Study of Organization and
Administration (Montreal:
McGill-Queen's University Press,
1987), 3-9.
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Louisiana.41

Vaudreuil

made

plans

to

use

the

distribution of merchandise and presents to undermine the
authority of Red Shoe among the Choctaws.

The key to

controlling

the

France's

Indian

allies

lay

in

proper

distribution of merchandise, and the new governor faced a
tremendous problem when Lenormant de Mezy arrived to begin
his investigation of the financial practices of Salmon.
The man Maurepas chose to conduct the investigation had
established his reputation in Canada as a "gargon de merit."
He was ambitious and he had connections with the French
court as a relative of the husband of the future marquise de
Pompadour,

the king's mistress.42

Lenormant arrived in

Louisiana on October 15, 1744, and on January 6, Vaudreuil
reported to Maurepas that no one could be found who was more
qualified to establish order in the colony's finances.

Even

so, the governor cautioned that Lenormant needed knowledge
and experience of colonial affairs that would take at least
two or three years to develop.43

Guy Fregault believes

that Lenormant had only one objective:

to economize and

41Vaudreuil to Maurepas, February 12, 1744, HM LO 9, I,
17.
42Fregault, Grand Marquis. 190.
43Ibid.. 191-92; Vaudreuil to Maurepas, January 6, 1745,
HMLO 9, I, 53-56.
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replenish the royal funds.44

To check the negative cash

flow of royal funds he would raise prices and eliminate
profiteering.
Lenormant's determination to achieve these objectives
without concern for the effect that this policy would have
on France's

Indian allies brought him

into direct

and

immediate conflict with the governor, who relied on his old
captains to control and manage the tribes surrounding the
French posts which had been strategically located for that
purpose.

Over and over, Vaudreuil and his old captains

insisted that the security of the colony depended on the
Indian nations.

There were not enough French troops to

maintain tranquillity, and adequate supplies and merchandise
would be required to insure the loyalty of the Indian allies
andencourage them to campaign actively against the English
and

their Indian allies. The crucial connection between

supplies and the fidelity of Indian allies was graphically
expressed by Vaudreuil in a letter to Maurepas on April 1,
1746

in

which

the

governor

described

the

effect

Lenormant's "mistaken economies."
As the security of this colony depends upon the
[Indian] nations, I am
omitting nothing to
conciliate them with us, but also I must be
supported by means of the merchandise that the

44Fregault, Grand Marquis. 197.
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King sends for this purpose, rather than for it
to be at the disposition of the commissaries
general to favor with it whomsoever they see fit,
claiming that they have a right to do so as M.
Lenormant has done this year .... 45
Louboey,

in command at Mobile, had already expressed his

exasperation with Lenormant in a letter to Maurepas the
previous fall.

He reported the short speeches made by

several different Choctaw chiefs to acquaint the minister
with the grievances of Choctaw warriors and the efforts of
France's enemies
to penetrate their country, a purpose that they
do not lose sight of and the execution of which
they will finally be able to accomplish if we
allow the colony to lack the goods necessary to
prevent them from doing so, since the Indians are
not people to feed forever on promises, selfinterest being the only motive that makes them
act ....
Louboey's message was clear.

For France to occupy the vast

territory of Louisiana with "a handful of men," a steady
supply of goods was needed to preserve the loyalty of the
Choctaw nation.46

45MPA:FD 4:268.
46Louboey to Maurepas, October 6, 1745 in ibid.. 4:237.
For an analysis of the connection between generosity and
loyalty in Choctaw culture see Richard White, The Roots of
Dependency: Subsistence. Environment, and Social Change Among
the Choctaws. Pawnees, and Navaios (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1983), 41-43.
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Vaudreuil

had

already

explained

to

Maurepas

how

presents could be used effectively by distributing them to
loyal chiefs to shore up their authority and by reducing
and, ultimately, withholding them from a rebel chief such as
Red Shoe.

In February 1744, the governor assured Maurepas

that peace was possible if a supply of merchandise would be
made available at the same price charged by the English.
specified that the amount needed was 100,000
excess

of

the

normal

supply.47

Two

years

He

livres in
later

he

reiterated his conviction that the Choctaws would keep their
promises provided they did not lack merchandise.48
the

arrival

of Lenormant,

Vaudreuil

had

Before

complained

to

Maurepas that the Indians believed the French were poor and
unable to produce as well as the English.

In June 1744 the

warehouses were empty; by October the lack of merchandise
was an embarrassment.49

Repeated shortage of trade goods

provoked statements such as the following by disaffected
Choctaw chiefs reported by a French trader to Louboey and
passed on to Maurepas.

47Vaudreuil to Maurepas, February 12, 1744, MPA;FD 4:221223.
48Vaudreuil to Maurepas, April 1, 1746, M P A :FD 4:265.
49HM LO 9, I, 17, 25, 37.
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But for the English we would all be dead ....
Those are our genuine Frenchmen.
Neither the
length of the road nor the difficulty in bringing
us the things we need ever rebuffs them. They do
not let us lack anything ....
The red men ...
who are [French] allies and at their door go
without breeches, the women and the children have
no blankets to protect themselves against the
cold;
how would they manage to give us
merchandise, are we not far distant from them?50
When supply ships finally began to arrive, Lenormant not
only doubled the price of goods but refused to release the
presents and merchandise that Vaudreuil, Louboey, and the
commandants of Tombecbe and Toulouse so badly needed.
The King's Interest and the Welfare of the Service
While

Vaudreuil

was

complaining

about

Lenormant's

action increasing the cost of merchandise to the posts,
Maurepas received new evidence against Commandant Taillefer
proving embezzlement at Tombecbe in 1743.

On April 13,

1746, Maurepas addressed a letter to Vaudreuil and Lenormant
instructing

the

commissary

to cooperate

with

Vaudreuil

because discontent among the Indians had to be prevented.
The minister stressed, however, that post commanders served
their own interests and were in the habit of justifying
their actions as necessary for controlling the Indians.
Taillefer had violated his authority by imprisoning the

50Louboey to Maurepas, November 6, 1745 in M P A :FD 4:25455.

228

storekeeper and taking over his functions.

According to

Maurepas, this affair was neither reported nor punished.51
The king's interest required precautions against embezzle
ment, and Maurepas warned Vaudreuil that he had doubts about
the governor's ability to control expenses and stop abuses.
Nevertheless, Vaudreuil continued to rely on the old
captains.

On

January

2,

1744,

he

had

given

specific

instructions to Pierre Annibal de Velle, who had replaced
Taillefer at Tombecbe in 1743.

In accordance with the

king's intention, the storekeeper was ordered to make no
advances and allow no trade in the post.

He was required to

record and report the source of peltries and act on behalf
of the king as the sole trader in them.

Both the commandant

and the storekeeper were instructed to send detailed written
reports directly to Vaudreuil and Louboey.52 In February
the governor cautioned de Velle against private trading.

He

explained that the instructions for carrying on trade with
the Indians were "good for the service" and that it was not
his intention for de Velle to "lose any gratification due

51Maurepas to Vaudreuil and Lenormant, April 13, 1746, HM
LO 58.
52Vaudreuil to De Velle, January 2, 1744,
31-33

HM LO 9, III,
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him."53

But de Velle pleaded continually to be relieved

from his duties at a hardship post, and in 1744 he was
replaced

by

Pierre

Henri

d'Erneville,

who

was

allowed

certain trading privileges for taking over as commandant.
By November of that year, however, d'Erneville was ordered
to transfer "all instructions" to Frangois Marie Joseph
Hazeur

although the terms of Hazeur's "monopoly" were not

spelled out.54

The problems at the post were such that

Vaudreuil later insisted that Hazeur be compensated for his
trading losses incurred for the welfare of the service.55
On July

30,

1747,

Vaudreuil

instructed

Louboey

not

to

restrain Hazeur from trading. He authorized de Velle to
direct the trading operation and "to name the destination of
the agreed merchandise in keeping with the good of the
service."56

53Vaudreuil to de Velle, February 29, 1744 in ibid., Ill,
63.
54Vaudreuil to de Velle, June 25, 1744; July 30, 1744, HM
LO 9, III, 94, 101. Vaudreuil to D'Erneville, November 11,
1744 and November 29, 1745, HM LO 9, III, 144-45, 184.
Vaudreuil to Pere Baudouin, December 19, 1745, HM LO 9, III,
185-88.
55Vaudreuil to Maurepas, March 20, 1748, HM LO 116.
56Vaudreuil to Louboey, July 30, 1747, HM LO 9, III, 271277.
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Vaudreuil continued to promote the services of his old
captains.

Indeed, he defined and used the term ancien to

describe the special qualifications of a post commandant.
The term had been used by Penicaut to describe a Canadian
officer.

Perier too had used the term after the Natchez

massacre

to

described

describe

St.

Denis.

informed Maurepas that he had approved his request

to

Vaudreuil's
Rouille,

Denis

as

"old

commandant

letter of April

Maurepas's

an

Vaudreuil
he

St.

as

1744,

when

replace

Sieur de Blanc

In

28,

successor

as

captain"

at

1751

Natchitoches.57

to Antoine

minister

of

Louis

marine,

described the special qualifications for a commandant of the
Alabama Post (Fort Toulouse). Aware of the need to protect
the southeastern frontier against the incursions of the
English, the governor based his job description for the
prospective commandant on his objectives for the Alabama
Post.

The post required an officer experienced in Indian

relations with the ability to oversee the settlement of the
territory.
According to Vaudreuil, governing the Indians required
"consumate experience and special study." An effective post
commander had to have "knowledge of the Indian nations" as

57Vaudreuil to Maurepas,
49.

December 29,

1744, HM LO 9, I,
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well as "talents

...

for organizing settlements."

For

example, Vaudreuil recommended one Chevalier d'Orgon for the
job of Alabama Post commandant because he was

"an old

captain" with the knowledge and experience of governing the
Indians.

D'Orgon had the knowledge and experience to be an

effective post commandant, and Vaudreuil expected that "like
a good pere de famille." he would have the ability to govern
the "people who have settled there and who will settle
there."

Vaudreuil held up de Blanc, St. Denis's successor

at Natchitoches, as a model:

"As this post deserves special

attention, I think also that it would be advisable for his
Majesty to appoint a commanding officer there as at the
Natchitoches"

capable

of

controlling

both

Indians

and

settlers.58
Vaudreuil's reliance on old captains to command the
frontier posts was threatened first by Lenormant's refusal
to release supplies from the king's storehouse and later by
the determination of Rouille to close the Tombecbe Post.
When Lenormant was replaced by Michel de la Rouvilliere, the
governor exercised his right to order the distribution of
supplies, but expenses incurred during the Choctaw rebellion
ultimately led Rouille to resort to increasing the number of

58Vaudreuil to Rouille, April 28, 1751, M P A :FD 5:69-72.
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regular troops to eliminate the expense of supplying gifts
and trade goods to France's Choctaw allies.
Peace with the Chickasaws was at hand in January 1744,
but more presents and trade goods were necessary to supply
both the Choctaws and the Chickasaws.

Vaudreuil cautioned

Louboey that it was unwise to give presents to the English
partisans, but he

was confident that an

merchandise would

insure French success.

instructed

the

commandant

at Mobile

ample supply of
The governor

that

the

presents

expected with the arrival of the ship should be used only
for negotiations and that they would be supplied by the
storekeeper "on specific orders." Only loyal chiefs should
receive presents.

Louboey must refuse "with discretion,

those who favor the English."59

Vaudreuil could not give

Louboey any news about the arrival of the king's ship. In
June he wrote to de Velle that "no word had been received of
the

king's

embarrassing

ship"

and

observed that it

if something happened

to

would
it."

be

"very

Not

until

October 20 did Vaudreuil inform Louboey that the ship had
arrived.

Louboey had already reported complaints of Indian

chiefs who expressed doubts about the ability of the French
to produce goods as well as the English.

Now Vaudreuil

59Vaudreuil to Louboey, April 22, 1744, HM LO 9, III, 7778.
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proclaimed that the new shipment "should create a great
change in the attitude of French allies who ought to be
reproached for having shown such little confidence in the
promises made to them."60
It was at this critical juncture that Lenormant arrived
with a mandate to cut costs and increase revenues.

To

achieve these ends, he doubled the price of trade goods,
delayed deliveries to the outlying posts, and retroactively
reduced the value c-f the money with which the wages of
soldiers

and

artisans

were

paid.61

In

short,

the

commissary placed every conceivable obstacle in the way of
Vaudreuil's policy of maintaining peace by enriching post
commandants and their Indian allies.
Lenormant's measures gradually strangled the colonial
economy. The complaints began in October 1745, a year after
Lenormant's arrival, reached a shrill level in December 1745
and climaxed in 1746.
Louboey had filed his first formal complaint with
Maurepas in October 1745.
improve

the

colony,

Lenormant's changes would not

and they

"might

easily cause

some

60Vaudreuil to de Velle, June 25, 1744, HM LO 9, III, 95.
Vaudreuil to Louboey, October 20, 1744, 141.
61Fregault, Grand Mar q u i s . 198-201.
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dangerous

events

system."62

if

he

continued

to

insist

upon

his

Vaudreuil expressed his utter frustration to

the minister on October 30.

The governor stated that his

only intention was to meet the expectations expressed by
entrusting him with "the reins of this government."

For

this reason, it was imperative to render an account of the
"economies that M. Lenormant has thought it advisable to
make

in

the

different

consulting me."
prevented

posts

of

this

colony

without

Only the prudence of the post commandants

"deplorable

results"

that

could

lead

to

disaster.63
Vaudreuil politely described Lenormant as a "zealous
servant of the King and a man capable of performing the
duties of his office well, without considering anything but
his Majesty's interests."

However, his decision "to impose

[a profit of] 100 percent on the merchandise intended for
the subsistence of the posts" caused "dissatisfaction on the
part

of

the

Indians

and of the garrisons,

which

have

attempted to rise in revolt" or go over to the English or
the

Spaniards.

Only the prompt action of the Tombecbe

62Louboey to Maurepas, October 6, 1745, MPA;FD 4:240.
63Vaudreuil to Maurepas, October 30, 1745, MPA:FD 4:249251.

235

commandant prevented a mutiny "by sending to me the soldiers
who were suspected of being the
The

soldiers

had

most seditious.1,64

always

been

able

to

purchase

merchandise for a cost of fifty percent above the price
prevailing in France.
conducted

without

additional

costs

Trade with the Choctaws had been

adding
of

the

doing

surcharge
business

to

in

cover

the

the

colony.

Lenormant's attempt to stop the financial drain on the royal
treasury by raising prices to cover heavy transportation and
other costs ignored the threat of English competitors and
the

bargaining

power

of

the

Indians.

"This

system,"

Vaudreuil protested to the minister, "disgusts them, and I
do not see any posts where it is possible to introduce it
without running the risk of incurring the hostility of all
the nations of these places."65
Vaudreuil

carefully

explained

that

the

commissary

general had ordered the storekeepers to "refuse to issue
from

the

King's

warehouses

the

merchandise

that

the

commandants of these posts are often obliged to give the
Indians in cases in which the welfare of the service is

64I b i d .. 4:249.
65Ibid.
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involved."

The governor clearly described the disastrous

effects of Lenormant's "good intentions."
I am not at all surprised, my lord, that M.
Lenormant has not felt the difficulties that
existed in changing the practices established in
these different posts.
He has never been near
understanding the ways of the Indians and the
manner in which one must conduct oneself with
them, and in the time that he has been staying
here he has been too much occupied with
fulfilling his mission, which he is capable of
performing well, to have been able to acquire a
sufficiently perfect idea of the management of
these nations, so I have no ill feeling against
him for the savings that he has wished to make
and I think that that is the only motive that has
caused him to act in this way, so I do him this
justice, but because people sometimes wish to
conserve the interests of the King overmuch they
often incur greater expense, as would be the
result if the new practices continued longer.66
On November 29, 1745 Vaudreuil informed Beauchamps that
supplies
Tombecbe.

would

be

sent

without

delay

to

Alabama

and

The trade concession for the Choctaws had been

given to Hazeur and the prospects for peace in 1746 would be
good "if the necessary quantity and quality" of merchandise
was available.67 On December 19, Vaudreuil wrote to Pere
Baudouin that deliveries of larger quantities of trade goods
would give France the advantage in the competition with
England, "unless the obstacles Lenormant placed in the way

66Ibid.. 251.
67Vaudreuil to Beauchamps, November 29, 1745, HM LO 9,
III, 184-85.
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cannot

be

removed."68 The

next

Louboey that supplies en route
Alabama

had

been delayed

Lenormant."

day

Vaudreuil

notified

to Mobile for Tombecbe and

"due to the

intransigence

of

Vaudreuil fumed that the delay was the cause of

a new Choctaw revolt and grumbled that Lenormant was "an
unmanageable

man

with

whom

I

have

little

affinity

today."69
By January 6, the governor was insisting that Lenormant
must be replaced.

"Without his removal there can be no

success in governing the colony."

He, Vaudreuil, must be

given "the authority to control the merchandise from the
stores

for

the

posts.70

On

minister

that

troublesome"

requirements

January

28,

Lenormant

practice

consulting the governor.

of

of

the

Vaudreuil

continued
contacting

Indians

and

the

reported

to

the

"annoying

and

the
the

posts

without

Lenormant was seeking Maurepas's

approval by cutting expenses and saving the king money, but
his actions were clearly "prejudicial to the good of the

68Vaudreuil to Baudouin, December 19, 1745, HM LO 9, III,
185-86.
69Vaudreuil to Louboey, December 20, 1745, HM LO 9, III,
188.
70Vaudreuil to Maurepas, January 6, 1746, HM LO 9, I, 73.
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service

and

peace

of

the

colony."71

By

February

6,

Vaudreuil intimated that the commissary had expended for
personal

advantage

supplies

badly

needed

for

trade

to

maintain the loyalty of the Choctaw nation.72
According to Vaudreuil, Lenormant ignored "increased
demands for more supplies and merchandise." The commandants
probably suggested using force, but the governor informed
Maurepas that force would not be used "to obtain powder from
the stores for the posts" because of the "poor impression"
violence would make on "the public."73 Vaudreuil motivated
and secured the loyalty of his post commandants by allowing
them to engage in closely supervised trading activities,74
but his ability to control the old captains was

being

questioned at the very moment when the governor depended on
them to quell the Choctaw rebellion.
The year passed as Maurepas temporized and reminded
Vaudreuil

about

Taillefer affair.

past

abuses

in Canada

as well

as

the

The minister did advise Lenormant to

71January 28, 1746, HM LO 9, I, 74.
72February 6, 1746, ibid., 76.
73March 9, 1746, ibid., 78.
74Vaudreuil to de Velle, February 29, 1744, HM LO 9, III,
63; Vaudreuil to d'Erneville, November 11, 1744, HM LO 9, III,
144-45.
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cooperate with the governor to prevent discontent among the
Indians, but he also declared that "post commanders serve
their own interests," use the need for Indian control to
justify their actions, while they are actually motivated by
the

desire

Maurepas

to

"control

stressed

that

distribution
an

example

in

the

should

stores."

be

made

of

Taillefer to discourage other officers from abusing their
authority over the storekeepers.75 He reminded Vaudreuil
that Lenormant had uncovered evidence of embezzlement by
Taillefer at Tombecbe in 1743, and that it was clear that
the post commandant should not have been allowed to imprison
the storekeeper and take over his functions.76
The conflict between the two servants of the king was
clear.

Lenormant aimed to prevent the old captains in

command at Tombecbe from making a profit in the Indian trade
at the expense of the king.
officers,

however,

The governor and his military

justified

their

right

to

order

the

distribution of merchandise as a means of preserving the
colony by insuring the loyalty of France's Indian allies.
In November 1746, Vaudreuil pleaded with Maurepas to
send him instructions for dealing with the commissaries.

75Maurepas to Vaudreuil and Lenormant, April 13, 1746, HM
LO 58.
76Ibid.
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After calling Maurepas' attention, once again, to the fact
that Lenormant had been responsible for Red Shoe's success
in organizing the Choctaw revolt, the governor wrote:
I cannot conceal from you in this matter what I
think of it because of the pain that I feel over
it, or refrain from [requesting you] to send me
orders about the manner in which I must behave
with the commissaries general on such occasions.
Otherwise this colony will always be in a
position to suffer from [these quarrelings]
because of the small amount of progress that it
will be possible to make there. Those gentlemen
have no other intentions than to show you a
spirit of economy and an order of finance to
accomplish
their
ends,
without
troubling
themselves about the administration of the
government, with which they are not charged.77
Despite the fact that Maurepas had ignored his demand that
Lenormant be replaced,

the governor used every possible

method to convince the minister that his own policy and
methods promoted and advanced the colonial welfare and the
king's interests.
In

New

Orleans

on

the

night

of

March

14,

1747,

Lenormant was assaulted by a man he and several

other

witnesses identified as "Sieur Taillefer."

The commissary

sent his manservant for help, then drew his sword and began
to defend himself.78

It is possible that the young cadet

77November 20, 1746, MPA:FD 4:302.
78Henry P. Dart, "A Duel in the Dark in New Orleans on
March 14, 1747," Louisiana Historical Quarterly 13 (April
1930): 200-203.
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officer was the younger brother of Lieutenant Taillefer who
had been charged with embezzlement at Tombecbe.
possible that Vaudreuil was behind the assault.

It is also
The absence

of subsequent references to the case in the records of the
Superior Council suggests that someone may have ransacked
the files.79
simply

Fregault maintains, however, that the cadet

attacked

Lenormant

to

•

avenge

his

on

brother.

Whatever the reasons behind the attack, Lenormant took it as
evidence that he needed to be removed from his post.

Even

before the attack he had been pleading with Maurepas to take
him out of a country he did not love, but Maurepas insisted
that he stay until a suitable replacement could be found. In
March 1748 Lenormant finally received orders to go first to
St. Domingue and then to return to France.
the

minister

Senechal

informed
•

D'Auberville

Vaudreuil
would

that

serve

At the same time
Vincent-Guillaume

as

ft 1

ordonnateur.°~L

Michel de la Rouvilliere was appointed commissary general.
While struggling to retain the fidelity of the France's
Indian allies and coping with the fetters of Lenormant's new
system, the governor had requested instructions from the

79Ibid., 201.
80Fregault, Grand Marquis. 212.
81March 25, 1748, HM LO 123; Fregault, Grand Marauis.
212 .
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crown for occasions when the commissary-general interfered
with his actions to govern the colony.82 In a memoir dated
December 23, 1748 and addressed to the governor and Michel
de la Rouvilliere, Maurepas provided clear and detailed
guidelines. Maurepas was determined to reaffirm Vaudreuil's
authority to govern the colony, but he also insisted on
strict

financial

accountability and

the

elimination

of

abuses by post commandants who might use Indian policy to
control the distribution of merchandise. The pressure of a
tight budget weighed heavily upon the minister.
The

royal

instructions

of

1748

clearly

gave

the

governor the authority to override the commissary and his
storekeepers when necessary for the security of the colony.
Difference of opinion must not cause any dispute
between them. When they will not agree on a matter,
His Majesty wants a report of their respective
reasons.
However, if the disputed matter is
urgent and cannot wait for His Majesty's orders,
the governor's will shall prevail.83
The

king's

memoir

went

on

to

delineate

the

different

responsibilities of the two "chiefs of the colony."

The

governor had exclusive authority over the military and
anything regarding the dignity of command.

82Vaudreuil to Maurepas, November 20, 1746, MPA;FD 4:302.
83"Memoire du roi," in Lemieux,
Ordonnateur", 103-106.

"Office of Comissaire
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The governor will order the troops and militia
and see to their discipline and readiness when
called upon to serve.
For this effect, he must
be kept informed by the officers of the condition
of their troops and even enter into details with
them over their responsibility in maintaining
strict discipline.
Furthermore, he must see to
it that the officers commit no injustice, such as
withholding
flour
and pay,
against
their
soldiers; and if an officer is found guilty of
such, the governor must punish that offender
independently of the restitution ordered by the
'ordonnateur'.84
Governing the Indians and building fortifications were
the responsibility of the governor, but once construction
was approved by His Majesty,

"the execution will be the

common endeavor of the governor and 'ordonnateur'."85
The ordonnateur was responsible for everything having
to do with supplies, but provision for the governor to order
extraordinary expenditures during times of emergency was
also included in Michel's instructions.
The
administration
of
capital,
supplies,
ammunition, and generally all which pertains to
the warehouses and treasury of the colony are the
sole concern of the 'commissaire ordonnateur'.
No payment, sale, nor consumption will be made
without the consent of the ordonnateur.
If,
however, Vaudreuil decides on an extraordinary
expense for the service of the colony, His
Majesty commands Michel to order it; but he
commands Vaudreuil to make such expense only in

84I b i d .. 103-104.
85Ib i d . . 104.
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case of absolute necessity and to report on his
motives.86
The administration of justice was also the responsibility of
the ordonnateur. and Vaudreuil was warned not to interfere,
except to enforce the judgments rendered.

The governor and

ordonnateur were jointly responsible for increasing the
population

of

the

colony,

developing

agriculture

and

promoting commerce.87
By

the

time

Michel

de

la Rouvilliere

arrived

in

Louisiana in the summer of 1749,88 Louis XV had dismissed
Maurepas and replaced him with Rouille.

Rouille relied

heavily on the advice of experienced naval

intendants,

reestablished administrative control, and began the process
of

rebuilding

the

navy.89

Rouille

was

more

able

and

willing than Maurepas to avoid excessive dependence on
commandant traders and Indian allies by providing additional
troops,

but the expense ultimately proved more than the

crown was willing to bear.

86Ibid.. 105.
87Ibid.
88MPA:FD 5:28, n. 3.
89Pritchard, Louis XV's Navv. 7-9.
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The Defense of Tombecbe

The Tombecbe Post was
established by Bienville in
173 6 during the Chickasaw
Wars.

It was not as far

from New Orleans
Toulouse,
be

as Fort

but goods could

transported

in

large
# T . TO MB BC BE
FT. T O U L O U & 1

boats only during certain
times of the year, (see map
p. 245)

When ships arrived

late or unexpected delays
rT . * T - CO UIS

rendered

it

transport
times,

necessary

goods

costs

Tombecbe

had

at

to

other

escalated.
to

pe r io d

PAUITHIM ISLAND

be

maintained because it was
strategically located near
the

western

villages.

Choctaw

English traders

had easy access to the area
from the north,

Reprinted by permission from
Journal of Alabama Archeology
(vol. 28, no. 1, 1982)

and they

would no doubt establish a post nearby whenever the French
pulled out.

The reunification of the Choctaw nation after

Red Shoe's death in 1747 and the destruction of the

246

remaining rebel villages could be accomplished only by
rewarding the Choctaw chiefs who had been unwavering in
their loyalty to the French.

In 1749, Vaudreuil reminded

Rouille that he and Louboey had committed the French to
supply the Choctaw nation, and the reunited nation would
require even more goods and presents.90
Vaudreuil

persistently

argued

that

posts

such

as

Tombecbe could be maintained at little or no cost to the
king by granting trading monopolies.

The problem was to

keep an adequate supply of goods so that there would be no
need for the Choctaws to resort to the English.

To prevent

those holding the monopolies from abusing these privileges,
Vaudreuil had insisted to Maurepas that he would closely
supervise their trading activities.

In 1744 the governor

had demonstrated his willingness to grant trading privileges
to an old captain when necessary. When de Velle, Taillefer's
replacement

at

Tombecbe,

asked

to

be

relieved

of

his

"hardship post," in 1744, Vaudreuil sent d'Erneville to
Tombecbe and permitted him to trade in peltries. Vaudreuil
informed d'Erneville that sufficient merchandise would be
sent to Tombecbe for the peltry trade he carried on with the

90Vaudreuil to Rouille, March 3, 1749, M P A ;FD 5:19-21.
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Choctaws.91

Vaudreuil

expected

Hazeur,

who

relieved

d'Erneville in December, 1745, to use his trading monopoly
to support the garrison at Tombecbe and reward loyal Choctaw
chiefs.
Hazeur had been sent to Tombecbe to engage in trade and
provide an advantage for those chiefs who remained loyal to
the French during Red Shoe's rebellion.

Vaudreuil notified

Pere

to

Baudouin

that

Hazeur

intended

serve

traders

recommended by the priest and others whom he would choose.
Hazeur's plan called for enlisting the cooperation of two
gentlemen-cadets,

Ensign Chambly

de Rouville

and

Sieur

Canelle, with everyone working together for the good of the
service.92
The need to promote rather than discourage trading
activity at Tombecbe was stressed Vaudreuil in 1745 when he

91Vaudreuil to de Velle, June 25, 1744, HM LO 9, III, 95;
Vaudreuil to D'Erneville, November 11, 1744, HM LO. Ill, 144.
92Vaudreuil to Baudoin, December 19, 1745, HM LO 9, III,
185. On Canelle see "Canelle's Journal of Campaign Against the
Chickasaws," MPA:FD 4:199-201.
Villiers du Terrage defined
gentlemen-cadets as "young volunteers serving without pay,
without being enlisted, carrying the insignia of the company
and always remaining free to resign from the service. They
carried out the duties of soldiers except for fatigue duties
and passed through all the ranks of subalterns." MPA:FD 4:201,
n. 2.
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explained why Lenormant's system could not be implemented.
Tombecbe was
a post among the Choctaws to which we send
nothing but flour for the subsistence of the
garrison and which most frequently is in the
situation of lacking it so that this garrison
must necessarily trade in order to get a living,
and it is likewise important that it be in that
situation in order that the Indians may find a
market for their products.
We cannot carry on
trade there on [Lenormant's] basis without
running the risk of disgusting this nation with
the French, and it would ask for nothing better
than to have such pretexts in order to resort to
the English, as it has wished to do this year for
the same reason.93
The arguments for and against abandoning Tombecbe in
1749 must be examined within the context of the mutual
determination

of

the Rouille

and Vaudreuil

expenditures and eliminate abuses.

to

curtail

While serving as interim

commandant at Tombecbe in 1747, de Velle had promised "a
great quantity of merchandise to those who would rid us of
that monster (Red Shoe), who was the cause of the troubles
that have disturbed that nation.1’94 After the death of Red
Shoe, Alibamon Mingo, the most loyal and constant ally of
the French, petitioned Vaudreuil to restore the presents of
villages whose loyalty had been in question.

The Choctaw

chiefs, their spokesman said, lacked sufficient authority

93Vaudreuil to Maurepas, October 30, 1745, MPA:FD 4:250.
94Louboey to Maurepas, February 16, 1748, MPA:FD 4:312.
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over their warriors to prevent the insubordination of those
who

unwisely

resorted

to

the

English.

Vaudreuil

had

indicated that a prompt response to his demand for justice
after the death of the three Frenchmen would have prevented
the carnage of a civil war within the Choctaw nation.
governor

informed

Rouille

that

he

was

moved

by

The
their

sincerity and determination to enforce commitment to the
French.
Since I was satisfied with the attitude in which
I saw the Choctaws I decided to give presents to
the twenty-five villages that came to see me, and
as they gave us a most complete restitution, far
beyond what could be expected of an anarchic
nation whose rebels were supported by the
English, in addition to the ordinary present I
gave gratuities to those who brought me scalps,
those who were wounded, and those whom I
recognized as being the most distinguished by the
good conduct that they have observed and the
means that they have employed to cause us to
succeed in this affair.95
The Choctaw chiefs were permitted to meet the governor at
Mobile only rarely and at the governor's convenience, but
they did not have to travel far to bring their wives and
children to Tombecbe.

The commandant of the

fort was

obliged to entertain them and provide presents.96

95Vaudreuil to Rouille, March 3, 1749, ibid.. 5:19-20.
96Ibid.. 23.
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The governor admitted that closing the post would cut
expenses,97 but the unity and commitment of the Choctaw
nation were his top priorities.

The promises of presents

and merchandise by de Velle and Louboey had to be honored,
and to vacate Tombecbe at the wrong time would be like
pulling the rug out from under those Choctaw chiefs who had
demonstrated their loyalty to the French by punishing those
who had rebelled.
The guestion of abandoning Tombecbe reached a critical
point after the arrival of Michel during the summer of 1749.
A twenty-three page, joint report on the state of the colony
dated

August

1,

1749

reveals

that

there

was

a

brief

honeymoon period during which the governor and the new
commissary

professed

service."98

The

"cooperation

establishment

for
of

a

the

good

firm

of

the

basis

for

communication set the stage for a good interchange of ideas
on matters relating to provisions, warehouses, and justice.
The commissary recognized Vaudreuil's "wisdom and experience
of the country," which prompted him to defer to the governor
"concerning extraordinary expense."

97Ibid.. 22.
98Michel and Vaudreuil to Louis XV, August 1, 1749, HM LO
177.
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By January 1750, however, Michel requested specific
orders recognizing his authority over civil police matters.
He reminded Rouille that

protecting the

residents from

oppressive military officers was his official duty.

In the

same letter, he complained that he had not been summoned to
several councils held at the governor's house when Antoine
Chauvin Des Islets, a trader under Hazeur's monopoly at
Tombecbe, arrived with fourteen Choctaw Indians from the
western villages."

On July 2, Michel suggested that the

governor may have issued orders to the post commandants
instructing them not to discuss Indian affairs with the
commissary.100
Vaudreuil

and

his old

captains

clearly were

sidestepping any potential interference by the commissary.
Michel asked Rouille to intervene; otherwise, the governor
and military officers would keep him uninformed even about
matters pertaining to commercial activities
because of the facility that the governor has of
disposing of all the posts,
in which the
commandants, who are
all devoted to him, render
account to him alone
of all that they learn and
discover.101

"Michel to Rouille, January 17, 1750, MPA:FD 5:38
100Michel to Rouille, July 2, 1750, Ibid.. 52-53.
101Ibid.. 53.

Michel's complaints escalated along with the financial
expenditures of the colony, but Vaudreuil was in charge.
The governor managed to keep Tombecbe afloat past Michel's
death

in

1752

administration.

and

for

the

remainder

of

Rouille's

Vaudreuil admitted that the isolated post

created a heavy financial burden,

but it could not be

dismantled without undermining the alliance with the Choctaw
nation.

He expressed his willingness to comply with the

crown's intentions "not to increase the number of posts."
He

would

even

eliminate

unnecessary

posts

if

it were

possible, but the only practical solution in September 17 50
was to reduce expenses by taking advantage of deep water and
transporting supplies in large boats.

It was not possible

to abandon Tombecbe "until the Choctaw nation has entirely
reunited and until the troubles, which have prevailed there
for so long, have been quieted."

The suppression of the

last two rebel villages had to be postponed because of the
lack of food supplies.

Another obstacle to the fulfillment

of Choctaw promises was the Chickasaws who, though few in
number, did not "fail to provide the English with the means
of going safely to the Choctaws."102

102Vaudreuil to Rouille,

September 24,

1750,

Ibid.,

55.
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At the end of September, Rouille wrote Vaudreuil that
he would prefer to enforce the rule excluding officers from
trading to avoid the type of abuse that had been common in
Canada.

Nevertheless,

though

he

agreed

to

allow

the

governor to make other arrangements to stop the abuse of
trade

by

officers

and

commandants,

he

would

hold

him

responsible and require him to report on the conduct of
each.103

Four

days

later

he

wrote

again,

this

time

informing Vaudreuil that the king considered Tombecbe an
expensive and unnecessary post.
control were out of hand.

The expenses of Indian

It was imperative to prevent the

attempts by officers to profit from their position in the
posts.

By increasing the number of troops in the colony,

the crown was determined to "place the colony in a state of
defense and security and procure more inhabitants for its
development.1,104
A memoir written for the king in 1751 stressed the
importance of increasing troops.

The king was given an

outline of the provisions of the treaty negotiated with the
Choctaws and informed that Vaudreuil expected the colony to
"enjoy a tranquillity as regards the Indian nations that it

103Rouille to Vaudreuil, September 26, 1750, HM LO 228.
104Rouille to Vaudreuil,

September 30, 1750, HM LO 234.

254

has

not

had

establishment."

the

good

fortune

to

savor

since

its

The Chickasaws were now so few in number

that their nation could be destroyed by the Choctaws.
As long as the Choctaws remain faithful to us
they will overawe the other nations. They form
forty-two villages, which occupy at least forty
leagues of country and in which there are nearly
four thousand men bearing arms. They have always
been our allies.
The efforts that the English
have made at all times to corrupt this nation had
always been in vain until these latter times when
they had found the means of detaching from it the
villages of which mention has been made, and,
according to what M. de Vaudreuil writes, there
is reason to hope that it will remain in the same
attitude toward us.
The increase that his
Majesty has made in the troops of the colony will
especially contribute to restraining it.105^
The governor welcomed the increase in troop strength, but he
needed to convince the minister and the king that the new
recruits must be led by experienced officers who knew how to
control the Indians.
It was in his letter of January 12, 1751, sent along
with the news and provisions of the treaty with the Choctaws
that Vaudreuil described how Sieur de Grandpre,

a young

French officer in command at Tombecbe, actually learned and
applied the knowledge of governing the Indians.

Grandpre

fought "at the head" of the Choctaw warriors in raids on
rebel villages to set the stage for the successful peace

105"Memoir for the King," 1751, M P A :FD 5:58-59.
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negotiations.106
captains,

Using the methods of the old Canadian

Grandpre had promised presents and a steady,

dependable supply of trade goods. The loyal Choctaws who
raided the rebel villages expected to be rewarded with
merchandise distributed at the Tombecbe Post.

Rouille,

however, was determined to place more troops in fewer posts,
thereby eliminating the need and expense of depending on
Indian allies to defend the colony.107
Expecting to receive an order from the crown to close
Tombecbe,

Vaudreuil boldly explained why he intended to

postpone the execution of the king's command.

The loyal

Choctaw chiefs had "acted with ... firmness against their
own blood only upon the assurances that were given them that
we would support them against their enemies."
trusted

Vaudreuil

Tombecbe."

to

"preserve

for

them

The chiefs

the

post

of

A decision to close the post would be "contrary

to the welfare of the service" and would place the colony in
a worse predicament than the one from which it had just
escaped.

Vaudreuil begged Rouille to entreat the king "not

to be offended that I should suspend the execution of his
orders" when the order to withdraw from Tombecbe reached

106Vaudreuil to Rouille,

Ibid.,

60.

107Rouille to Vaudreuil,

September 30, 1750, HM LO 234.
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Louisiana.

The governor reiterated that there was no doubt

"that such an unexpected change will have the effect of
puzzling beyond all expression the Choctaws of the eastern
faction."

They "would think themselves ... abandoned and

sacrificed to the resentment of those of the west."

They

would immediately "call back the English to their country"
and become permanent enemies of the French.108
Vaudreuil ended his letter defending the continued
maintenance of Tombecbe by recommending Grandpre as the type
of officer who would keep expenses under control while
earnestly promoting the interests of the king.
In this command he incurs only the expenses that
are absolutely necessary, keeps his garrison
there in good order, and renders me the most
exact account of what is happening among the
different nations of this continent, with which
he is perfectly acquainted and by which he is
loved.109
Grandpre knew how to function as an essential link between
the king and his people living in and around the frontier
post.

This

young

Canadian

officer

had

acquired

and

demonstrated the knowledge and experience of governing the
Indians.
He is assuredly an officer [who is] capable and
very zealous for the service. The action that he

108I b i d . . 63-64.
109Vaudreuil to Rouille, January 12, 1751, M P A :FD 5:64.
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has just performed, of marching at the head of
our allies against the rebels with so much
prudence and firmness, proves this sufficiently.
Moreover, I have had the satisfaction of hearing
them say that it is to him that they are indebted
for the peace that they have just received and
for the advantages that they have won over their
enemies.110
The governor recommended that Grandpre be granted the Cross
of St. Louis.

Although by age he was not "one of the oldest

captains," the reward and recognition would give incentive
to other officers seeking "opportunities to distinguish
themselves. "11]Like La Salle,

Iberville, Bienville,

and Vaudreuil,

Grandpre spoke to the Indian leaders in the language of the
old

Canadian

increase

the

captains.
glory

Their common objective was

of the king by controlling

to

a vast

territory by enlisting Indian allies in the royal service.
The king, for his part, contracted to provide presents for
the Indian captains and trade goods for their people.

The

potential of sending a fleet of ships with soldiers and
weapons was the trump card in the game of
diplomacy played by the ancien capitaine.

intertribal

The very real

conflict of interest between the king and his people in the
New World reached a critical point when Rouille expressed

110Ibid.
111I b i d . , 5:65.
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his determination to increase the number of regular French
troops as a means of eliminating the crown's dependence on
the old captains and their Indian allies.

The governor

needed the resources of the king to maintain the loyalty and
service of the French and Indian frontier captains.

He

needed their loyalty and service to maintain control of the
colony.

Vaudreuil had to resist the crown to save the

colony.
The complaints of Michel during the winter of 1750 no
doubt reinforced Rouille's determination to bypass the old
captains and implement strict financial controls, but the
commissary was not permitted to impede the flow of trade
goods.

In January 1750, Michel tried to intervene when the

military commandant of New Orleans,
civilians

to

patronize

his

canteen

attempted to force
by

arresting

and

imprisoning those who were drinking and amusing themselves
in private homes.
Michel

When Vaudreuil refused to do anything,

informed Rouille that the

complains

with

good

reason."112

"public
In

June

is vexed
1751,

and

Michel

protested that officers engaged in the Choctaw trade enjoyed
excessive profits, causing the service to suffer.113

The

112Michel to Rouille, January 17, 1750, Ibid.. 37-38.
113Michel to Vaudreuil, June 9 and 10, 1751, HM LO 291
and 292.
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following month Vaudreuil reported that he was obliged to
order

Michel

to

release

merchandise

needed

by

the

commandants for gifts and trade.114 This time the governor
was determined not to allow the commissary to interfere with
his efforts to maintain the alliance of the reunited Choctaw
nation.
Increasing the number of troops could enhance the
exercise of royal sovereignty, but such action required a
greater financial expenditure than the crown was willing to
bear.

While Rouille pushed Vaudreuil to reduce expenses by

closing a "useless" post, the governor continued to use the
methods of the ancien capitaine for the good of the service.
In his letter of February 1, 1750, Vaudreuil had recalled
that during the Chickasaw Wars in 1736 and 1740, the French
were obliged to depend on their Choctaw allies to "avenge us
for the least insult."
circumstances

would

He suggested that these deplorable

persist

"until

it

pleases

you

to

persuade His Majesty to send to this colony sufficient
forces to act with firmness.115
increase

troop

strength

for

Still, the decision to

the purpose

of

curtailing

expenditures required to maintain the Indian trade would

114Vaudreuil to Rouille, July 20, 1751, M P A :FD 5:96.
115I b i d . . 5:44.
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alienate

the

Choctaws,

thereby

requiring

the

military

occupation of a vast territory.
In the long run, the most economical policy was to rely
on the old captains who could insure the loyalty of the
Choctaws by distributing merchandise supplied by the king.
By September the governor responded to Rouilie's demands to
stop trading abuses and reduce the enormous expenses of
Tombecbe by admitting that it does "cost the king something"
to use loyal Choctaws to avenge insults, but there was no
practical alternative.116
Nothing could please the old captains more than an
increase in troop strength, but Rouille's belief that it
would

eliminate the need

expenses

was mere

for trading posts

fantasy.

Between the

and reduce

last

year

of

Bienville's administration in 1743 and the last stages of
the Choctaw rebellion in 1748, annual royal expenditures for
the Louisiana colony had increased from 348,528 livres to
539,265.

For 1752, 1753, and 1754, the king's expenses

amounted

to

930,767,

respectively.117

By

887,205,
August

and
1753,

963,124

livres

Governor

Louis

Billouart, Chevalier de Kerlerec was reiterating all of the

116Vaudreuil to Rouille, September 24, 1750, ibid.. 5:56.
117
•
.
•
1
J-'Gayarre,
History
of Louisiana.
2:21, 47, 65, 73, 78.
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old arguments.

Supplies and trade goods would insure the

loyalty of the Choctaws.

When there was a shortage of goods

or the prices were too high, the English were there to stir
up trouble.

It was less expensive in the long run to

provide supplies in order to prevent expensive warfare.118
The governor would not admit that there was any gap
between the welfare of the service and that of the colony,
but he defended his determination to resist the commissary's
interference.

Vaudreuil insisted that he was motivated by

nothing but the good of the service.119

He had made every

effort to keep expenses down, but timing the arrival of
supplies from France so that provisions could be dispatched
to Tombecbe
expenses.120

in a single boat was the key to reducing
High

costs

resulted

when

a

shortage

of

supplies in the posts created the burden of feeding and
entertaining Indians who descended on Mobile.

Michel erred

118Kerlerec to Rouille, August 20, 1753, MPA:FD 5:129130.
1 1Q

»

•

For example, when he petitioned the crown to approve
his selection of Chevalier d'Orgon as commandant for the
Alabama Post, Vaudreuil insisted that he was not "susceptible
to partiality or to any influence that can be prejudicial to
[the service]. Vaudreuil to Rouille, April 28, 1751, MPA:FD
5:72.
120Vaudreuil to Rouille, January 12, 1751, M P A :FD 5:64.
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in ascribing the increased expenses to officers who meddled
with the warehouses.121
In July

1751,

the commissary unleashed his

verbal

tirade against Vaudreuil and his "Canadian creatures and
kinsmen," but as late as May of that year, he supported the
governor's opinion that any withdrawal from Tombecbe must be
gradual

and

carefully

planned.

The

arrival

of

reinforcements would strengthen the hand of Vaudreuil in
matters of alliance and defense, but the "Indians do not
lose sight of the presents that we are accustomed to give
them, which they regard as a charge that we have contracted
with them."122

On the basis of this

observation,

one

might have predicted that increasing the number of regular
troops would not reduce royal expenditures.
On the same day in July that the commissary drafted his
verbal

attack

against

Vaudreuil

and

his

kinsmen,

the

governor requested positive orders that would ensure the
delivery of the merchandise needed for France's

Indian

allies.
Permit me, if you please, my lord to have the
honor of remarking to you in this connection that

121Michel to Rouille, June 27, 1750; Michel to Rouille,
July 2, 1750, MPA:FD 5:51, 53.
122Vaudreuil and Michel to Rouille, May 21, 1751, ibid..
5:88.
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a door must either be open or shut, that is to
say that if we have no interest in keeping this
nation it is advisable to abandon it to the
English, who thirst only to get possession of it,
and that on the contrary if we must show it
consideration, for the reasons that I have had
the honor of reporting to you in my letter of the
twentieth of last April, to retain it in our
interests we have only ... the single method of
furnishing it its needs in order not to put it in
the position of obtaining them from other
sources, which is the surest [way] to alienate it
from us.123
Vaudreuil suggested that Michel himself recognized the need
to cultivate the good will of the Choctaw nation, but the
commissary was so blinded by egotism that he asserted his
authority

"without

considering

the

welfare

of

the

service.1,124
As
colonial

a

provincial

officer

governor

corps.

He

Vaudreuil
understood

commanded
the

the

connection

between loyalty and generosity, the importance of managing
needs and interests, and the determination of the crown to
reduce colonial expenses.

He refused to permit Michel to

manipulate the royal purse strings to undermine his ability
to control the colony.

Michel's complaints were testimony

to the fact that Vaudreuil relied on the old captains to
control miltary and financial activities in the posts.

123Vaudreuil to Rouille, July 20, 1751, Ibid.. 96.
124Ibid.
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Bienville and Vaudreuil relied heavily on the "old
captains" to control the frontier posts and repeatedly tried
to convince the king that his interest and that of the
colony were the same.
continued

to

coax

the

The governors and their captains
crown

to

finance

the

colonial

enterprise in the tradition of Iberville and La Salle.

The

Canadian governors of Louisiana resisted the crown's attempt
to

stem

the

financial

hemorrhage

by

permitting

the

commissary general to manipulate the royal purse strings.
My analysis of the correspondence relating to Lenormant
and Michel shows that Vaudreuil managed to prevent Michel
from interfering with his policy of providing gifts and
merchandise for France's Indian allies.

The fact that

Lenormant's interference had led to the Choctaw revolt gave
the

governor

leverage with

the minister,

and

Michel's

complaints can more accurately be interpreted as indicating
the commissary's frustration than as evidence of effective
interference with the governor's activities.125
Royal control of the colonial kinship network depended
on a steady flow of provisions and supplies.

The efforts of

125For the opposing view see Michael J.
Foret,
"Irresolution and Uncertainty: French Colonial Indian Policy,
1699-1763," M. A. Thesis,
University of Southwestern
Louisiana, 1982, 107.

265

the crown

to stem the

financial hemorrhage exposed

unbrigeable gap between the king and his people.

an

CHAPTER 8

The Commercial Kinship Network and the
Conciliar Bridge to the People

The royal commissaries insisted on strict financial
controls, but Lenormant and Michel were not the harbingers
of a modern financial system.
the death of Michel
successors

to

engage

The transfer of Lenormant and

actually opened the way for their
in

factional

family

politics

in

Louisiana, when the obsolete naval bureaucracy struggled
through the crisis precipitated by the poor performance of
the French navy in the Seven Years7 War and the territorial
losses of European colonial warfare.1 The Canadian family
network expanded to include the descendants of La Chaise,
and several men sent from France to serve on the Superior
Council married

into Canadian families.

The Louisiana

kinship system included heirs of councillors and financiers
as well as young military cadets who married into the old
Canadian family network.2

1See Pritchard, Louis XV7s Navy. 55-70, 206-211.
2Giraud, History 5:8, 181, 282-285; Carl A. Brasseaux,
Denis-Nicolas Foucault and the New Orleans Rebellion of 1768
(Ruston, La.: McGinty Publications, 1987), 60-61.
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Michel

began

asserting

his

authority

against

the

military officers when he accused the commandant of New
Orleans of harassing citizens who declined to patronize his
canteen.
against

Between January and July
the

governor's

restrictions

1750,

he

on his

struggled

efforts

to

communicate with post commandants and investigate their
trading activities.

For a long time, he had first-hand

information only about what was happening in New Orleans.
It was his duty to keep track of the merchandise distributed
to the different posts, and Vaudreuil continually ordered
him to send more supplies than he thought was necessary.

He

had,

on

of

course,

agreed

to

defer

to

Vaudreuil

extraordinary expenses pertaining to Indian affairs as he
had been instructed to do.3
By July 20, 1751, Michel was able to provide Rouille
with

detailed reports about the supplies requested for

Tombecbe, but what really precipitated his vehement verbal
attack

against Vaudreuil

D'Erneville affair.

and the old

captains

was

the

In July 1750, Michel had reported to

3,lMemoire du roi," December 23, 1748 in Lemieux,
"Office of Commissaire Ordonnateur," 105; Michel and
Vaudreuil to Louis XV, August 1, 1749, HM LO 177; Michel to
Rouille, January 17 and June 2, 1750, MPA:FD 5:37-38, 53;
Rouille to Vaudreuil, September 26, 1750, HM LO 243;
Vaudreuil to Michel, June 8, 1751, HM LO 290; Michel to
Vaudreuil, June 10, 1751, HM LO 292; Michel to Rouille, July
20, 1751, MPA:FD 5:98, 101-02.
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Rouille that the governor had neglected to inform him about
a certain trading expedition to Santa Fe.
only

denied

the

charge,

but

rejoined

Vaudreuil not

that

acknowledged the advantages of the enterprise.

Michel

had

The governor

was already irritated that Rouille would question his good
intentions when Michel took the side of the storekeeper in
a quarrel with Duplessy, his newly appointed commandant at
English Turn.
Orleans

Then,

Commandant)

one night when Membrede

(the New

D'Erneville,

colonial

and

other

officials were gathered at the governor's house, D'Erneville
insulted the commissary.4
A native of Basse-Normany, D'Erneville,

came as a

gentleman-cadet to the colony where he married the daughter
of Frangois Fleuriau, the attorney-general on the Superior
Council.

The elder Fleuriau had connections in the ministry

of the marine and the king's council

as a kinsman

of

Fleuriau de Morville, a relative of the keeper of the seals,
and de Morville's son, Fleuriau d'Armenonville, who served
briefly as marine minister.

Frangois and Antoine Brusle,

another member of the Superior Council, married into closely
related families.

Fleuriau had been the leader of the

4Fregault, Grand M a r q u i s . 294-299.
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faction that developed in opposition to La Chaise.5

By

marrying Pelagie Fleuriau, D'Erneville tapped into a kinship
network with deep colonial roots.
On June 17 D'Erneville responded to Michel's charges
concerning the incident at the governor's house.6 The next
day Michel described the incident in detail in his own
letter to Vaudreuil.

D'Erneville, he said, had called him

a "zero" in the presence of all the colonial officials.
Michel demanded that the governor intervene and render him
justice.

The governor replied rather bluntly that he "never

interferes in affairs between officers."7
A month after the climax of the D'Erneville affair,
Michel exploded his powder keg.

His letter of July 20

accused the governor of placing his private interest above
the interest of the king.

Moreover, Vaudreuil promoted and

protected the financial and trading interests of his friends
and kinsmen to the detriment of the colony.

Michel's

invective against Vaudreuil and his Canadian "creatures"
began with the Choctaw question.

With the old captains

enjoying the protection of Vaudreuil,

"a single Choctaw

50'Neill, Church and State. 181;
Giraud,
5:274-75, 291; Fregault, Grand Marquis. 298.

History

6D'Erneville to Vaudreuil, June 17, 1751, HM LO 294.
7Michel to Vaudreuil, June
Fregault, Grand Marquis. 300-301.

18,

1751,

Ibid.. 295;
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Indian in the colony will always be a cause of considerable
expense for the King."

The "devious devices" used to keep

the Choctaw nation in balance make it "necessary for us to
treat it with consideration."

Grandpre and Des Islets

arrived in New Orleans after the peace treaty went into
effect.

They made excuses about surplus merchandise which

they left in the hands of "the most imprudent and most
reckless of all the officers of the colony, and several
traders [who are] vagabonds and jailbirds."

Not only did

they leave this officer in command at Tombecbe, but they
requested an advance of 25,000 livres in merchandise that
they would be able to sell at a profit of 150 percent.

To

illustrate the devious devices, Michel enclosed letters to
indicate that the governor sometimes doubled the amount of
merchandise requested by the post commandant.8
Michel went on to explain that he simply had not been
able to oppose the
officers.

insatiable demands

of the military

Mere remarks about the prodigal allocation of the

king's resources brought "cabals and vexation" down on the
commissary.

Yet there was no doubt that the governor gained

a profit of 30 percent of the merchandise distributed at
Tombecbe and all the other posts as well.
must have proved

"M. Lenormant

it to you by his memoirs

and M.

8Michel to Rouille, July 20, 1751, M P A ;FD 5:97-98.
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Vaudreuil's sponsorship of the preceding commandants and
holders of monopolies.” All the posts are occupied by "his
Canadian creatures and his kinsmen and allies of himself or
of his wife."9
Michel's most serious charge was that eight soldiers
had deserted the Tombecbe Post because the flour sent to
Tombecbe was traded to the Indians, forcing the garrison to
eat corn.
absence

The soldiers had taken advantage of Grandpre's
to

desert.

The

situation

at

Tombecbe

was

considerably more complicated than Michel led Rouille to
believe, however.

The commissary did say that the deserters

had been apprehended by the Choctaws and that the Choctaw
demand for their pardon created a diplomatic incident, but
he did not explain why Imataha Mingo, Alibamon Mingo, and
about fifty other Indians petitioned the governor to spare
the lives of the deserters.

Michel would have Rouille

believe that the soldiers escaped from a garrison where they
had been forced to eat corn by the commandant and those who
held the trading monopoly.

In a speech reported by a trader

stationed at Tombecbe, Alibamon Mingo admitted that these
soldiers

"had

lost their

senses."10

Speeches made

in

9Ibid., 98-99.
10Dupumeux to [?Beauchamp], June 18, 1751, M P A :FD 5:8991.
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defense of the Frenchmen ignored the fact that the soldiers
had stolen the king's merchandise, stressing rather that
they had provided things needed by the Indians.
The soldiers deserved punishment for leaving their
posts, Alibamon Mingo was reported as saying, but Vaudreuil
should

overlook

the

wrong

that

had

been

consideration for his Choctaw "children."

done

out

of

"He can easily

imagine the infinite pain that it would give the Choctaws to
see the blood of people who every day bring them the things
they need, and that with great difficulty."
Frenchmen

dwelt

in the

"same cabin"

Because these

with their

Indian

brothers, the "great chief of the French" should not "refuse
his children the favor they ask of him."

The chief of the

Chichatalayas sent a gift of deer skins to the great chief
of the French along with the message that he had risked his
life "often enough for the service of the French to deserve
this pardon."11
In

his

explanation

of

the

Tombecbe

dessertions,

Vaudreuil explained to Rouille that the soldiers at Tombecbe
had to trade for a living.12

What created the diplomatic

1:LIbid.. 5:90-91.
12Vaudreuil to Rouille, July 20, 1751, MPA:FD 5:94;
Vaudreuil's letters to Commandant de Blanc and the trader de
la Ronde at Natchitoches clearly indicated that the governor
routinely regulated and protected the trading privileges of
certain individuals.
The governor's correspondence also

273

incident was that their status as soldiers subjected them to
the death penalty for desertion.
grant them a pardon.

Only the governor could

According to the Indian "captains" he

ought to do so for the sake of his "children." Michel, of
course, did not see it this way.

He would not concede that

the military officers he criticized should be permitted to
maintain their position as frontier post commandants by
practicing techniques handed down as a legacy of the old
Canadian Indian captains.13
Vaudreuil had recommended that Hazeur be protected in
his

losses for the good of the service.14

Michel now

suggested that the governor was willing to let the king bear
the expense for the poor judgment of commandants who chose
to leave their posts in charge of subordinates who might not
resist the efforts of the garrison to empty the storehouse.
All these gentlemen imagine that it is the King
who must bear the expense of their bad moves, and
in fact he does bear them, since they put it all
down in their accounts, which it is not possible
to correct in opposition to M. de Vaudreuil, who

demonstrates that the governor and his post commandants made
a conscious effort as officers of the crown to reward loyal
leaders and penalize rebels. Vaudreuil to de blanc, November
22, 1752, HM LO 406; Vaudreuil to de la Ronde, November 22,
1752, LO 408.
13Michel to Rouille, July 20, 1751, MPA:FD 5:99.
14Vaudreuil to Maurepas, March 20, 174 8, HM LO 116.
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serves them all as advocate to the detriment of
the King's interests.15
Michel went on to comment about the lack of discipline in
the colony in terms reminiscent of Pere Raphael's complaints
about the Bienvillists twenty-five years before.
knows

discipline,

soldier.

wrote

Michel,

"neither

No one

officer

nor

Every thing is permitted to the soldier, provided

that he drinks up his money at the canteen."16
Michel's

invective

against

the

governor

and

his

officers offers a glimpse at a protected economic enterprise
operating in the camouflaged,

colonial kinship network.

Everyone in New Orleans knew that the soldiers violated
police

regulations

by obtaining wine and

rum from the

canteen and reselling it to the blacks and Indians, but the
governor refused to do anything about it.

M. de Belisle

farmed the canteen, and Michel suspected that he paid off
the

major

governor's

of

the

wife

New

for

Orleans

the

troops

privilege.

as

well

as

He

charged

the
that

Vaudreuil had advanced Belisle ten thousand livres to buy
wine for the canteen.17

15Michel to Rouille, July 20, 1751, MPA:FD 5:100.
16Ibid.
17Ibid., 101, 104, n.7.
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Michel further alleged that the governor's wife also
profited from trade in the capital city.
She has business with everybody here and she
forces the merchants and individuals here to take
charge of her merchandise to sell it at the price
she fixes. She has a warehouse at her house of
all sorts of stuff, which her butler sells, and
when he is not there she takes up the measuring
rods herself.
The commissary went on to say that Vaudreuil knew all about
his wife's trading activities and that he derived revenue
from them.18
Michel went

on to report to the minister

another

example of how the governor and his old captains found
support for their trading monopolies even in the Superior
Council. Despite the fact that Michel held the position of
First Judge on the Council and shared with the governor the
responsibility for promoting commerce, he carried little
weight when the two highest ranking military officers and
the attorney-general were loyal supporters of Vaudreuil.
In the letter of July 20, Michel proposed to secure a
steady, daily supply of fish for the poor people and troops
of the city.

He had found a "contractor who promised to do

the fishing every day no matter what the weather and to sell
the fish at half the price at which it was formerly sold."
When word reached the New Orleans major about Michel's plan,

18Ibid.
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he

immediately

Raguet

and

monopoly.

conspired with

Attorney-General

Councillor
Fleuriau

to

Jean

Baptiste

protect

his

Raguet, whose father had arrived in Louisiana as

a clerk for the Superior Council in 1717, had even deeper
roots in the kinship network than did Fleuriau.19
Even before he presented his proposal, Michel reported,
the councillors told him on behalf of the governor that the
king's orders "forbade anyone whomsoever to take possession
of or to appropriate to himself any fishing or land, and
that everybody had the right to fish in this colony." The
commissary

upbraided

the

councillors

for

making

"representations to the governor" about a project that had
not yet been formally introduced.
about

the matter,

he

Surprised that they knew

asked who had

informed

them

and

protested that they had no right to discuss it with the
governor without speaking to him first.
councillors

away

and went

immediately

Michel sent the
to Vaudreuil

to

determine whether the governor had "authorized all these
procedures."

He

pleaded

with

Vaudreuil

to

prohibit

commercial fishing activities of the soldiers and protested
that it was his duty as commissary to confiscate their
fish.20

The

governor

19I b i d . , 102,
20Ib i d . , 102.

and

104, n. 8.

the

councillors,

however,

Ill

completely ignored the commissary.

Nothing changed despite

all he said and did.
The major still has his fish market for his
profit, which he is promoting to the detriment of
the other one by means of five or six soldiers
exempt from service throughout the year. What am
I saying? They have since attempted to force the
true fishmongers whom I have established there to
go every day and make a declaration of their fish
at
the guardhouse, and they have
declared
publicly that I was receiving a thousand piastres
from the proceeds from the fish21
By the end of 1751, the crown had decided to inject
more funds into maritime administration, but the integrity
of the French navy still depended on the bond of personal
loyalty that bolstered the unity of the officer corps and
linked the king to his people.

By the beginning of 1752,

Vaudreuil had weathered the crisis of the Choctaw rebellion.
He never lost the confidence of the king and his minister
even after resisting the intention of Rouille to close
Tombecbe.

The

old

captains

continued

to

rally

their

companies at his command.
In a letter to Rouille in January 1752,
expressed

his

commissaries

bewilderment

to cooperate

about

the

by releasing

refusal
the

Vaudreuil
of

the

merchandise

needed to promote good relations with the Indian tribes.
I have never clearly understood what could be the
reasons of the commissaries general in this

21Ibid.
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country for having raised so many objections up
to the present about the delivery
of this
merchandise unless they prefer to sell it among
the people, while the King's intention is that
this merchandise be used for the trade with the
Indians and that this is onlyan advance that he
is obliged to make for six months or
a year,
which is, moreover, indispensable, since it is
true that the traders can provide themselves with
stocks only from the King's warehouses, where
alone the merchandise can be found and the only
place by way of which we could arrive at
satisfying the Choctaw nation and thereby retain
it for ourselves if it is true that it is
important for this colony, as we shall find it as
soon as we wish to fathom the reasons for it and
to consider its advantages.22
The murder of Frenchmen by Red Shoe had beenavenged.
The Choctaw nation had demonstrated that it would meet its
obligations to the French.

Vaudreuil commanded the support

and loyalty of the king's people.

The real question was

whether the king and his commissaries were willing and able
to

"satisfy

[the Choctaw nation]

in the matter

of its

needs.1,23
Kerlerec, the Council, and the People

The divergent interest of crown and colony may well
have been at the root of Vaudreuil's troubles as governor of
Canada.24 They only became apparent, however, during the

22Vaudreuil to Rouille, January 28, 1752, Ibid., 5:11011 1 .

23Ibid., 113.
24Eccles,

France in A m e r i c a . 188-89.
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administration of Vaudreuil's successor, Louis Billouart de
Kerlerec, from 1753 to 1763.

Vaudreuil had mastered the

rhetoric of the old Canadian captains, but the determination
of

the

crown to eliminate the

"corruption"

of private

interest interfered with his ability to rally Indians and
Canadians

to the

increasing

funds

service of the king.
for

regular

troops

The

idea that

might

eliminate

dependance on Indians and old captains certainly wreaked
havoc in Louisiana under Kerlerec.
The new Louisiana governor lacked colonial roots, but
he

began

captain,

to use

Canadian rhetoric

he knew how important

confidence of his crew.

because

as

a naval

it was to maintain the

He began his term as governor with

a plea for popular support.

The neglect and indifference of

the crown made it all the more necessary for the governor to
do all he could to meet the needs of the people.

Under

Kerlerec, the good of the public began to overshadow the
service of the king.
By the time Kerlerec arrived, Michel was dead,

and

D'Auberville, who had served as interim ordonnateur in 1748,
once again took charge of the financial administration as
ordonnateur from 1752 to 1757.25

In March 1753, the new

25Marc de Villiers du Terrage, The Last Years of French
Louisiana, eds. Carl A. Brasseaux and Glenn R. Conrad,
trans. Hosea Philips (Lafayette, La.: Center for Louisiana
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governor reported to Rouille that he had "spent an entire
day"

with

new

settlers

at

representations of every sort."

English

Bend

"hearing

The settlers complained

about their flooded land and expressed doubts about their
ability to cultivate it.

They told him that Michel had

refused to give them the assistance that had been promised
to them.

Kerlerec decided to give the settlers

gratuities

in

provisions

proportional

to

their

"some
urgent

needs."26
In his effort to do something for the merchants of New
Orleans,

Kerlerec

also

informed

the minister

of

their

grievances.
I also cannot refrain from adding to you on this
subject that the late M. Michel, because of the
little attention that he gave to this matter, is
the sole cause of the bad faith that may prevail
here among the merchants.
Great partiality has
always been the basis of his own judgment and
very often that of the entire Council, which his
haughty disposition had subjugated and which has
almost always been browbeaten. At last his death
postponed the decision to leave this country
which a small number of good merchants had
made.27
The new governor worked hard to establish his position
at the head of the colony by seeking conciliar support for

Studies, 1982), 49.
26Kerlerec to Rouille, March 8, 1753, MPA:FD 5:121-22.
27Ibid.. 123.
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his decisions and consulting with the old officers.28

Not

until September 1754 did he report that he was forced to use
the term "order" for the first time in his relations with
the commissary.29
commissary

began

Kerlerec's serious problems with the
only in

1758 with the appointment

of

Vincent de Rochemore to replace D'Auberville as ordonnateur.
Although the neglect of the colony by the crown would be
Kerlerec's biggest problem, Rochemore's alliance with Simard
de Bellisle and D'Erneville was the greatest threat to the
governor's authority in the colony.
By the time Rochemore arrived, Kerlerec had won the
respect of the Indian chiefs by providing them with gifts
and supplies in the tradition of the ancien capitaine.
Kerlerec claimed to hear the voice of his people expressed
by the "chiefs and honored men" who represented the diverse
clans and companies of the lower Mississippi valley in
general

assemblies:

gatherings

"principal men of the nation."30
rage

of

the

public

of

all

of

village

chiefs

or

He thus used the "just

classes"

to

justify

his

intervention against Rochemore and his associates when, in
28Kerlerec to Jean Baptiste de Machault d'Arnouville,
September 15, 1754, Ibid., 147-49.
29Ibid., 148.
30See "Memoir on Indians by Kerlerec" December 12,
1758, MPA:FD: 5:218.
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1759, petitions signed by "the most notable inhabitants and
all

the merchants" of

New Orleans and Mobile asked him to

use

his authority" to

ensure "a free sale"of merchandise

confiscated by Rochemore and Bellisle.31
The

association of

Rochemore

with

"rascals"

who

promoted their private interests made it necessary for the
governor to intervene on behalf of the public and dismiss
with the king's approval those responsible for refusing to
follow his orders.

One of the "rascals" was Jean Baptiste

Destrehan, a land speculator who had accumulated property
worth 600,000 livres in a twelve-year period.32

Another

was d'Erneville, the officer who had insulted Michel,
the

governor was making his annual visit

Indian presents

at Mobile

in the March

While

to distribute
1759,

Bellisle

disobeyed Kerlerec's orders to receive any vessel carrying
food for the colony.

The refusal of the captain of a Dutch

ship to sell the cargo at the low price insisted upon by
Rochemore caused Bellisle to invoke a 1727 ordinance against
trading with cartel ships. A similar incident occurred three

31Kerlerec to Nicolas Rene Berryer, April 24, 17 59; to
Simards de Bellisle, April 9, 1759; "Report to Louis XV on
the Texel Affair; in Abraham Nasatir and James R. Mills,
eds. , Commerce and Contraband in New Orleans During the
French and Indian War (Cincinnati:
American Jewish
Archives, 1968), 59, 39-40, 162.
32Villiers du Terrage, Last Y e a r s . 100.
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months later with the arrival of the Three Brothers. It was
during the Three Brothers/s affair that Kerlerec sparked a
popular demonstration and supported his decision to release
the ship by calling a convocation of the people.33
spring of 1760,

In the

the crown responded by giving Kerlerec

"broad powers" which

"placed the ordonnateur completely

under his control."34
Kerlerec's principal difficulty was therefore not with
establishing his authority over the commissary in the eyes
of the crown.35

Rather, it was the governor's inability

to dominate the Superior Council and the powerful colonial
faction led by d'Erneville that proved to be his biggest
obstacle.

With the support of prominent military officers

engaged in the commercial kinship network, Rochemore was
able to defy Kerlerec not by virtue of his authority as
ordonnateur. but through an alliance with "captains" who
profited more by private trading carried on in opposition to
a

governor

distribute.

who

had

no

royal

patronage

or

goods

to

In March 1769, d'Erneville wrote to marine

minister Nicolas Rene Berryer accusing the governor and his

33Ibid., 103-104;
Contraband. 20, 34.

Nasatir

and Mills,

Commerce

and

34Villiers du Terrage, Last Years. 145.
35See, e.g., Berryer to Kerlerec. October 1, 1759 in
Commerce and Contraband. 150.

284

secretary, Titon de Silegue, of establishing partnerships
with the post commandants and enjoying the profits of their
economic enterprises.

Michel had made similar accusations

against Vaudreuil, but d'Erneville suggested that whereas
Vaudreuil had been "fond of this military corps," Kerlerec
was

a

charged

despot.36
the

The

governor

commissary
with

and

violating

prohibiting trade with cartel ships.

the

councillors

royal

ordinances

However, when Berryer

learned that the commissary had decided to enforce those
regulations only after the captain refused to sell the
merchandise at the price set by the commissary, he concluded
that Kerlerec had indeed acted in the interest of the king
and the colony by releasing the ship and permitting the
cargo to be sold at a price that would encourage other ships
to bring badly needed supplies into the colony.37
The Forsaken Children of the King

Kerlerec convinced the crown to recall Rochemore, but
the

naval

instability

defeats

of

the

Seven

Year's

War

produced

in the marine ministry which reflected the

disarray at the royal court.

Jean-Jacques-Blaise d'Abbadie

was sent to settle the king's accounts and liquidate the

36D'Erneville to Berryer, March 15, 1760, MPA;FD 5:245.
37Berryer to Kerlerec, October 1, 1759, and Report to
the King on the Texel Affair in Nasitir and Mills, eds. ,
Commerce and Contraband. 146-147, 152-54.
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French colonial enterprise in Louisiana.

By the time his

replacement arrived on June 29, 1763, Kerlerec had been
summoned to France to answer Rochemore's charges against
him.38
Desiring to shed the financial burden of Louisiana, the
crown decided to invest d'Abbadie with the authority of both
governor and comissaire-ordonnateur.39
the original,

The provisions of

secret "Act of Cession" to Spain had been

changed to exclude all of Louisiana east of the Mississippi
except

New

Orleans.

When

d'Abbadie

took

command

as

"commissary general and ordonnateur" in October 24, 1763, he
received
complaints

news

of

Pontiac's

rebellion

and

heard

the

of various Indian tribes before he received

clarification of his orders and an update on the original
"Act of Cession."40
On April 21, 1764, the French king had expressed his
hope

that

his

Spanish

cousin

would

provide

"for

the

prosperity and tranquillity of the inhabitants of the colony
of Louisiana" by giving "orders to his governor" to ensure
that the clergy and missionaries would continue to perform
their services for the colony.

Louis XV also expressed his

38Villiers du Terrage, Last Years. 172, 182.
39Ibid.. 180.
40Ibid.. 191-192.
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hope and expectation

"that the ordinary judges and the

Superior Council will continue to serve justice, according
to the laws, forms and customs of the colony."

The king

ordered d'Abbadie to "have this letter registered with the
Superior Council of New Orleans,

so that the different

estates of the colony may be informed of its contents, and
so that they may have recourse to it as needed"41
On September 30, the new governor acknowledged receipt
of the king's letter and reported that his "departure from
this colony cannot be as prompt as you assume."

The English

had been unable to take possession of the Illinois territory
and French troops could not be withdrawn before the arrival
of the Spanish governor.

Dealing with French settlers on

the banks of the Mississippi required "careful handling,
because of the Indians."

The transfer of territory from

France to Spain would take at least three months.

D'Abbadie

went on to say that it would be "necessary for the Spanish
to adopt French methods in governing the Indians" because
the English "will use all manner of means to win over the
Indian tribes."42

41Louis XV to d'Abbadie, April 21, 1764 in ibid., 225227.
42D'Abbadie to Choiseul,
225.

September 30,

1764 in Ibid.,
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The sudden death of d'Abbadie on February 4,

1765

brought Charles-Philippe Aubry to the helm as head of the
colony.

Denis-Nicolas

ordonnateur.43

Foucault

assumed

the

duties

of

As first judge of the Superior Council,

Foucault was closely associated with Nicolas Chauvin de
Lafreniere who in January 1765 convoked an assembly of
"delegates of all the parishes of lower Louisiana" which
sent Jean Milhet, a rich merchant and captain of the New
Orleans militia, on an embassy to France to petition the
king to "annul the act of cession of Louisiana."44

Milhet

may have departed for France before d'Abbadie died, but he
did not return until the end of 1767.45
In the meantime, Aubry and Foucault faced a massive
financial and political crisis.

Aubry did his best to

please the French, the English, and the Indians.46

Aubry

claimed to work "ceaselessly from morning till night."
complained that there was no money, no supplies,
commerce.

He

and no

"Everything falls on me, and I bear all the

43Brasseaux, Foucault. 41-42; Villiers du Terrage, Last
Years, 232.
44Villiers du Terrage, Last Years. 234-35.
45Ibid.. 234, 281.
46Ib i d . , 239.
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expenses."47

On

February

25,

1765,

he

reported

to

Choiseul that he would send "several small gifts" to Louis
St. Ange de Bellerive for the tribes that were "harassing"
the Illinois commandant "on all sides."

He explained that

he would like to "dispense with all expenditures."48

It

was in this atmosphere of penury and uncertainty that Aubry
had to deal with Indian rebels and French councillors and
merchants who slowly came to realize that the French king
had forsaken his children in Louisiana.
One of the many Indian chiefs who invaded New Orleans
during this period expressed his disgust to Aubry at hearing
"strange words" which he, at first, did not believe.

Not

only did the French give away the land where his people
lived to the English, but French traders were no longer
permitted to come into their villages. "We have learned also
that you,

Frenchman

(sic) , whom we

believed

to

be

so

powerful and so brave, have obeyed [the English] like women,
letting us die from hunger and suffering."
Aubry for one thing only:

The chief asked

that he "replace the guns, the

47Aubry to Choiseul, April 24, 1765, in Carl A.
Brasseaux, ed., Quest for the Promised Land:
Official
Correspondence Relating to the First Acadian Migration to
Louisiana. 1764-1769 (Lafayette: University of Southwestern
Louisiana, 1989) 42.
See also Villiers du Terrage, Last
Years. 264-265.
48Aubry to Choiseul, February 25, 17 65, in Promised
Land. 30.
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powder, the tomahawks, and the knives that we expended in
fighting with you."

He then expressed his rage at the

Englishmen who heard his speech.49
Chariot Kaske, a Shawnee chief, returned to Illinois
from New Orleans to form an alliance with French traders to
continue to resist the English occupation of the Illinois
country after Pontiac suffered military defeat and could no
longer command the allegiance of the Indian confederation.
Presenting

himself

to

the

French

governor

as

"a

representative of the Shawnee 'great chief,' seeking aid
from

his

father,"

Chariot

expressed

"emperor" yielded the territory.
he told Aubry:
lands."50

"we are masters

surprise

that

the

Angry at being rejected,
of our bodies

and our

It was clear that the Indians were determined

to resist the English with or without the support of their
French "father."

After being rejected by the French, who

refused to provide protection or iron, Chariot returned to
Illinois, where he continued the struggle against British
occupation under the pretense that Aubry

"had promised

assistance and demanded attacks on the British."51

If

there were no powerful European protector to be had, the old

49Quoted in Villiers du Terrage, Last Years. 239.
500uoted in Richard White, Middle Ground. 300-303.
51Ibid., 301.
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Indian captains would invent one so as to overcome their
foes with powerful rhetoric which could sometimes be as
effective as a powerful military force.

They surely could

not seek the protection of the British who now refused to
provide them with the things they needed.
Conclusion

In spite of Aubry's efforts to dissuade them, the old
captains and their people had rebelled against the express
orders of the king.

They tried to excuse their disobedience

by arguing that the Spanish did not respect any of the laws,
established customs,

and usages.

The Council sent two

representatives to France to plead the colony's cause, but
Choiseul received the deputies only as private citizens.
Their pleas were ignored.52
The October 1768 "Memoir of the farmers and merchants
of

Louisiana"

Council

and

represented the position of the Superior

overflows with the

language

of the

ancien

capitaine. The Superior Council here pleadedwith the king
on

behalf of his people. The "magistrates

longer

refuse

to

oppressed people."

reply

to

the

plaintive

... could no
cries

of

Collectively they

authorized a suffering people to bring their
requests and their wishes to the king ... quite
convinced that their respectful attention for

52I b i d . , 305-11.

an
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their monarch would not be rejected by His
Majesty who is so benevolent, who is for his
people the earthly image of the savior ...
The Spanish governor Ulloa was a tyrant who had violated the
"promises" contained in the letters of April 21.53
From the very beginning of French exploration in the
Mississippi Valley, LaSalle and Iberville had cajoled the
king

into

supporting

the

colony

with

increasing his wealth, power, and glory.

the

prospect

of

After the death of

Louis XIV, France was in Glenn Conrad's words, a "reluctant
imperialist."54 When the Company of the Indies withdrew,
Maurepas

took

the

colony under his

wing,

but

he

kept

expenses down by promoting the frontier exchange economy
while vigilantly taking precautions against profiteering by
the governor and post commandants.
could

not pay the costs

France would not or

of Rouille's determination

increase the number of regular troops.

to

After Vaudreuil,

Kerlerec cultivated a broad base of popular support and
steered a course guided by the interests of the colony.
A bizarre situation resulted when the crown decided it
was no longer in the king's interest to support the colony.
53Ibid.. 315.
54Glenn Conrad,"Reluctant Imperialist: France in North
America" in Patricia K. Galloway, ed. , La Salle and His
Legacy:
Frenchmen and Indians in the Lower Mississippi
Valiev (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1982),
93-105.
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Aubry became the reluctant head of a colony that no longer
needed to compete with the English for Indian allies.
governed

in

the

name

and

service

of

transferred the territory to the king
governor was perceived as a tyrant.

a
of

king

who

Spain,

He
had

whose

The people rose up to

proclaim their liberty under the protection of a French
king, who had turned his back on his children.
Aubry, Ulloa, and Foucault were links of a chain that
had been broken.

The councillors who promised the people

that they would restore the linkage with the French king had
deep colonial roots as leaders of the many and varied
companies that the king termed the "estates" of the colony.
But the

Indians and the French

inhabitants would

only

recognize a sovereign who protected their lives and property
and supplied the goods they needed.

The Indians and the

habitants were ready to obey the strong, wealthy chief who
could ally with a "Frenchman" able and willing to supply
their needs.

The key to Spanish control would be to enlist

French captains in the service of the Spanish king.

CHAPTER 9

Posts and People:

French Captains in the Spanish Service

When the French crown transferred Louisiana to Spain in
1763,

the

French

governor

and

his

captain-commandants

continued to maintain the loyalty of the Indians.

Spain

hesitated to take formal possession of the orphan colony.
After the short-lived rebellion of 1768, General Alexander
O'Reilly spent less than eight months (from August 17, 1769
to March, 1770) securing Spanish control of the province and
installing Luis de Unzaga as the new governor.1 In New
Orleans O'Reilly prosecuted and punished the rebel leaders
and replaced the Superior Council with the Cabildo, but in
the outlying posts very little was changed.
The

general

appointed

former

commandants of the various posts.

French

officers

as

Only the Illinois post

was placed under a Spaniard, but even there Louis de St.
Ange of Bellerive continued in Spanish service because of

1Lawrence Kinnaird, ed., "Introduction," Spain in the
Mississippi Valiev. 1765-1794:
Translations from the
Spanish Archives in the Bancroft Library (Washington, D.C.:
American Historical Association,
1949),
2:xxi-xxiii.
Hereafter cited as SMV.
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his knowledge and experience governing the Indians.

In 173 6

Bienville had described St. Ange as the "son of an ancien
capitaine de milice

... vigorous in spirit and valor."2

More than twenty years later Kerlerec endorsed him as an
"excellent officer for the country and particularly for the
savages that he leads and guides as he wishes."3 Ulloa had
explained to Grimaldi that it was "necessary to keep him in
the same command which he has held not only on account of
his conduct but also because of the credit and reputation
which he has among the Indians."4
O'Reilly established a hierarchy of officials in the
frontier

posts

by placing

two

lieutenant

governors

in

strategic posts in charge of the French captains performing
their duties as commandants of the smaller posts.

On the

list of officials appointed by O'Reilly on February 4, 1770,
Pedro Piernas was listed as Lieutenant Governor of the
Ylinueses (Illinois) district with the rank of Captain of
Infantry while de Mezieres, ranked as a captain of militia,

2Etat-major, La., 1736, AC D2c 50:45.
3Apostille, 1759, AC D2c 50:vo63.
4Ulloa to Grimaldi, August 4, 1768, SMV 2:59; Bernardo
de Galvez reported to his uncle Jose on March 21, 1777 that
he had selected "the retired captain of infantry, formerly
of the French service, Don Pedro Francisco Volsay to replace
St. Ange as an advisor on Indian affairs after the death of
the old captain who "had a perfect knowledge of [the
Indians]." SMV 2:236.
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received the title "Lieutenant Governor of Natchitoches."
Simard de Bellisle,

selected as

commandant

of the

St.

Charles half of the German coast, was also ranked as a
captain of infantry.5
O'Reilly listed five post commandants as captains of
militia,

but two others held this position without any

military rank.

Marafret Laysarde,

commissioned as the

Rapides Post commandant, had been a merchant in New Orleans
before he served as storekeeper of the Arkansas Post.6
Fusilier

de

trader.7

la Clair at Opelousas

Their

appointment

was

a merchant

demonstrated

that

caoitaines were not necessarily military men.
their

posts

because

of their position

prominent colonial families.

at

anciens

They earned
the

head

of

loyalty to the

of

The fact that they had not

participated in any active way in the rebellion,
profession

and

Spanish crown,

their

and their

ability to govern the inhabitants and Indians in and around
their posts were the most important factors in O'Reilly's

5SMV 2:157.
6Stanley Faye, "The Arkansas Post of Louisiana: French
Domination," Louisiana Historical Quarterly 26 (July 1943),
716-19.
7Winston De Ville, Opelousas: The History of a French
and Spanish Military Post in America. 1716-1803 (Cottonport,
La.: Polyanthos, 1973), 71-72.
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decision to appoint them.8

Each qualified as an ancien

caoitaine and a good pere de famille. Athanase de Mezieres
was noted for his ability to bring the Indian tribes of
Louisiana and Texas into allegiance to the Spanish crown.
The

Rapides

Post

Natchitoches.
apprenticeship

actually
Several

at

Balthazar

French

Natchitoches

command at Arkansas,
example,

served

as

Villiers

dependency

officers

before

Pointe Coupee,
de

a

being

did

their

placed

or Opelousas.

moved

from

of

Balize

in
For
to

Natchitoches, then to Pointe Coupee. In 1772, he served as
acting lieutenant governor while de Mezieres traveled to
Europe.

He later served as commandant of the Arkansas Post

while Governor Galvez was aiding the Americans in their
revolt against England.9
The Vaugine family provides another example of the
special importance of the Natchitoches Post as a school for
post commandants. Etienne Martin de Vaugine de Nuisement was
the patriarch of a clan that was to dominate the Arkansas
Post by the time the Louisiana Territory was sold to the
United

States

in 1803.

In 1753 he married Antoinette

80 /Reilly to Arriaga, October 17 and December 10, 1769;
O'Reilly to Grimaldi, December 10, 1769 in in SMV 2:99, 10102, 127-29; See also Herbert Eugene Bolton, Athanase de
Mezieres and the Louisiana-Texas Frontier.
1768-1780
(Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark, 1914), 1:79.
9Bolton, M e z i e r e s . 1:100.
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Pelagie Petit de Livilliers, a descendant of Pierre Boucher
who had arrived in Canada in 1634.

Vaugine de Nuisement

established an indigo plantation in the Attakapas district
in 1764 and served in the Louisiana Infantry Regiment. From
1780 to 1786, he served as commandant of the Natchitoches
Post.

His son, Frangois, represented the United States when

the Arkansas Post came under American sovereignty.10
The primary purpose of the Spanish frontier posts was
to protect the North American border of the Spanish empire.
Natchitoches was the training ground for commandants whose
most important gualification was the knowledge of how to
control

the

Indians

and

surrounding their posts.

settlers

in

the

territory

By 1776 the number of Natchitoches

Indians living next to Fort St. Jean had dwindled to 10, but
the

census of Indian Tribes conducted that year counted

1443 Indians living along the northwest radius extending 135
leagues from the Natchitoches Post.11 French officials did
their best to convince the Choctaws and the Alabamas who
still numbered in the thousands to accept British dominion.
The

Osages

west

of

the

Mississippi

would

have

to

be

10,,The Vaugine Arkansas Connection," Grand Prairie
Historical Society Bulletin 21, no. 1 (April 1978) : 6-10.
1;LElizabeth S. Mills, comp., Natchitoches Colonials:
Censuses. Military Rolls, and Tax Lists. 1722-1803 (Chicago:
Adams, 1981), 21.
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controlled, and numerous tribes requested to migrate to the
west

after

the

British

took

possession

of

the

Ohio

valley.12
The Indian population may well have declined sharply
from what it had been in 1500, but their numbers were still
immense compared to the number of Europeans living in the
Mississippi Valley.13

Of course

it was always

in the

interest of the post commandants to exaggerate the Indian
threat, but the commercial and demographic advantages of the
British rendered reliable Indian alliances essential to the
process of controlling the Louisiana territory.

The ability

12,,D /Abbadie Journal," in Brasseaux, Comparative View.
113-124. See also Din and Nasatir, Imperial Osage. 54;
Bolton, Mezieres. 1:73.
130'Reilly himself pointed out that Pointe Coupee,
located fifty leagues upriver from New Orleans, was, except
for the capital city, the "only well populated district in
this Province." David K. Bjork, ed., "Documents Relating to
Alexandro O'Reilly and the Expedition Sent Out by Him from
New
Orleans
to
Natchitoches,
1769-1770,"
Louisiana
Historical Quarterly. 7 (1924), 21. A census dated September
2, 1771 indicates that the city of New Orleans and both
river banks downstream numbered 2,2 32 white inhabitants.
Pointe Coupee counted 548. The total of whites, free
negroes, negro and Indian slaves in the whole province was
only 11,344. The white population of Natchitoches and
Rapides barely exceeded 500. See SMV 2:196. A census of the
Arkansas Post reported by De Villiers on April 3, 1777
reveals that 509 Indians, 11 slaves, and 50 habitants were
counted in the area surrounding the post. (Archivo General
de Indias, Seville, Papeles Procedentes de la Isla de Cuba,
legajo 190:111-113. Microfilm copies, Center for Louisiana
Studies, University of Southwestern Louisiana at Lafayette.
Hereafter cited as AGI, PC, leg.)
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of a commandant to distribute gifts wisely "to the various
tribes ... harassing him on all sides"14 was required to
maintain the territorial integrity of Spanish Louisiana
against the British threat.

Aubry, the last French governor

of Louisiana, did his best to warn his Spanish counterpart
that most "of the tribes residing on this continent, both in
English

territory

fierce."15

The

and

in

ours,

"vast horde"

of

are

very

"powerful

populous

and

and warlike

tribes"16 would present the greatest challenge to Spanish
governors who would be responsible for occupying the vast
Louisiana

territory.

The

magnitude

of

the

task

of

controlling the Indians clearly indicates the important role
that post commandants and Indian captains would continue to
play during the Spanish period.17

14Aubry to Choiseul,
Land. 30.

February 25, 1765,

in Promised

15Aubry to Choiseul, March [probably May] 28, 17 66,
ibid., 63.
16Bolton, Mezieres. 1:67,70.
17In his Memoria of 177 6, Francisco Bouligny observed
that the innumerable "Indians who inhabit that immense
country" deserve special attention.
"Without their
friendship and good relations, it will not be easy for us to
ascend the [Mississippi] without employing superior forces
and making heavy expenditures. On the contrary, assuring
ourselves of their friendship, not only will we have free
passage of the river, but they themselves will be the guards
and defenders of our rights, impeding and containing any
insult or invasion which we might fear from the English."
Louisiana in 1776:
A Memoria of Francisco Bouligny. ed.
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In October 1769, O'Reilly reported to Minister of the
Indies Julian de Arriaga that he had taken possession of
Louisiana in the name of the Spanish king and received a
profession of loyalty from the inhabitants. Afterwards he
"summoned all the Indians living within sixty leagues" of
New Orleans.

When the Indians arrived at his house they

were received into his presence by "all the officers of the
garrison and the principal persons of the city."

The

greeting ceremony included saluting the governor with his
flag and smoking the peace pipe.18
Following this ceremony the Bayougoula chief spoke on
behalf of the Indians,

their chiefs and warriors.

He

addressed O'Reilly as the father of the Indians and the
"chief whom the great King of Spain has
possession of these lands."

sent to take

He had been careful to ask

permission to speak and he prudently did not speak too long
for fear of displeasing the "great chief of chiefs."

He

Gilbert C. Din (New Orleans: Jack D.L Holmes, 1977), 65.
Bouligny was an officer in the Fixed Havana Regiment when
O'Reilly developed disciplined militia units by using
regular soldiers to train local soldiers. He came to
Louisiana as O'Reilly's aide-de-camp and remained in
Louisiana to serve successively as lieutenant governor of
Louisiana, commandant of Natchez, commandant of the Fixed
Louisiana Regiment, and acting governor. Gilbert C. Din,
Francisco Bouligny: A Bourbon Soldier in Spanish Louisiana
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1993), 1718, 29, 55-102, 141-156, 178-205.
180'Reilly to Arriaga, October 17, 1769,

SMV 2:101.
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assured O'Reilly "that all these red men,

warriors and

chiefs of the tribes will be inviolably faithful to thee,
both here and in all the posts where there are people at thy
orders.1,19
O'Reilly then described to the Indians "the close bonds
of blood and alliance between the kings of Spain and France,
as a result of which this cession of the colony had been
made."

He made it clear that the friend of the French king

was a friend of the Spanish king and the enemy of one was
the enemy of the other.

He even encouraged the Indians to

treat the English well because they were friends of the
Spanish king, although "they were not related by the same
bonds as was the French nation."

The Indians would be given

their annual presents without delay and the king would
demand of them no "other gratitude than their constant
fidelity."

Then O'Reilly placed medals on each chief and

had them "kiss the royal effigy" before touching them on the
shoulders with his sword.20

In performing this ceremony

for the Indians surrounding his post of New Orleans O'Reilly
acted as a type of surrogate king.
When O'Reilly made a trip to Pointe Coupee on December
12,

1769,

he performed the same ritual.

19Ib i d . , 101-102.
2QI b i d .. 102.

He asked the
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inhabitants to assemble in certain designated places so that
he could "listen to all complaints which they may have,"
gather information about "the conditions of the country and
the number of inhabitants," establish militia companies, and
"issue regulations

by which they may berapidly united

for

defense in case of

Indian insults or in case this Governor

should need them for any other purpose."21 To outlying
posts which he could not visit personally, O'Reilly sent
emissaries as his representatives.
example,

On

November 16,

for

the General had sent two officers to Atakapas,

Opelousas, Natchitoches, and Rapides "to administer the oath
of

allegiance

to

the

inhabitants

and

to

obtain

all

information which I may need."22
The Discourse of de Mezieres
Athanase de Mezieres came to Louisiana as a young
cadet.

His mother

sisters

had

D'Andelot

was Marie Antoinette Clugny, and

established matrimonial

and

Montessons

families.

alliances
While

with

serving

his
the
in

Louisiana as ensign, lieutenant, and captain, de Mezieres
acquired the knowledge and experience needed to govern the
Indians.

He married Marie Petronille Feliciane, a daughter

21Bjork,

"Documents Relating to Alexandro O'Reilly,"

21-2 2 .

22I b i d . , 22.

303

of St. Denis.

His first marriage ended when Marie died in

1748, and sometime before the end of 1769 he established
another alliance by his marriage to Pelagie Fazende,

a

descendant of Jacques Fazende who had begun his lengthy
service on the Superior Council in 1722.23
Military rank and family connections spurred the career
of de Mezieres, but his years of living among the Indians,
his trading activities, and his linguistic ability earned
him his appointment by O'Reilly as lieutenant governor of
Natchitoches.

Prior to his Louisiana assignment O'Reilly

had organized a disciplined militia in Cuba as a means of
defending the sprawling Spanish empire at the least possible
cost.24

Similarly in Louisiana, he chose not to replace

the local captains with professional administrators from
Spain but rather to select those French captains whose
loyalty to the Spanish crown could be ensured by royal
favor.25

23Bolton, Athanase de Mezieres. 1:80-81.
24Allan J. Kuethe, Cuba. 1733-1815: Crown. Military,
and Society (Knoxville:
University of Tennessee Press,
1986), 25-49.
250'Reilly thus departed from standard Spanish colonial
practice.
See John Walton Caughey, Bernardo de Galvez in
Louisiana. 1776-1783 (Berkeley:
University of California
Press, 1934; repr., Gretna, La.: Pelican, 1972), 33.
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In December 1769, O'Reilly noted that de Mezieres had
"a good amount of capital of his own with which to answer
for his conduct, [and] much experience, and knowledge of the
Indians and the district of Natchitoches." By enlisting de
Mezieres's two eldest sons as cadets, O'Reilly "caused great
satisfaction to the father" and bound "him more firmly to
the

service."26 On his part,

de Mezieres

profess loyalty to the Spanish crown.

continued

to

In a letter to

Governor Luis de Unzaga written in June, 1770 after O'Reilly
departed Louisiana, he made it clear that he was glad to
"sacrifice my person and my goods" in the enterprise of
inducing the Osage Indians to sue for peace.27
O'Reilly issued explicit instructions to be followed by
the commandants of each post.

Unzaga would occasionally

reprimand de Mezieres for not abiding by the rules, but the
overriding need for government economy and the policy of
preserving the tranquillity and territorial integrity of the
Spanish empire without expense to the royal treasury meant

260'Reilly to Grimaldi, December 10, 1769, SMV

2:129-

30.
27De Mezieres to Unzaga Y Amezaga, June 27, 177 0, in
Bolton, Mezieres. 1:203.
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that de Mezieres actually exercised a substantial degree of
autonomy.28
De Mezieres's first concern as lieutenant governor of
the

Natchitoches

jurisdiction
whom

they

Post

was

with

the

traders

under

his

who set a bad example for the Indians among

lived

by

their

lack

of

discipline.29

De

Mezieres's "Instructions to the Traders" contains a clear
statement of the rules they were to follow and reflects
O'Reilly's policy of controlling the traders by placing them
under the firm authority of the post commandants. They in
turn would use the traders to control the Indians.
"Instructions

to the

Traders"

reflects

the

The

traditional

wisdom of the old Canadian captains and summarizes much of
the discourse that constitutes the essential features of the
Louisiana synthesis of Athanase de Mezieres.
De Mezieres began by informing the traders that his
captain-general enjoined him to "choose persons known for
their good habits and their zeal for the service of the
king."

Such persons were to be sent

into the

Indian

villages "to encourage the savages more and more to work,
and not to permit them to remain in an idleness dangerous
OR

.

.

.

■

.

^°Moore, Revolt in Louisiana. 83; Din and Nasatir,
Imperial Osacres. 62, 83-86.
29Din and Nasatir, Imperial Osaqes. 28, 62; see also
Moore, Revolt in Louisiana. 92-102.
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not only to their own interests but to those of his Majesty
as well.” After listing Grappe, Dupin, and Fazende Moriere
as the traders to whom he extended trading privileges, de
Mezieres outlined ten rules for them to follow.
Rule

one

required

that

the

traders

furnish

satisfactory, customary merchandise at the "ordinary trade
price.”
identified
supplies,

Rules two to five banned English merchandise,
the

friendly

nations

which

should

receive

and required the traders to arrest French or

Spanish vagabonds and confiscate their goods.

The sixth

rule, which required a pledge to send couriers to keep the
commandant informed of "any news of interest to the service
of his Majesty," indicates that the traders were to perform
a service for the post commandant that was similar to the
services performed by the commandants for the governor.

The

seventh rule clearly indicates that a licensed trader was
expected to perform the functions of an old captain and a
pere de famille in his assigned village.
They are likewise pledged to maintain peace and
entire harmony among the people allied with us;
and if any quarrel should occur between the
families or individuals of the villages where
they reside, or even among the neighboring
tribes, they are pledged to stifle it and to
conciliate the parties.
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Rule eight required the traders to
explain daily to the Indians the inestimable
advantage which they enjoy of being under the
happy dominion of his Majesty; that all the
French are charmed to live under the laws of so
august a monarch.
In addition, the traders were to assure the Indians that
"this great king considers them as his dearest subjects."
The king expected them "to submit to his will, but with no
other purpose than their own happiness."30
The discourse of Athanase de Mezieres is a window on
the important role of the ancien capitaine as a link between
the king and his people.

Licensed traders and loyal Indian

chiefs brought their families and tribes under the umbrella
of the king's authority.

They motivated their people to

work and fight in the service of the king, established peace
and tranquillity in their villages, and defended their local
districts against hostile invaders.

For his part, the king

was obligated to supply them with European merchandise and
to exercise the awesome power of his invincible arms on
their behalf.

The sacred pact that bound a people or

"company of savages"

to the king required each of his

subjects to sacrifice their persons and their property in
the service of the king.

In return the governor and the

30"Instructions
for the Traders of
D'Acquioux and Hiatasses Nations, February
Bolton, Mezieres, 1:148-50.

the Cadaux
4, 1770 in

308

post commandant were required to place the welfare of the
king's people above their own personal interests.31
De Mezieres served as a critical link in the new chain
that connected the Spanish king to his people in what is now
Louisiana,

Texas,

and Arkansas.

That link was tested,

however, when O'Reilly issued specific regulations requiring
de Mezieres to defer certain decisions to the governor.32
The conflict between de Mezieres's duty to abide by these
regulations and the necessity of maintaining good relations
with the Indians is illustrated by the case of Francisco
Morvan.
Before the transfer of Louisiana to Spain, Morvan had
killed a vagabond named Brindamur, then found asylum with
the Cadodachos where he remained for seven years and became
an adopted member of the tribe.

When de Mezieres ordered

the appearance of all traders and vagrants to appear before
him in 1770, the Cadodacho cacique Tinhioiien escorted him to
Natchitoches but asked that he be allowed to return to his

31De Mezieres to Unzaga Y Amezaga, October 23, 1770,
ibid., 1:188.
32Instructions to the lieutenant governor of the
Natchitoches district, November 24, 1769, AGI, PC, leg. 187
cited in David K. Bjork, ed., "Documents Relating to
Alexandro O'Reilly and An Expedition Sent Out by Him From
New
Orleans
to
Natchitoches,
1769-1770,"
Louisiana
Historical Quarterly. 7 (1924), 22, note 5.
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new "family."33 According to O'Reilly's regulations only
the governor could then release Morvan from de Mezieres's
custody.

However,

relationship

with

not

wanting

Tinhioiien,

de

to

jeopardize

Mezieres

his

convoked

an

assembly of those men who represented the most important
families in and around the community of the Natchitoches
Post.

They agreed with him that Morvan should be delivered

over to Tinhioiien.34

De Mezieres tried to justify his

action by deferring to the assembly, but Unzaga stiffly
reprimanded him

for

ignoring explicit

instructions

and

suggested that by exercising a pardon he was attempting to
steal the glory that properly belonged to the governor.
Unzaga complained that de Mezieres's action in convening the
council was not only contrary to Spanish law, but appeared
"in such a light that only your meritorious behaviour, good
conduct,

and

honest

intentions

absolve

you

from

criminality."35
De Mezieres had acted here more as a spokesman for his
people than as a agent of the king.

In a conflict between

the king's regulations and tribal custom he convoked a

33De Mezieres to Unzaga Y Amezaga,
Bolton, Mezieres. 1:160-162; n. 211.

May

15,

1770,

34Ibid.. 1:162.
35Unzaga Y Amezaga to De Mezieres, June 1, 1770, ibid.,
1:171-73.
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council of his own "tribe" to justify actions that would
insure the tranquillity of colonists and Indians alike.

His

language was that of the ancien capitaine.
Six months earlier O'Reilly had expressed his approval
of the language used by de Mezieres to instruct an Indian
chief concerning the duties and privileges of his people as
subjects of the Spanish king.
The language which you used, Sir, with the Indian
chief, is quite in conformity with my intentions
and with everything which I have said to you on
the
subject.
These are the sole expressions
which the service of the king and which the
public
welfare
can dictate
to
each post
commander.
In
this respectI am very
well
satisfied with the way in which you conduct
yourself and with the means which you have taken
to make known the mildness of the government and
the clemency ofthe king, and I hope that as a
result of your
careyou will experience the
happiest results.36
Nevertheless,

it

was

O'Reilly's

policy

which

placed

tremendous emphasis on providing for the happiness of the
king's

subjects

while

"maintaining

the

people

in

the

fidelity and submissiveness which are due to their sovereign
that

created

the

bind

in

which

de

Mezieres

found

360'Reilly to De Mezieres, January 23, 1770,
1:134.

ibid..

himself."37

37Establishment of the New Orleans Cabildo, November
25, 1769, SMV 2:108-10.

311

Governor Unzaga and the viceroy of Mexico continued to
make every effort to keep tabs on de Mezieres.
Pena,

a military officer serving as

Joseph de la

interim

lieutenant

governor while de Mezieres traveled among the Indian nations
in 1772, reported to the governor that de Mezieres had a
reputation

of

being

a

"man

of

two

words."38

After

accusing de Mezieres of "pure deceit," de la Pena charged
that the "only thing that has proved true is that the posts
and mails are being directed to the traders who are in the
nations, announcing his coming and giving new instructions,
retiring some from trade in which they are occupied and
establishing others to the injury of the former."39

In

1774 the viceroy instructed the governor of Texas not to
correspond with the governor of Natchitoches.40 Near the
end of the decade,

however,

Governor Galvez praised de

Mezieres's special merits when he reported to de Mezieres
that he had asked Theodoro de Croix the Commandant-General

*3 0

JODe La Pena to Unzaga Y Amezaga, September 14, 1772,
in Bolton, Mezieres. 2:16.
39Ibid.. 2:15.
40Antonio Maria de Bucareli to the Baron de Ripperda,
May 8, 1774, ibid., 2:51.
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of the Interior Provinces to afford him "the protection and
confidence which you merit.41
De la Pena was not the only Spaniard who denounced de
Mezieres.

Fray Jose Abad informed the viceroy that the

Natchitoches commandant was "one of the principal agents"
encouraging a scandalous trade which was the "sole cause of
the complete perdition of ... [the Indians'] souls and of
the destruction of the province."42

The implication was

that the traders promoted warfare and drunkenness among the
Indians so that they could profit from the sale of liquor
and weapons.

De la Pena and Fray Abad maintained that de

Mezieres abused his authority by protecting and encouraging
traders

who,

together

with

their

patron,

profited

by

corrupting and exploiting the Indians at the expense of the
public welfare and the tranquillity of the province.
Actually,

de

Mezieres,

who

was

willing

to

risk

everything in his service of the king, resorted to borrowing
money on his own personal credit in order to supply the
Indians
loyalty.

with

trade

goods

and

gifts

to

maintain

their

By the time he died, his accumulated capital was

41Bernardo de Galvez to de Mezieres, March 22, 1779,
ibid., 2:245.
42Fray Jose Abad to Bucareli,
2:67.

July

15,

1774,

ibid.,
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gone.43

Although he did have a vested interest in the

Indian trade,

and he was ready to resort to force when

necessary, like St. Denis, he preferred a relationship with
Indian allies who had such a profound respect

for the

captain and his king that they were willing to identify and
destroy

any

enemy who would dare

insult

such

a wise,

powerful, and benevolent father.
De

Mezieres's

Tavaiazes,
included

speech

Tuacanas,
in the

Cadodacho tribes,
ancien capitaine.

to

the

Iscanis,

report

on his

seven

and
1770

chiefs

Quitseys,

of

which

expedition

to

the
he
the

epitomizes the effective discourse of the
With it he effectively performed the

duties of an old captain and a good pere de famille. by
proclaiming to the errant Indians both the consequences of
remaining outside the great household of the Spanish king
and the rules and the advantages of joining it.
De Mezieres first sent word "by means of the friendly
tribes" that he had come to see the unruly chiefs at the
"command of the captain-general of Louisiana."
father,

The chief,

and protector of the Indians wished to receive

information about their willingness to make amends for the
"great abuse" that caused the king to suspend their aid.

De

43De Mezieres to Unzaga Y Amezaga, May 20, 1770, ibid..
1:200-201; Bolton, "Historical Introduction," ibid.. 1:83.
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Mezieres pointed to the Spanish flag and told them "that we
had

become

naturalized

as

our new

and

beloved monarch was the most powerful in the world,

and

emperor of the Indies."

Spaniards,

that

Although their misconduct had

angered the king, his clemency and magnanimity equalled his
immense power.

If they changed their behavior and proved

themselves deserving of his benevolence,

the king would

grant them the peace they sought. If, however, they failed
to "desist from robberies and hostilities ... they would
bring

upon

themselves

invincible arms."
example

and

the

imponderable

weight

of

his

De Mezieres reminded them of the "good

inviolable

fidelity

of

the

friendly

Cadodachos.44
De Mezieres next reminded the errant Indians that the
Osages to the north, the Comanches to the west, and the
Apaches to the south surrounded them, and that if they did
not make peace with the Spaniards to the east they would be
reduced to ashes by four horrible fires.

De Mezieres took

special care to convince the Indians that they could not
turn to the French to aid them against their enemies and the
Spanish.

He emphasized that

the very name of Frenchman had been erased and
forgotten; that we were Spaniards, and, as such,
44"Report by de Mezieres of the Expedition
Cadodachos," October 29, 1770, ibid., 1:209-210.
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as sensitive to the outrages committed as we
would be interested in avenging them as soon as
they might be resumed.45
At

the

end

of his

affectionately"

speech,

took

"the

de Mezieres
hand

of

"cordially

each

one

of

and
the

surrounding Spaniards," purposely demonstrating and making
"evident the close and sacred pact which binds us."46
The recalcitrant Indians made a number of excuses for
their refusal to comply with the conditions for making peace
with the Spanish king and his allies.

Upon being invited to

accompany de Mezieres to Los Adaes so that "the Spaniards
there, by whom they would be lovingly received, might report
it to the great captain at San Antonio, who would be much
pleased by such authentic testimony," they balked.

De

Mezieres suggested that they were afraid. He interpreted
their "irrational" behavior by explaining that they were
"savages." "Vengeance is not a defect, but a virtue" with
them he wrote, "and since in treachery they find the laurel
for their most heroic deeds, their material natures do not
imagine that there could be people endowed with more sublime
thoughts."47 In his "Instructions for the Traders of the
Cadaux

D'Acquioux

45Ibid.
46I b i d .. 1:211.
47I b i d . . 1:213.

and

Hiatasses

Nations,"

issued

the
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previous February, de Mezieres had stressed that the Indians
must be taught that the protection of the king is "assured
to all natives who comport themselves as becomes men."48
To become true Frenchmen, the Indians were expected to
abide by the rules. They would only acquire true honor in
the service of the king.

The old captain pleaded for the

rational behavior which would permit him to direct the
activities of the Indians in accordance with the king's
will.

The discourse of de Mezieres illustrates how the

contrast between reasoning men and brute beasts opened the
door for the old captain to present himself as both mediator
and master to the Indian tribes.
After the transfer of Louisiana to Spain , the exercise
of royal authority continued to depend on the old captain in
the frontier posts and inside the Indian villages.

Beneath

the superstructure of military and administrative titles,
lies the ancien caoitaine de milice. Carl Ekberg has shown
that the tension that developed between local power and
Spanish authority in colonial Ste. Genevieve was resolved
when the local militia captain, Frangois Valle II, became
town commandant and through his influence over the local

48Instructions for the Traders of the Cadaux D'Acquioux
and Hiatasses Nations, February 4, 1770, ibid.. 1:149.
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community

brought

it

into

Spanish

service.49

The

tranquillity and stability of frontier settlements such as
Ste. Genevieve depended to a great extent on the willingness
of the militia captain to support the commandant of the
post.

In the case of Ste. Genevieve, the tension ended when

the militia captain became the commandant.
Under the authority of the Valle militia captains, Ste.
Genevieve remained stable as the Louisiana territory was
transferred back to France and then to the United States in
1803.

In 1804, Jean-Baptiste Valle succeeded his brother

Frangois as commandant.
brother

"made

the

According to Ekberg, the younger

transition

from

Spanish

officer

to

American commandant of Ste. Genevieve without so much as
batting an eye."

Jean-Baptiste's son, Louis, attended West

Point, and "by returning to Ste. Genevieve he helped to
fulfill Thomas Jefferson's plan of turning the residents of
Upper Louisiana into Americans."50
local

autonomy,

and

the

Authority, stability,

benevolent

care

of

the

local

populace were the characteristic features of Ste. Genevieve
under the patriarchal authority of the Valle family.

The

United States inherited the services of the Valle patriarchs

49Carl J. Ekberg, Colonial Ste. Genevieve:____ An
Adventure on the Mississippi Frontier (Gerald, Missouri:
Patrice Press, 1985), 348.
50Ibid., 83-85.
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who presided over the Americanization of a post noted for
intensely local loyalties.
Don Juan Filhiol
A young French militia captain who entered the service
of Spain during the American Revolutionary War used the
technique and tactics of the ancien caoitaine to establish
Fort Miro on the Ouachita river.

He obtained a land grant

from the governor, led settlers into the virgin territory,
established a trading post, and convinced Governor Esteban
Miro to provide the things needed to build the fort.
Jean Filhiol's early military service in Louisiana was
rewarded by a grant of land as well as a commission as a
"Capitaine des Milice" who served as "Commandant Civil et
Militaire" of the Ouachita Post.51
On July 7, 1787, Filhiol convoked a local assembly at
his new post to tell them that the
governor-general has conferred on me the command
of this post
in order to safeguard the
tranquillity of the inhabitants who are dependant
and to look after all who contribute to their
greatest well-being.52

51James Fair Hardin, "Don Juan Filhiol and the Founding
of Fort Miro, the Modern Monroe, Louisiana," Louisiana
Historical Quarterly. 20 (1937): 464.
52"Address to an Assembly of Inhabitants of
Ouachita Post," July 7, 1787 in AGI, PC, leg. 188-c.

the

319

As a civil administrator Filhiol exercised royal authority
by performing the functions of mayor, sheriff, judge, jury,
and notary in his jurisdiction.
before

him

with

petitions

agricultural improvements,

Local inhabitants appeared

for

services

that

included

repair of the jail,

bills of

sale, and regulation of prices.53
Filhiol's correspondence with Governor Miro illustrates
how the captain functioned as a channel of royal authority.
A letter of August 25, 1790, for example, indicates that
difficulties of communication called for the exercise of
initiative on the part of the captain.

Filhiol informed the

governor that the people had requested a fort to provide a
refuge for families and a place of retreat for hunters and
those who worked in the wilderness.

He then explained that

he had made the decision to build the fort because he had
not yet received a response to his last letter, and it would
be too late in the season to begin after the governor's
reply, which he did not expect to receive until the next
spring.

Captain Filhiol also told Miro that he could depend

on the lieutenant of his company to help to construct the
fort if the local people failed to follow through on their
committment to the project.

The inhabitants proved to be

53See documents in Natchez Trace Collection, University
of Texas at Austin, Barker Archives, Box #1.
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somewhat obstinate, and Filhiol reported in October that the
Fort would not be completed until January.54
The relationship between the captain and the local
community depended to a large extent on what he could do for
the people and what the people were willing to do for him.
The

new

Spanish

rulers

held

their

French

captains

responsible for control of Indians, settling of disputes,
maintenance of enterprise, stalwart generalship, accurate
reportage and constant, subtle intertribal and inter-trader
diplomacy.

In short, the captain was required to lead or

direct all aspects of regional administration.

Filhiol

lived long enough to perform these services for the United
States as well.
The ancien capitaine clearly presented himself as the
pivotal link between the king and his people.

The effective

frontier commandant was a royal officer who could command
the loyalty of the fictive kinship groups surrounding his
post.

By offering protection, provision, and justice, the

old captain would lead his people to clothe themselves with
a new French or Spanish identity.

Taking command of a post

required the royal officer to forge a link in the chain by
winning the loyalty of the little captains or chiefs and

54Filhiol to Miro, August 25, 1790 and October 12,
1790, in Hardin, "Don Juan Filhiol and the Founding of Fort
Miro," 468-69.

establishing a good working relationship with the local
militia captain.

The use of words and force by the ancien

capitaine forged the strong link of the chain that tied the
people— families, tribes, and traders— of the captain's post
to the kingdom, confederacy, or federal republic which was
best able to defend and protect his people and supply their
needs.
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APPENDIX

THE BALLAD OF ST. DENIS*

In days of old, the king of
France
Sent a band of pioneers
Across the sea, to guard a
land
Beset with trials and tears
And hostile redmen who had
ruled
This strange great land for
years.
Then to old Louisiana
This band of brave men came
Led by a valiant Frenchman,
St. Denis was his name—
A bold commander who aspired
to prove his monarch's claim.
Day after day, he led his men
Thru this unsettled land
And when they grew morose or tired
"Twas he who cheered the band,
For he was gifted with the strength
Men need when they command.
One day St. Denis led his men
Thru forest gloom and shade
And there they came upon a camp
And Indian tribe had made—
And there they settled on a bluff
That rose above this glade.
And there they built, of sturdy pines,
A small fort, crude and low,

*Reprinted from Portre-Bobinski, Natchitoches. 1936.
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Upon the bluff that overlooked
The redmen's camp below,
Where lazily the waters of
The old Red River flow.
Not many moons had waxed and waned
Before this kindly man
Had won the secrets and the hearts
Of the wild neighboring clan,
Known as the tribe of Natchitoches,
A mighty, fearless clan.
The King of Spain had sent his men
Across the Rio Grande
And from Presidio del Norte
They threatened all the land
Where bold St. Denis was ensconced
With his intrepid band.
A rumor reached St. Denis' ears
The Spaniards planned to wage
War on the tribe of Natchitoches
So he, their friend and sage,
Set out upon his perilous way,
The Spaniards strength to gauge.
At last he reached the Spanish fort
Where ruthless foes of France
Were deep in making heartless schemes
Of their proposed advance
But here, alas! St. Denis fell
A victim of romance.
Strange are the hearts of fearless men
Strange are the ways of Fate—
St. Denis fell in love with one
Whose sire he could but hate—
Commandant of the gate!
The course of true love often runs
Upon a troublous way
But after trying times, Maria
Became his bride one day,
And they set out to join his men
Who waited far away.
There he rejoined his loyal men
And ably did defend
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The fort from many hostile troops
That sought his rule to end.
The redmen now were his allies—
And he, their truest friend.
He later founded, near this fort,
The quaint old trading post
Of Natchitoches, where good folks like
To sit around and boast
Of those exciting days when he
Was their forefathers' host.
He lived and fought and died, a man,
Beloved and revered-True patriot, who never knew
An enemy he feared—
True pioneer, whose name to us
Forever is endeared.
L'ENVOI
Sleep on, O valorous soldier,
And peaceful be thy rest!
Sleep on, 0 valiant pioneer,
Among God's happy blest
No nobler dust than thine lies on
Louisiana's breast!
GRACE TARLETON AARON
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